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Abstract
The IUC Independent Policy Report prepared by a group of lawyers at the International Uni-
versity College of Turin was presented at the meeting convened by the G8 Presidency in Rome on
May 12, 2009.
The IUC Independent Policy Report was drafted by the IUC Legal Standards Research Group,
organized by a Steering Committee chaired by Ugo Mattei (International University College of
Turin), coordinated by Edoardo Reviglio (International University College of Turin) and Giuseppe
Mastruzzo (International University College of Turin), and composed by Franco Bassanini (Uni-
versity of Rome “La Sapienza”), Guido Calabresi (Yale University), Antoine Garapon (Institut des
Hautes Etudes sur la Justice, Paris), and Tibor Varady (Central European University, Budapest).
Contributors include Eugenio Barcellona (Eastern Piedmont University), Mauro Bussani (Univer-
sity of Trieste), Giuliano G. Castellano (Ecole Polytechnique Preg/CRG), Moussa Djire´ (Bamako
University), Liu Guanghua (Lanzhou University), Golnoosh Hakimdavar (University of Turin),
John Haskell (SOAS), Jedidiah J. Kroncke (Yale Law School), Andrea Lollini (Bologna Univer-
sity), Alberto Lucarelli (Federico II University), Boris N. Mamlyuk, (University of Turin), Alberto
Monti (Bocconi University), Sergio Ariel Muro (Torquato di Tella University), Domenico Nicolo`
(Mediterranean University of Reggio Calabria), and Nicola Sartori (University of Michigan).
The IUC Independent Policy Report argues for a radical change of perspective, capable of restor-
ing the supremacy of the law over the economic system. It is not only about finance, nor is it only
about economics or policy. In this sense a transnational set of normative principles is needed in
order to establish a global legal system capable of controlling economic processes, rather than be-
ing controlled by them. Within this framework a series of policy proposals are presented in order
to effectively implement a new system of global standards.
∗This draft was presented at the seminar, Global Standards in the 21st Century, organized by
the G8 Presidency in Rome at the Ministry of Economy and Finance and Villa Madama on the
11-12th of May 2009. Special thanks to the IUC MSc candidates: Emanuele Ariano, Marco De
Morpurgo, Tomaso Ferrando, Giulia Massobrio, Yacouba Sabere Mounkoro, Sara Palmas, Jasna
Pocek, Ibrahim Shikaki, Francesco Vazzana; to the IUC Student Dean Jennifer Hilton; to the
Lanzhou student Ding Cheng; and to Ignazio Castellucci (University of Macau).
The current Western standard of living is unsustainable. Should the rest share the model of devel-
opment of the West, our planet will simply not be capable of resisting the growth in consumption
and pollution. Within this fundamental setting of scarcity in resources, using the rhetoric of the
end of history as the polar star for growth, development and ultimately happiness of the whole
world is simply a cynical lie. We argue here for the beginning of a necessary process aimed at
the development of a legal system that is much less about creating an effcient backbone for an
exploitive economy and much more about a vision of civilization, justice and respect where the
laws of nature and those of humans converge in a sustainable long-term philosophy.
Principles of justice, responsibility and long term environmental protection, rather than short term
economic contingency and strong interests must set the legal agenda. A new governance and
bottom-up inclusive integration of knowledge-based economies (wherever located), which is cru-
cial to the very survival of humankind, cannot happen without defning new terms of a widely
accepted standard of long term justice in the transnational context, hence the urgency to conceive
legitimate transnational legal structures and possibly some apparatus of “superlegality.”
The report is composed of fve sections. After having presented the pitfalls of the prevailing
theoretical apparatus, an alternative cultural grid upon which policy actions should be shaped
is presented. In this sense several normative proposals - revisiting the key characteristics of the
current system - are offered aiming at acquiring a wider perspective over the actual global crisis.
KEYWORDS: global legal standards, economic crisis, capitalism, global economic policy, legal
theory, finance, financial regulation
Erratum
This article was originally published under the series ‘Global Administrative Law Sympo-
sium.’ This was corrected on June 25, 2009 to ‘The Global Legal Standards Report.’
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. A Malthusian Picture  
 
Since September 2008, when the crisis started to hit hard in the United States, the 
ghost of Lord Keynes seems to have supplanted that of Von Hayek as the most 
cited hero of mainstream economics. In this Report, in order to justify and ground 
our policy claims, we wish to evoke Malthus a towering (in a way sinister) 
economist that should enter the hall of fame of those that from the past brutally 
point at the tremendous challenges in our way into the future.  
This Report is not the work of economists, and it is certainly not grounded 
in the mainstream. Nevertheless, from the perspective of a small but highly 
cosmopolitan community of lawyers experienced in approaching economic issues, 
we beg global policy makers to think of the current crisis as a Malthusian one. It 
is not “only” about finance, nor is it only about economics or policy. We submit 
that the truth is much more uncomfortable and dramatic. The current Western 
standard of living is unsustainable. Should the “rest” share the model of 
development of the “west” our planet will simply not be capable of resisting the 
growth in consumption and pollution. (Some observers believe we would need 
five Earths!).  
Within this fundamental setting of scarcity in resources, using the rhetoric 
of the “end of history” as the polar star for growth, development and ultimately 
happiness of the whole world is simply a cynical lie. Over time this lie has been 
supported by a thick ideological apparatus such as the one that even today 
proclaims its faith in technological innovation as a condition sufficient for 
survival. After twenty years, this fundamental lie should finally be recognized 
even by the “commanding heights” of the global economy. Technological 
innovation may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient. There is no long 
term future outside of a radical cultural shift banning the self-serving Western 
perspective thus letting a new vision unfold. A future can be gained only 
harvesting all cultural inputs available out there. Either the future is going be 
plural and cosmopolitan or it will not be.  
 
2. A  Science of Exploitation 
 
As Carlo Cipolla once said, our Western-lead development experience can be 
equated to that of a very smart child that finds the key to the safe-box where 
generations before him had hidden a family treasure. The kid quickly specializes 
in the best technique to have fun spending all the money he has found. In the 
West, beginning with the Industrial Revolution, we became increasingly skilled in 
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exploiting the treasure within a very short term horizon. We have even invented 
economics as a “science” grounding such exploitation (which unfortunately has 
never been only physical but also human), and our legal institutions have been 
developed to that end. Individualized property rights, freedom of contracts, 
corporations as a nexus of contracts, fault liability and many other private law 
institutions enforced by a professionally trained judiciary have all been developed 
as the most efficient institutional setting possible. Societies that have not fully 
deployed this toolkit have been singled out as “lacking” the rule of law. The legal 
and institutional aspects of the Washington Consensus, “good governance” and 
the “rule of law” have been imposed by means of “conditionality” often accepted, 
perhaps in good faith, by the leadership of many peripheral countries. 
 
3.  The Bankruptcy of Two Political Interpretations of the Same 
Approach 
 
Socialism and Capitalism have been the two most important, and apparently 
opposite, political models through which modernity developed its exploitive skills 
and unsustainable consumption behaviors. The leading epiphany of the former has 
collapsed in 1989. Almost exactly 20 years later we may be witnessing the 
collapse of the latter. We have no business here to stress the staggering historical 
parallels between the political role of Secretary General Gorbachev of PCUS at 
the beginning of the end of the Soviet Empire and that of President Obama of the 
United States at “the end of the end of history” as we have titled our Report. But 
we have a strong argument to make that a new truly cosmopolitan approach to the 
law and legal institutions is needed; that the current dominating global vision of 
legality and institutions must declare “intellectual bankruptcy”; and that a new 
beginning based on a genuine sharing of this planet among all its living 
inhabitants requires a completely new vision of the function and role of the law.  
We argue here for the beginning of a long, painful but necessary process 
aimed at the development of a legal system that is much less about creating an 
efficient backbone for an exploitive economy and much more about a vision of 
civilization, justice and respect where the laws of nature and those of the humans 
converge in a sustainable long term philosophy. 
The bankruptcy of the current global institutional system is clearly 
exposed by data on global inequality. Suffice to think that some 45% of the global 
working force lives on less than two dollars a day. Law is about justice and 
sustainability. Global law is about global justice and sustainability. No lawyer can 
observe this catastrophic state of affairs without a mote of rebellion.  
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4.  The Philosophy of This Report 
 
The aim of this Report is to translate such mote of outrage into some suggestions 
capable of making the law about the solution rather than about the problem as too 
often it has been in the modern historical experience. 
From our premises some consequences follow: we will only offer 
suggestions that are truly cosmopolitan, and that try to take into consideration the 
interests of humankind and not that of discrete States or aggregate of States. States 
may well be instruments to implement a global policy and a global vision, and 
most likely they are the most powerful instruments we can deploy. Nevertheless 
they must be a mean, and not an end. Consequently, we must not assume that the 
interest of states and those of their citizens are necessarily aligned. There are poor 
people in rich countries and rich people in poor countries. What we aim at is 
beginning the path towards the urgent construction of a “people’s rule of law” and 
not of a global legality serving state-based geo-political interests.  
Cosmopolitanism requires a “dialogical dialogue” and the immediate 
abandoning of any feeling of superiority. The fact that a society is more 
technologically advanced does not imply that it is culturally superior. 
Thus our effort has been to harvest “from the bottom up” a catalogue of 
sensitive issues that must be openly and humbly faced by the international elite to 
avoid coming up with more self-serving ideology. We submit that basic research 
is needed before jumping to the conclusion that global legal standards are useful 
or even only that they are possible.  
The IUC Report is based on a general global approach in search of a new 
paradigm of globalization and social relations among the inhabitants of the world. 
The new paradigm is based on communication, long term trust and respect, rather 
than on economic, financial and military might.  
 
5.  A Grand Mirror Project for the People’s Rule of Law 
 
Law, in both its local and global dimension, is mostly an intellectual construct. In 
a functional perspective, the one dominating today in the global conception, it is a 
public good, an infrastructure of communication between human groups as 
important as airlines or freeways. Despite the domination of this vision, we should 
not forget that law is also a cultural device, a common intellectual vocabulary 
(usually local in its nature) used to express the sense of justice shared within a 
discrete social group. This sense of justice shapes the local identities. Today we 
are living an intellectual earthquake that has destroyed the blind belief in law as a 
mere technological device. The challenge, beginning from the foundations of 
financial markets, all the way to the building of a global legal system capable of 
re-gaining control over the economy, is to shape a global identity around a grand 
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project of a global legal order. This project should be capable of making a sense 
of global justice emerge. And this new born cosmopolitan sense of justice should 
be deployed in organizing the institutional setting of the new millennium, after the 
“false start” of the end of history. 
The fallen Soviet model served in the last twenty years as a negative 
model, mirroring which the “end of history” could design itself. Privatization, a 
light State with the demise of welfare institutions and of public bureaucracies, the 
demise of politics in favor of technocracy and professionalism, a free market 
economy ideology, competition as a constitutional value, the demise of protective 
labor law, the celebration of flexibility, deregulation, outsourcing, downsizing and 
financial innovation, the theory of comparative advantages and many other 
notions have been capable of conquering the stage because at the antipodes of 
Soviet socialism. Today’s crisis will become a “civilizations saving” opportunity 
if we use the “the end of history” its single thought based on the Washington 
consensus as a mirror to learn from mistakes and develop a workable 
methodological platform for the daunting task that is ahead of us. Because it is an 
issue of global sustainability that motivates our work, ultimately an attempt to 
transmit this world to the generations that will follow us, the 
sustainable/unsustainable opposition might perhaps lead us in the current state of 
emergency to act quickly in the right direction, or at least to avoid moving in the 
wrong direction. 
 
6.  The Unsustainable Single Thought: Foundations of a Global 
Tragedy of the Commons 
 
The end of history has been characterized by a Western-centric single thought. It 
has, moreover, been characterized by much unilateralism by the most powerful 
States at the expenses of the weaker. We submit that both Western-centrism and 
unilateralism have been affecting the first policy reactions to the crisis. A tragedy 
of the commons is well in sight. In fact, the variety of un-coordinated domestic 
“stimulus packages” that have been made necessary by the U.S. unilateral 
approach have produced a rush to “business as usual” through encouraging 
consumption that goes exactly in the wrong direction. Like the over-grazing and 
over-fishing communities described in the famous paper by Garrett Harding, each 
country tries to stimulate as much as possible its own economy and to externalize 
the costs on everybody else. Indeed we should learn from the failures of the end of 
history that lower consumption and saving is a commendable attitude in the long 
run, and that only an agreed-upon gradual reduction and change of consumption 
habits, especially in G7 countries can avoid the “tragedy of the commons”.  
The rush to this tragic path leading to a foreseeable final crash has been 
triggered by ideological assumptions that today can be openly challenged even in 
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high places, but that until a few months ago were political taboos whose 
infringement would have produced total marginalization. The end of history and 
its assumptions were simply an ideological manifesto of non sustainable 
development.                        
We can now openly submit that the model of world exploitation led by 
unlimited profit is no longer sustainable.  We are now all aware that there is no 
such a thing as a “self-regulatory market”; markets are defined by law; laws are 
informed by values; prohibitions and incentives are crucial and unavoidable to 
take care of the long-term. The law should not be solely meant to advance the 
unprincipled animal spirits of the stronger market actors. The short term which 
leads to tremendous financial speculation is not sustainable. Incentives and 
regulations must point to the long term. 
The single thought ethnocentric approach is not sustainable. The law 
should be cosmopolitan, harvesting all the “best practices” wherever they are 
located. In coping with the crisis we must think plural: “single-thought” solutions 
are not sustainable. Pluralism of solutions/ paradigms is sustainable; civilization, 
what ultimately the law should strive to save, is not “natural”, but “historical” and 
“political”. 
 
7.  The Priority of a More Equal Distribution 
 
Redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor, through taxation and other 
direct legal measures were taboo at the end of history. Economics was about 
efficiency, not about distribution. Today we know that the poverty of too many 
and the wealth concentrated in the hands of too few is not sustainable. Poverty, 
like finance, is highly mobile and of “global” quality. The denial of elementary 
material rights is not internationally sustainable from the legal, moral and 
economic perspective because it triggers biblical migratory fluxes that produce 
tremendous deprivation and losses.  Sustainable global law must be inherently 
redistributive getting over that ideological taboo. These needs of long term 
redistribution must be the backbone of any regulation of global financial activity. 
Both the Soviet experience and the end of history have failed because of 
their highly materialistic spirit. But the human experience is not only about the 
physicality of the world. It is not only about having but also about being. It is 
about conceptual and moral sustainability that eventually translates into 
institutional settings. This is why we can hope that new sustainable ideas will 
bring about new sustainable institutions. 
The end of history banned genuinely critical thinking to develop a single 
thought that has been particularly infectious within the leading Economics 
departments especially in the United States. This is why today it is very important 
that genuine critical thinking be present in the international debate over the future 
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global institutional setting. We simply cannot afford to assume that “the law” 
might be part of the solution before thoroughly considering that, mostly because 
of its pedigree of exploitive ethnocentrism, there are good reasons to believe that 
it has been part of the global problem. Moreover, the very idea of law has been re-
invented at economist’s image. This is not sustainable because it reduces the law 
into a mere technological tool and legal thinking into mere social engineering 
banning distribution from the radar screen.  
Any attempt to redesign the global system, we argue, must now rethink the 
very foundations of the model of capitalism which, in the last two decades, has 
been legitimized by market fundamentalism, and whose drawbacks are finally 
beyond mainstream denial thanks to the present global crisis. The evidence of the 
failure of such a model is no more a question of ideology, of personal taste or 
political preferences. It is history itself which gives evidence of its failure. 
 
8.  Elements of a Sustainable Vision 
 
The global agenda should implement a reasonably utopian vision. 
We venture to submit that the economic emergency makes it legitimate to 
advance at least some broad political guidelines, logically and organically linked 
with each other, and aiming at the safeguard of the weaker rings of the chain of 
global survival. In openly acknowledging our perspective we need to point at the 
following: 
First, we side with the losers of social transformations.  
Second, a different relationship between the local and the global 
dimension must be outlined. Attempts to impose global law (or regulation, or 
standards) from the top down by means of more or less violent use of 
conditionality has failed and must be abandoned. From the local to the global 
should be the direction of a legitimate legal flux that is potentially a solution, and 
not itself a problem. 
Third, a genuinely cosmopolitan approach to globalization must grant to 
the periphery the same dignity of the center, and must place without hypocrisy 
responsibility where it belongs.  
Fourth, a long-term policy vision of world economics and finance must 
take into account the dramatic threat to a natural and balanced evolution of the 
planet produced by technological development coupled with short term 
individualism.  
Fifth, a capacity to outline a different timing for action must point out 
what must be done immediately, its limits, and the need to invest on the middle 
and long term horizons, in order to correct what are structural cyclical problems of 
the capitalist model of development that has prevailed in the near past.  
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Within these broad political beliefs we argue that the law should not serve 
as a mean to survive from crisis to crisis. Nor should it attempt to transfer as much 
as possible the social costs to the weaker majority of the people by socializing the 
losses and privatizing the gains. To the contrary, the law should serve to build 
new foundations of the world order, which will go in the direction of a sustainable 
and peaceful evolution of the planet. We are all living in the same home. There is 
no possibility for anybody to exit from this world; thus, we must stay all together 
and, if we wish to survive, we must look for what unites us and for what saves us, 
rather than for what divides us and what destroys us. Not an easy task, indeed. 
However, the only reasonable one if we wish to save the planet from global 
destruction and endless pains. 
 
9.  Sheltering the Innocent from the Consequences of the Crisis and 
Making the Culprit Disgorge the Gains  
 
In this broader perspective, the first task we are now facing is an urgent one: we 
need to avoid that the negative consequences of the current financial crisis keep 
spreading out, hitting even more the weaker parts of the global society. We need 
to propose a solution rapidly, answering to the short-run economic challenges 
faced by the crisis. Nevertheless, we shall not forget that this first ‘rapid-response’ 
solution to the crisis of the financial markets is just the first step of a long-run 
major political global project. It is thus imperative to overcame the logic of the 
”socialization of costs and the privatization of benefits”, which has been the 
dominant pattern of corporate capitalism and which should make the critical 
observer aware of the fundamental continuity of market centrism, even in the 
current tragic juncture as witnessed by the already mentioned first unilateral 
reactions such as the “stimulus package”. 
In approaching the current situation, the first and most urgent break with 
the Washington consensus must be found in the reconsideration of the relationship 
between capital and labor. A new governance of globalization and new models of 
corporate and fiscal governace are necessary to satisfy the needs of a fair 
distribution of the cooperative surplus. It is the law which needs to provide 
principles to distinguish between those that work for the community and those 
that work just for themselves. The era of the “trickle down” rhetoric that at the 
end of history has been deployed to legitimize, legally and ethically, the unlimited 
accumulation of fiscally irresponsible capital must be over. Accumulation in the 
hands of the very rich does not “naturally trickle to the poor” and this is true both 
within countries and across them. This is again a professional lie that must be 
exposed.  The era in which the law protects as if it were a fundamental human 
right the corporate multiplication of capital gains obtained by playing as in a 
Casino with the savings of honest and humble households and individuals is over.   
9
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There is a fundamental difference, and the global sense of justice can 
recognize it despite the staggering cultural variations of the global societies, 
between the savings of the hard working low and middle classes and the executive 
bonuses and stock options that are responsible of the doping of the international 
financial markets. Good principled law is about distinguishing and not hiding 
behind formalistic and biased visions of “the rule of law”, such as those recently 
evoked by members of the Obama administration when telling that they could do 
nothing about the AIG executive bonuses being in a “rule of law” country that 
protects contracts. 
 
10. Global Law is about Reconstructing the Public Sector and Protecting 
the Commons 
 
Global law, in whatever form and wherever produced, cannot be seen as an end in 
itself. It is a mean to protect interests that are worth being protected and that 
humankind collectively decides are worthy of such protection. The very fact of 
being an inhabitant of this planet, wherever located and no matter how humble in 
the circle of life, entitles all people to global respect and legal protection. This 
approach is reflected in the claim for a new broader vision of the commons and of 
the public goods. Not only individuals but also communities have rights. Not only 
humans but also nature, as recently recognized in the pivot experience of the new 
Ecuadorian Constitution. Not only current generations but also past generations 
are entitled to respect (cultural property protection). Future generations must be 
guaranteed a valuable inheritance and it is the law of today, if capable of 
restraining self-serving short-term visions, which might pose the political cultural 
and legal conditions for this protection to be effective. At the end of history, 
corporate corruptive behavior has determined the plunder of public property and 
its transfer by law in the private domain. Privatization and the rhetoric of 
superiority of the private sector have ben massively deployed and supported by 
mainstream legal and economic pundits, resulting in the transfer outside of any 
formal guarantee of massive amounts of the public treasure into private hands. 
This phenomenon affects not only tangible property but also most of the services 
and activities that are the province of the public sector because the logic of the 
profit is fundamentally incompatible with them. Welfare, social housing, 
education, healthcare, the care of the elderly but also prisons, energetic and 
foreign policy and even the war have been declared  “up for grab” with massive 
transfers of public resources into corporate hands.  
The long term consequences of these policies are devastating both in the 
industrial countries of the G7 and elsewhere. In the first context today there is 
simply no more public sector (with the possible exception of the War machinery) 
capable of directly acting and “doing things”. Public law has been reduced to a 
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system of rule making aimed at guaranteeing “competition” in the private delivery 
of public services. State owned economic players have been delegitimized as 
inefficient and privatized. Their role of social stabilization control and ultimately 
long term economic order (stable employment, social benefits etc.) has been 
ignored. Even when a political decision is made that public intervention is needed, 
such as in front of the financial crisis, paradoxically and dramatically the funds to 
act are not given to public actors (now inexistent) but handed out to investment 
banks, law firms and other private actors (very often in conflict of interest) 
making them continuously stronger than public agencies, in a pattern of continuity 
with the end of history that must be stopped now. The fundamental problem is 
that today the global public sector is too weak not too strong compared to the 
private sector. There are no global agencies strong enough to assert their authority 
on global private actors, and in the development of such global “biting” public 
sector we should invest. In peripheral countries, such professional and strong 
public sector that requires resources both physical and human never developed. Its 
absence has been the most serious reason of the rampant corruption and global 
corporate plunder and the WB and IMF have been proactively engaged through 
conditionality to preclude it from developing.  
At the end of the end of history, learning from these mistakes we should 
begin immediately an ambitious global process capable of re-publicize by means 
of the law, whatever has been privatized outside of very serious reasons. 
Reconstructing is harder than dismantling but the construction of a global public 
service (of course with local variations and articulations) is the most exciting 
challenge in making human capital unfold that is ahead of us.  Doing so does not 
pollute and is at the core of a long term transformation capable of digging the 
many “have nots” out of poverty while simultaneously limiting the few “haves” in 
the accumulative frenzy, and thus reaching a sustainable world where it is 
possible and worth living. 
This is why we need a fundamental rethinking of the very notion of rights, 
of public goods and of commons. It is only through the good public minded 
government of the public that we can find the resources to tame the excesses of 
the private greed.  
 
11. Taking Political Ideological and Legal Control of Global Economy 
 
To be sure, this urgent plan to save human civilization(s) by means of global law 
requires the development and the acceptance in the West (especially of the G7 
countries) of a different relationship between man and nature, between the 
individual and the community, between the haves and the have nots. In short we 
need the courage to declare bankrupt and overtake the Western liberal 
individualistic vision of freedom that has characterized the end of history and to 
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revamp of an organic, communitarian, pluralistic, quality based approach to the 
political economy. We need to begin a serious intellectual reconsideration of the 
myth of local and global “competition” and substitute it with a cosmopolitan and 
internationalist idea of “cooperation” and solidarity. A vision of brotherhood, 
solidarity, mutual help is still globally much more diffused than the extreme 
Western individualism and the survival of the fittest ideology of the end of 
history. Such vision makes life more worth to be lived and it is much more 
economically sustainable because it reduces the material needs those that can be 
satisfied only by exploiting and transforming energy.   
One may find clear indications that a new transnational set of normative 
principles is needed. And to be sure what is really at stake is the establishment of 
a global legal system capable to control economic processes, rather than being 
controlled by them. The needs of justice and survival of nature and of the 
communities inhabiting the planet, expressing themselves by legal forces, should 
determine public action, and not the needs of capitalistic accumulation expressing 
itself by market forces.  
Principles of justice, responsibility and long-term environmental 
protection, rather than short term economic contingency and strong interests must 
set the legal agenda. It could be argued that a new governance and bottom-up 
inclusive integration of knowledge-based economies (wherever located), which is 
crucial to the very survival of humankind, cannot happen without defining new 
terms of widely accepted standard of long term justice in the transnational context 
– hence the urgency to conceive legitimate transnational legal structures and 
possibly some apparatus of “superlegality”.  
The superlegal apparatus must refer to fundamental principles with which 
the behavior of political and economic players in the global scene must comply, 
and supply a series of standards and rules for evaluating the objectives and 
equanimity of the conduct of national and international actors, public and private. 
But rules and standards are not enough if not supported by a well articulated and 
organized (and therefore expensive) system of effective monitoring and 
enforcement.  
 
12.  The Political Demand for Change and Its Current Strength. A 
Global New Deal 
 
Voltaire once said that if we want good laws we must throw every single one that 
we had before in the trash-can and draft new ones. We are all too aware now, 
especially as lawyers, of the utopian and ultimately undesirable nature of this 
vision. Very thick institutional aggregates defeat the domain of the politically 
feasible and of legal fantasy. But let us still deploy it for once, because in 
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revolutionary conditions such as the ones we might be living in now there is a 
need to think ahead of time.    
The current financial crisis is a factor capable of producing a great change 
even in mainstream political positions across the world and at the international 
level. The losers of the social processes of the end of history are already taking the 
streets in the Western capitals. The desperate pressure on the wall of Fort West 
which is producing so much death and moral scandal might sooner rather than 
later be transformed from a humble begging of help into an organized and 
demographically winning assault. In the West millions of desperate and homeless 
poor might become a critical mass finally capable of politically organized 
assertion of their rights against the irresponsibility of the rich.  When the pie is 
one, a huge slice in the hands of the few leaves to the many only leftovers. And 
the tipping point in which neither rhetoric nor political repression are sufficient to 
maintain such injustice might arrive very soon.  
Avoiding this nightmare of violence should produce the political incentive 
for the powerful to get out very fast from the end of history and to start facing the 
political reality that a self serving dream cannot longer hide. This is why it is 
worth being intellectually courageous in proposing legal change. To be sure the 
need for a change in the colonial and neo-colonial international institutional order 
emerged from Bretton Woods and San Francisco has been “in the air” for quite 
long so far, but there was no effective political demand due to corruptive impact 
of capital on the electoral systems selecting the elites in the world. The crisis 
made the political demand for more justice finally effective. G7 countries have a 
choice. They can try to apply the “straight power” doctrine proposed by Secretary 
of State Kennan in 1946, according to which the defense of the privileges of the 
rich cannot afford to be impaired by democracy or rights talk and everything boils 
down to the brutal exercise of military might. Alternatively they can accept to 
enter among themselves and with the rest in a Global New Deal, in which the 
interests of  all the inhabitants of the world come first. In fact, with the global 
success of the weapon production industry and with the diffusion of its products 
the latter can be the only real alternative.  
 
13.  De-Globalization is not the Solution. A Genuine Idea of Legal 
Globalization is Required 
 
At the end of history, with globalization the dominance of Western single thought 
over the Rest is not only illegitimate, unjust, or immoral - it is not even an 
economically, socially and environmentally sustainable solution the get out of the 
well of poverty and injustice. It is actually an all mighty agency of production of 
poverty and injustice. But processes of change cannot be stopped and de-
globalization would not be a solution either.   
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Historically, the peoples of the world have been integrating into bigger and 
bigger communities and institutions (such as families, communities, villages, 
cities, states, and so on), so that our future history will be characterized by a 
growing important role of institutions at the global level. This is why we do not 
have to avoid, even less to fear, integration, but we have to work in order to make 
it happen, being as sustainable and just as possible for everyone. 
Given the need for global legal solutions, the crucial question is how and 
where to find them and how to implement them. Traditionally, legal answers to 
social problems generate from models elaborated in ‘contexts of production’ and 
exported to “contexts of reception” (with higher or lower degree of adaptation). 
Within this historical pattern, powerful and prestigious “producers” of global legal 
solutions, invariably located in the West, have been progressively closing their 
legal fantasy focusing only on their own highly professionalized “legal ways”. 
Clear failures of such models in the contexts of reception have been blamed on 
lacks on the receiving side, not on the flawed nature of the “exported” legal 
artifact or on the cultural and political violence of the transplantation process. 
This is the essence of Western universalism – of the belief of the inherent 
superiority of the “rule of law” and of its individualized underpinnings. 
Nor can one assume well intentioned naiveté in the process of Western 
legal expansion. Legalistic rhetoric has often been deployed with the conscious 
intention of pursuing  the interests of a few over the many. Also on the receiving 
side ruling elites (not only in the periphery but also in semiperipheral settings as 
Europe or Japan) have been blindly convinced (having attended Western 
academic institutions where critical thinking is marginal) of the equation between 
technological and cultural\legal superiority thus promoting the reception of 
dominant legal ways. Moreover, sometimes receptors have been more or less 
forced to adopt external solutions through mechanisms of conditionality. Other 
times they have been - in good faith – simply fascinated by Western models of 
life. Very often the process takes simply the form of corruption of the power 
elites. 
Nobody should read this Report as a denial of the fact that Western law 
has produced also some “good legal artifacts” such as the welfare state or the 
concept of relativism and plurality of values. But good legal artifacts (and we will 
discuss some in this Report) have been produced in many non-mainstream 
societies as well; more often than not they may create better long term incentives. 
Think about the role of workers in the former Yugoslavian corporate governance, 
or the variety of alternative visions of property in Andeans cultures, or the 
institutional settings that allow the social capital represented by elderly people be 
put to value in many African societies, or the legal institutions of solidarity and 
long term commitment in Islamic finance, or the open access to culture and social 
knowledge in the traditional Asian resistance to intellectual property rights.   
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The sustainable elements of all legal experiences no matter if dominant or 
recessive should be available, known and put in the conditions to contaminate 
each other. At the end of history single thought and Western hubris was the rule. 
Now a pluralistic and humble trial and error attitude should become dominant. 
In the new international political paradigm that is about to begin, there is 
the need for elaborating global solutions with a new and different method. It is no 
more about following one leader and emulating it: it is about cooperating among 
each other and discussing all together in order to produce regulatory solutions that 
give the same dignity and respect to all cultures of the world and a fair 
distribution of the economic surpluses that an ordered economic oganization can 
yield. The direction and the criteria to evaluate regulatory solutions is their 
capacity to reduce global injustice and disparity and not only to stimulate growth 
and further unsustainable consumption. 
Thus, in the new global legal paradigm we need to confront ourselves 
abandoning the idea that there is a single right ‘way’ forward. We must 
understand that each culture and each civilization is the most capable of finding 
the best solutions for itself locally; further, from a bottom up perspective each 
culture should contribute, like in an orchestra, to rethink a sustainable 
globalization. 
 
14.  The First Necessary Step at the G8: Debt Remission for the Poor 
 
Having abundantly reached the bottom of the moral and political well of injustice, 
the minority of humans that actually have enough to care about the crisis (if you 
spend your life in the Nairobi dump, or if you are a miner in a remote Chinese 
mine or a homeless harassed by the NYPD you do not care about the fate of 
Citybank or GM) now finds itself in front of a politically necessary opportunity to 
“legally” redesign the world before it is too late. Whether this “opportunity” is 
going to be a tragic joke or a serious commitment will become apparent very soon 
when the first necessary and immediate global legal steps have to be taken.  
Some of these immediate steps do not require any legal expertise but only 
political resolve. The very first step that is now long overdue, and that will 
determine whether a path of long term “Fabian reforms” is at all worth trying, is 
the immediate complete and unconditioned remission of poor countries’ debt. 
This remission - and this remission only - will produce sufficient economic 
pressure to reform the IMF and the World Bank. Once this is done at the next G8 
summit, then it will be commendable and farsighted to continue a political 
worldwide legal discussion capable of giving a voice to everybody that lives on 
this planet. Such discussion might over time produce a new pluralist consensus for 
a sustainable legal control of the economy. Such new consensus must be a 
dramatic break with the Washington’s one: we need global structural solutions 
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and not, as so far it has been, globally exported oligarchic and ethnocentric 
interventions which exhaust their impact in the short run and lead us from crisis to 
crisis. 
There is the immediate need to adjust the strong inequalities between the 
rich and the poor, which is largely the product of the legally unrestrained behavior 
of the economically powerful during a past of mistakes that we can no longer 
afford to replicate, but that we should know very well in order to fully learn from 
it. At the end of the end of history, we must return to unbiased historical 
knowledge the role it deserves. 
 
15.  A New Forum for Deciding the New Start. Preparing the Global 
Economic Constitutional Convention 
 
Certainly the risks of a cynical deployment of rhetoric of change in the law for the 
purpose of maintaining a status quo of domination have been very present to 
everybody involved in the preparation of this Report. Previous episodes of such 
strategy by the World Bank in the legal domain are exposed in this Report. This is 
why the issue of a politically accountable global government is so crucial (and we 
use the idea of government and not of governance to stress the political stake). 
This Report calls for the creation of a U.N. connected truly representative 
international institution in which all interests are equally represented, a sort of 
Constitutional Convention for the production of a globally legitimized economic 
constitution. Within such an institution, genuine discussion and policy-making 
would guarantee the representation of the interests of everyone. The preparation 
of such a Constitutional Convention should be entrusted already at the next G8 
meeting to an international preparatory commission studying the tremendously 
complicated issues of global representation.  
The rapid legal intervention on financial markets must be coordinated with 
a wider political and cultural project that must rethink globalization. Moving now 
in this direction requires tremendous courage and vision by those such as the G8 
that have more to lose in the short run in a world of conflicts over increasingly 
scarce resources where the stake is survival. But the fundamental idea of this 
Report is that either we are all saved or we are all damned. 
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PART I 
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE END OF HISTORY 
 
    
1.1 Making the crisis an economic turning point is both an opportunity 
and a duty to safeguard a future for human civilization. 
 
The current intensity of the economic crisis offers, to those lucky enough to be 
spared the suffering of poverty, an occasion (which is actually a duty) to approach 
in depth the question of long-term global sustainability - itself a notion to be 
handled with care. In fact, capitalism displays the capacity to change its form in 
order to maintain its fundamental substance of exploitive relationship between 
capital and labor. In a sense, this most important structural characteristic of 
capitalism keeps it always in a crisis. Therefore, what is at stake is the capacity to 
manage the next great transformation so that an environment compatible with the 
survival of human civilization is maintained. To do so, a new institutional 
framework for long-term global governance is indispensable. 
 
1.2 The only way to make law sustainable and functional to the long-term 
solution of the economic crisis is to free it from technological and 
economic dependency. This requires consciousness of what is really new 
in the current phase and what to the contrary is an historical cycle.  
 
Sustainability means that the fundamental function of an organized global 
political space should be to contrast the progressive reduction of civil society and 
social experience into the mere cash nexus.  There is in fact a clear risk that the 
new institutional framework may end up allowing the final commodification of 
nature and of civil society. This is why it is so crucial to rescue politics and its 
most important instrument of mediation, law, from the current subordination to 
technology. This is why the new institutional framework should have the nature of 
nothing less than a global economic constitution.   
Globalization is not a new phenomenon. The international expansionism 
of capital and the role of the State in this process were clear to Adam Smith and 
Karl Marx. Economic historians point at the 16th century and the take of the new 
world as the starting point of capital accumulation of global magnitude which in 
fact originated the industrial revolution. The first great globalization process was 
the attempt to exit the great depression originated by overproduction, which began 
in 1870. After World War I, as an economic consequence of peace, the failure of 
the first globalization effort became clear with the global recession of the 1930s. 
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Europe and the US followed two different political options - in Europe 
Nazism and Fascism, in the United States Fordism. World War II defeated the 
first and exported the second to Europe. Fordism was a de-globalizing force. Its 
production of standardized mass production of durable commodities was aimed at 
the internal market. The distribution between capital and labor of the cooperative 
surplus needed to sustain demand - itself necessary for important long-term 
investments. Government, firms, families, the whole society needed long term 
horizons to sustain this form of economic organization. 
The crisis of overproduction due to the diffusion of Fordism seems to 
explain the transformation of the 1980s, including the birth of the wave of 
globalization known as “the end of history” and the financial hegemony over the 
real economy. Fordism has failed in its attempt to solve the fundamental 
contradiction of capitalism created by the tendency toward reduction of the profit 
rate. As the previous experience of late 19th century has already taught us (and is 
a fortiori true today), economic globalization alone cannot be the answer.  
What is new to the current crisis is that possibly capitalism has reached the 
borders of its geographical expansion so that for the first time human civilization 
can face the truth that we all live in the same home. A powerful apparatus of 
political decision-making is necessary to tackle the next wave of capitalist 
transformation whose face we do not know as yet but that it is most likely to be 
ugly if it is not tamed. It is in fact probable that - in the absence of possibilities of 
significant further physical expansion - capitalism will make an attempt toward 
the final commodification of the entire human experience and spaces.   
The fact is that there is no exit from this world and capital cannot be the 
only decision-maker of the next “great transformation” because the cost of its 
short-term and short-sighted survival strategy is simply unsustainable for 
humankind. Its cost like global warming and climate change is not a natural 
phenomenon but it depends directly on human responsibility. To put the future in 
the hands of humankind there is the need of a new humanistic approach involving 
every aspect of civilization that can be deployed to resist the final 
commodification of the planet and its consequent inevitable destruction. As Max 
Horkheimer wrote as early as 1926 (and as was believed by Lord Keynes at the 
time), the truth of the matter is that our society possesses the technical and human 
means to abolish misery in its most brutal material form. We do not know of any 
time in history in which this possibility was as serious as today. It is only the 
proprietary structure that opposes its realization. So that, a fortiori today, it is from 
the property interests in the current global organization that we need to start. 
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1.3 A new strong form of political legitimacy is required for the law to 
tackle the titan of financial liquidity left at large. The global private 
proprietary system, guardian of a status quo locked in by international 
geo-political interests is the immense obstacle that politics must overcome. 
 
Today the international financial system is virtually independent from the control 
of the system of central banks. Global unregulated liquidity – which has had an 
impressive growth in the last three decades – is by far greater than the sum of the 
reserves of all central banks taken together. This means that there is no possible 
political control by the nation states for lack of economic means. Nor is there any 
possible control from international institutions for lack of political force. The 
common global problem is how to assert a new public control over the proprietary 
structure of the global financial system. 
The problem is common but not all the peoples of the world have the same 
role. Nor do they bear in the same way the responsibility and the effects of this 
“man made” situation. The excess of non-regulated liquidity is felt in a very 
different and more acute way by the people – for instance - living in sub-Saharan 
Africa compared to those living within the borders of Fortress Europe. But if we 
look for responsibility, the intensity ratio is the opposite. Global solutions have to 
be sought among a plurality of peoples with very different needs, very different 
power, very different responsibilities. Nevertheless, if we do not find common 
solutions we are all going to sink. For the very first time even self interested 
capitalists must admit that we really are interconnected, like an organism where 
single parts cannot save themselves while every other part degenerates.   
How to face the problem of finding global solutions with so many 
different counterparts involved?  
There is, first of all, a problem of timing. We need quick answers. But 
quick answers are very difficult to reach, given the complexity of the world 
scenario. Such a complexity is also due to another factor. We are not dealing with 
individuals or with groups of people. We are dealing with institutions. Institutions 
are legal entities. They show the rigidity and the path dependence typical of the 
legal order. And that makes the timing and the process even more difficult to deal 
with. 
There is a global problem. The global problem has to be faced by trying to 
find a balance among contrasting interests. The goal we have to reach is a 
common goal, but in such a process each player acts in its own self-interest. A 
cooperative solution of the game is then extremely difficult to find. Just take 
China and the US, respectively the emerging and the declining major players in 
the global scenario. Do they have conflicting interests? They are both 
superpowers and they are not ready to give up on each other’s requests. China is a 
great producer and exporter. It owns over 1/3 of the American Public Debt. Such 
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debt - denominated in dollars - is deflating very quickly. China is going through a 
very intense, fast, difficult and highly unsustainable process of economic growth. 
If it slows down it will have to face serious problems. Thus is not ready to reduce 
its carbon emissions and to lose on the value of its foreign assets and reserves. So 
it is in its self interest to sustain the unsustainable US economy and not to accept 
new and sound environmental regulations. The interaction between China’s 
overproduction and US overconsumption is the Gordian knot that must be solved 
with the maximum urgency. How to solve this knot is made difficult by the very 
different situations in the world scenario and by the lack of a credible space of 
political mediation between such interests. There are rich countries and poor 
countries. There are rich people in poor countries and poor people in rich 
countries. There are poor countries with rich natural resources and rich countries 
with little natural resources. This makes the global picture extremely complicated. 
Financial markets are dependent from this framework and speculation thrives 
within it. 
Some countries were for many years closed systems. They were not part of 
the global game of financial capitalism. Think of China or the former Soviet 
Union. The opening of their frontiers to capital provoked a great shock to the 
global balance, both in the financial and in the international trade systems. 
Speculation increased its business opportunities. 
 
1.4 Today it is universally accepted that a monetary policy is 
indispensable, and that “money” is needed which is quintessentially 
“public” – i.e. which is not bound to any automatic market determination 
 
Seldom is it considered that the only monetary system wholly consistent with a 
pure market economy would be a system that fundamentally prevented any 
monetary policy. In fact, to avoid any intrusion of an extra-market public power in 
the (private) arena of trade, “money” should be inexorably bound to a commodity 
whose price is market-determined (Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis).  
However, even in those countries most informed by a fundamentalist 
market ideology (e.g.: US & UK), at least since the 1929 crisis nobody - apart 
from Hayek in his Denationalization of Money - has ever doubted that due to the 
inevitable imperfection of markets the production of money must be conferred on 
a “public power” whose discretion makes it possible to suitably administer 
“liquidity” and “lending of last resort”. Nor has anyone ever doubted that this 
necessarily public production of money could – and often should – have a major 
effect on the redistribution of wealth. 
Of course, insofar as a monetary policy is confined within the power 
boundaries of the public producer and administrator of money, its redistributive 
effect on wealth will be understood as politically legitimate. In fact, being the 
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“absolute proprietor” of its own assets, a sovereign community is entitled to have 
the “last word” on the allocation of those assets even by contradicting the 
market’s “first word”, either by means of taxation or through monetary policy 
proper. 
However, when monetary policy wants to go beyond the boundaries of the 
nation-state to the “external” level of the international community, a radically new 
situation will arise which presents a dichotomy. On the one hand, international 
money with the same qualities of national public money is required to permit an 
international monetary policy able to determine “international liquidity” and 
“international lending of last resort”. On the other hand, the nonexistence is 
acknowledged of a sovereign power with international political legitimacy to have 
the “last word” on the allocation and redistribution of global (non-national) assets. 
Bretton Woods (1944) was the first attempt at a “world monetary 
constitution” to find a solution to the above-mentioned dichotomy. Its main 
characteristics are well known: on the one hand, (i) the exchange rate of all the 
currencies of the over 100 Bretton Woods countries is in some way tied to the US 
dollar, and (ii) in its turn, the US dollar is tied to the value of gold; on the other 
hand, to compensate for these unbending ties, (iii) two crucial powers were 
recognized to a supranational institution (IMF): a) a limited power to give credit 
in case of a country’s non-structural imbalance of payments (i.e. when the 
country’s lack of liquidity is not matched by its insolvency); and b) the power to 
re-establish the country’s exchange rate in case of structural imbalance of 
payments. 
The rationale behind Bretton Woods was: on the one hand, a common rule 
of law was established which applied to all the currencies in the world, including 
the hegemonic US dollar; on the other hand, the managing power of the IMF 
guaranteed a certain flexibility to the system. The external boundaries fixed to the 
exchange rates (eventually tied to gold) and their public and supranational 
management should have guaranteed the achievement of both the opposite goals 
of the stability of the international monetary system and the autonomy of national 
macroeconomic policies, and the IMF should have become the legal and political 
center for those goals to be achieved. 
However, Bretton Woods presents an international monetary system which 
is actually separated from the financial system (Gilpin, The Political Economy of 
International Relations), with an international “public” money which is coupled 
by national “public” finance. In a global regime that did not allow for free capital 
mobility, each sovereign community enjoyed a certain macroeconomic autonomy 
– including an internationally controlled autonomy in monetary policy - while 
world trade could enjoy the benefits of a stable monetary system. 
From the first half of the 1970s Bretton Woods was formally and actually 
demolished. Two key events took place in this respect: (i) the US unilaterally 
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terminated the dollar-gold convertibility (1971-1973); and (ii) capital mobility 
was progressively freed worldwide, starting from US and UK in the 1980s, and 
spreading to the whole world by the end of the century. These two events 
successfully undermined the “global political pact” signed at Bretton Woods 
under US hegemony but in a bipolar world. 
 
1.5 Excesses of unregulated liquidity originated in the 1970s. They were a 
consequence of the oil crisis and the abandoning of the gold standard. 
They were exasperated, in preparation of the end of history by the IT 
revolution, the WTO system and the opening of new market frontiers in 
the East 
 
The long phase of high liquidity on the global markets has its origin in the 1970s, 
with the birth of the petrodollar and Eurodollar markets as a consequence of the 
unilateral abandoning of the gold standards which made the Bretton Woods 
system collapse. It was the first case of the creation of very large amounts of 
capital moving freely, with no control from the system of national central banks. 
The petrodollars were financial instruments which were created in order to buy oil 
in a period of very high oil prices and double digit inflation. 
The “emancipation” of the dollar from any external ties gave the US what 
De Gaulle happened to define as an “exorbitant privilege”, created by the 
combination of the initial Bretton Woods power to produce the money used in the 
international trade with the after-Bretton Woods freedom from international limits 
to that power. Today, unlike any other country, the US enjoy not only a complete 
freedom as to economic and monetary policy which has allowed them to flood the 
world market with inconvertible dollars, but also a complete freedom from 
controlling their balance of payments and ultimately their public debt. In terms of 
real economy, today the US can purchase goods and services from the rest of the 
world by giving in exchange a mere “promissory note” that will be honorable with 
other promissory notes ad infinitum. Basically, since their unilateral violation of 
the Bretton Woods agreement, the US cannot be insolvent, and do not have to care 
about the amount of their public debt. This new regime of fiat money is 
internationally tantamount to a transformation of the rule of law into the ruler’s 
law (from imperium iuris to ius imperii). 
Thus, when the oil crisis was over, the liquidity created did not disappear. 
Rather, it remained in the system of the richer national financial markets and it 
was mostly invested in their economies. Around such a massive amount of 
liquidity flowing around the international financial system a wide movement of 
currency speculation also began. To protect the stability of the monetary system at 
the beginning of the 1980s, the European Community began to work on the 
building up of the European Monetary System (EMS). The Maastricht Treaty 
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represented the birth of what ten years later became the Euro system – a common 
monetary area with a common currency. 
While monetary deregulation freed the US dollar from any external 
discipline - more clearly showing a function that has less to do with “markets” 
than with “power” - the deregulation of capital mobility and the consequent 
creation of global financial markets closed the circle. Huge amounts of freely 
mobile capital are now able to alter considerably the power relations between 
dominant and dominated economies, exposing even healthy dominated economies 
to monetary pressure and speculative attacks that can greatly modify the price of 
their primary goods and supplied labor. 
Therefore, monetary deregulation and free capital mobility are two sides of 
a coin that during the 1970s and 80s transformed a global regime of (though 
weak) world rule of law into a global regime of monetary and financial 
imperialism masked by the ideology of a market economy which has been denied 
and contradicted by the actual behavior of hegemonic countries. 
In other parts of the world global liquidity became the engine for sudden 
and fast economic growth. From the late 1970s China started to change its 
economic system, open up to trade and foreign investments, and grow very 
rapidly. In 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and another huge economic area was rapidly 
transformed into a market economy increasing the size and imposing new 
equilibriums to the global market. In 1995 the WTO trading system was 
established and the international trade increased very strongly. 
So the entire world economy experienced major changes and fast growth 
due to the huge amount of money which was artificially created in the financial 
systems. In the 1990s a massive process of privatization all over the world 
increased the size of Stock Markets, thus producing further “materials” for 
financial growth. Households’ savings were attracted towards the capital markets 
and away from government bonds. The fiscal discipline of the European Treaties 
and the competition policy implicit in the Euro system greatly increased the size 
and power of the private sector. The European model of mixed economy and 
welfare state – which had worked very successfully for over thirty years – started 
to be gradually put under attack thus weakening the only alternative model to the 
Anglo-American financial system left after the collapse of realized socialism.  
In the meanwhile, new information technology (Internet) allowed for the 
globalization of the financial markets. The equity shift transferred into the hands a 
few ever larger financial institutions huge amounts of money. Financial arbitrage, 
also due to very low short-term interest rates in some region of the world (notably 
Japan), increased the creativity and speculation of financial institutions throughout 
the global system. Derivatives ceased to be useful systems of risk insurance and 
spread. Paradoxically, together with innovative financial products, they became 
the chips of a gigantic international casino.  
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Two were the principal distinctive features of this process. First, the global 
financial system was greatly independent from the control and regulation of 
national central banks. Second, the system was producing liquidity endogenously, 
like a snow ball. Since the liquidity given to creditors was smaller than the 
liquidity in the hands of the lenders (due to derivatives and arbitrage between 
short-term and medium and long-term durations) this unsustainable structure was 
made possible.  
Such system was for over 15 years apparently beneficial to the economy. 
The people from the richest part of the world were able to buy goods and services 
(thank to the low cost of debt) from producers which could export goods and 
services at low cost (due to the exploitation of labor). This mechanism 
characterized the relationship between China and the US. But almost everywhere 
the richest citizens of the world could take advantage of the poorest. This pattern 
of post-colonial exploitation was somehow hidden by mainstream economists 
because countries like China, India and many others, could grow fast since they 
were importers of Western technologies. Even Western high-quality products in 
export-oriented economies such as Germany could take advantage of this feast, 
satisfying the doped consumption habits of increasing numbers of the very rich 
elites from regions fully included in the global economy who were capturing the 
sudden growth (Russia, Gulf Countries, Far East, Latin America). In fifteen years 
the world GDP doubled, producing an increase of the wealthy worldwide – from 
600 million to 1,300 million - and a dramatic increase of the poorest.  
 
1.6 In a long-term perspective cash injections in the system are like giving 
more drugs to an addicted patient. Cash injections are just bad policy 
driven by the very same interests that the law must tame 
 
Current crisis figures are quite dramatic: global financial markets have collapsed 
pulling into the panic the entire global real economy, and several billion dollars 
have been spent by some Western Governments and some international 
institutions in the attempt to save what is still possible to save. The US alone have 
approved several plans to bailout banks and buy toxic assets for a total amount of 
around five to seven trillion dollars: a huge amount of money, which, according to 
the followers of “business as usual”, could re-establish confidence and let things 
restart smoothly.  
Yet, once we compare them with the figures of the global financial 
markets, we will realize that these efforts, even assuming their good faith, are no 
more than grains of sand compared to the global financial markets and the global 
financial actors that the last twenty years of globalization have created. 
Globalization of financial markets is a trend that is often discussed but 
rarely quantified. Although it is quite hard to have updated and global data 
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concerning the size of the financial markets, it is enough to give a look to 2006 
figures to realize why the current meltdown is spreading its effects all around the 
world and so deeply: less than three years ago the total value of the world's 
financial assets intermediated through banks and securities markets reached $167 
trillion, with a daily trade of $1.5 trillion, fifty times more than the export of 
goods and services, which annually totaled $6.1 trillion. And the relation will be 
the same if we compare the size of the global financial market with the global 
GDP: in 2006, more than seventy countries had financial assets that exceeded the 
value of their GDP, while the value of the assets traded in the markets and by 
official intermediaries was around 3.5 times higher than the global GDP. 
If we consider that all these already astonishing figures do not take into 
consideration private markets, which include all the trades in assets that do not 
take place in regulated markets or do not pass through official intermediaries, and 
which were the first pillar of the system to collapse, we can easily understand why 
the financial meltdown immediately affected the real economy. Even if it is not 
easy to calculate the amount of this parallel and unregulated market, a recent 
Report (McKinsey 2006) estimated that it could amount to $477 trillion. Financial 
markets are a powerful giant with no rivals, especially if they can freely flow 
without impediments. 
The growth of cross-border capital inflows and outflows is what better 
represented the new chaotic world, and took us to the situation we are living in. 
Without considering the flows of capital toward offshore centers, and without 
looking at the movements in the parallel private market, which are impossible to 
estimate, the 2006 annual value of such cross-border capital flows totaled $8.2 
trillion – three times more than the level in 2002 and 2/3 than the annual global 
GDP - while the world's outstanding stock of such investments reached $74.5 
trillion - a huge amount of  money that freely moved from one country to another 
thanks to the removal of capital controls. 
 
1.7 The uncontrolled growth of their public debt allows the US to 
redistribute the world’s real resources and assets in favor of the US 
economy, through a policy whose logic is purely national 
 
For a hegemonic country the inconvertibility of money is tantamount to being 
freed from the budgetary limits of an ordinary debtor. Inconvertibility of money 
and unlimited freedom to get into debt are two sides of a coin that is in radical 
contradiction with the “market”: (i) inconvertibility of the US dollar, (ii) growth 
of the US public debt, and (iii) redistribution of the world’s assets in favor of the 
hegemonic nation by means of public expenditures are the three modes of the 
structural and constant obstruction to that “efficient allocation of resources” that 
the “market” should be promoting on a global scale. It is thanks to the US self-
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granted “monetary immunity” from any supranational ius gentium that emerging 
economies are forced to accept promissory notes (inconvertible dollars) in 
exchange for real goods and services, and that the US can force the rest of the 
world to subscribe their public debt securities. In fact, since the US dollar is the 
worldwide accepted money in the international trade, emerging countries are 
forced to maintain monetary reserves in US dollars to protect themselves from 
world trade risks. Given that these reserves in inconvertible dollars do not yield 
any interest, emerging countries are then forced to buy US treasury bonds. This 
way, the US finds itself in the enviable position of a debtor that can dictate rules 
to its creditors. Thus, the US is at the same time the debtor and the arbitrator of 
the debt’s value, in spite of any feasible credit-debt state of affairs which is 
assured by the existence of a third impartial guarantor. 
Freedom from external control has allowed the US to “live beyond its 
means”, i.e. to adopt a model of “growth without savings”. Only, this protracted 
US imbalance of payments was eventually painfully paid by the rest of the world 
through the inevitable global financial crisis. Life beyond the hegemonic nation’s 
means was made possible by breaking the Bretton Woods monetary agreement, 
which in its turn produced a distortion in the way world prices of goods and 
services are fixed (in US dollars). This distortion, while challenging the overall 
rationality not only of world trade prices but also of the value (in US dollars) of 
financial activities, successfully supported the excessive life style and expenses of 
the hegemonic nation. Consequently, there appears to be a close link between the 
monetary imperialism established by the US in the 1970s which ultimately 
resulted into free capital mobility and the current monetary and financial 
“bubble”. 
 
1.8 Free circulation of capital outside of any form of public control leads 
to unsustainable speculation. Binding restrictions on such free flows are 
necessary, urgent and comparably simple measures to be taken 
 
What the 1997 crisis taught, and no one learned, is that an explosive growth of 
cross-country flows increases volatility, which automatically raises the risks of 
long-term investing, creating the perfect incentive for investors to undertake 
short-term projects, then in turn contributes less to productivity growth than long-
term investments, and is not able to stabilize unstable economies. Thanks to new 
technologies, the cost of cross-border trading has fallen to a fraction of what it 
was only some years ago, while the liberalization of markets has done the rest of 
the job: money can be poured into a country suddenly and rush out just as fast, 
and whoever does not have the chance to ride this fast car can only sit and stare at 
the ruins left behind.  
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In a 1997 conference, the South African President Nelson Mandela said 
that “the same mobility of the capital and the globalization of capital and other 
markets make it impossible for a country to pick up a national economic policy 
without taking into consideration the possible reply of the markets”. Globalization 
of capital has created a strict relationship between all the countries of the world, 
making it easier for wealthy investors to look for high yield in “emerging 
markets”, and making the latter more and more dependent from the former, 
because no long-term investment is ever pursued. In such a scenario, and given 
the size of the financial market, how could a country (with the exception of the 
US) decide to fight against it? How could it spend reserve money and increase the 
public deficit? How could it challenge a system that wants a free market that 
regulates itself? A few seconds after, foreign investments would be withdrawn, 
and the country would find itself dried up and abandoned, incapable of dealing 
with its future, mainly because nothing has ever been planned to last until the 
future. This is not only contrary to the idea of the autonomy of countries, but to 
the principles themselves of sovereignty and democracy: financial markets are not 
only a question of money, they are a question of power, and nowadays they have 
too much power. 
 
1.9 Environmental primacy and global welfare are the values that must 
guide a global economic constitution to overcome the lock in 
 
If we tried to understand the changes in the prices of bread, wheat, or rice, just by 
looking at the producers or at the distribution chain we would be mistaken. We 
are back to the original problem. The world is one and its size is limited. The 
growth of population and the rapid changes of its needs due to expanding 
consumption produce great imbalances made worse by financial speculation on 
the price chain.  
Of course, the poorest people are the ones to suffer the most. But the rich 
countries are those that have the power. How are we going to find a balanced 
solution?   
Every actor should be pushed to think in the long term. Resources are 
scarce and the world population is growing too fast. Environmental balance is an 
essential element of the survival of humankind. Will this be a sufficient incentive 
for the rich and powerful to begin the ambitious path towards a global economic 
constitution - a process that necessarily limits imperial ambition and sovereignty? 
And what should the fundamental ideas be around which to invite countries and 
people to sign in this process?  
In the second half of the 19th century welfare state regimes were dominant 
in Western Europe and in many Communist countries. Then, at the end of history 
a global authoritarian model called corporate financial capitalism took over in a 
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political and cultural revolution. In less than twenty years such transformation 
commodified human experience to a large extent and exported organized 
exploitation worldwide with the help of a thriving western-centric intellectual 
industry grounded in the short-term arrogance of mainstream economic theory. 
We should reverse this trend and propose this reversal as the platform for a global 
economic constitution. The protection of the environment and a public-minded 
universal welfare system might thus become two leading values of the new 
humanism around which a global constitution should be drafted and signed by all 
nations of the world.  
 
1.10 Discrete recognizable political choices have freed the wild beast of 
finance. Regaining political control over global financial and economic 
speculation is the ultimate aim of any attempt to use the law. A new 
international monetary system is urgently needed 
 
Over thirty years of accelerated exploitive economic growth followed the crisis of 
the Fordist model of production in the late 1970s. The new highly unsustainable 
pattern of accelerated exploitation was the consequence of the aggressive global 
expansion of unregulated financial capitalism. Many new regions of the world 
experienced such growth, with the consequent rise of the already discussed global 
unsustainability. At the same time, such growth excluded in terms of number of 
individuals a great majority of the world population. A growing number of people 
were left behind in rich countries because of the dismantling of welfare 
institutions. 
A world market where prices of goods and financial activities can be 
freely manipulated either by the hegemonic country or by the hegemony of 
speculation will always be exposed to global crisis. Reforming the international 
monetary system entails an agreement involving all the main stakeholders (US, 
China, EU, Japan and other economies). This agreement must be on the overall 
allocation of global resources and assets (technology, land, labor), and must re-
establish external boundaries to the production of “world money”. These 
supranational legal boundaries must offer a solution to the dichotomy between 
international monetary stability and necessity of flexibility in national and 
regional economic policies. While this time we cannot resort to rigid or automatic 
limits like those that gold used to provide, the current monetary anarchy must be 
fought, which only masks a law of the jungle where the strongest prevail and the 
international community languishes. 
Possible measures are: (i) A re-evaluation of the IMF as the core of a 
world central bank (as recently desired by both high representatives of China 
Central Bank and distinguished US economists). (ii) The institution of a 
mandatory supranational standard formed by regional currencies, including the 
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US and EU currencies and a future (and futuristic) Asian currency. (iii) A new 
separation between a world currency that works only as a universal monetary unit 
of account (to be used by law in all international contracts and all transnational 
corporations’ budgets) and a few regional currencies that work as actual 
“exchange intermediaries”. (iv) The simultaneous institution of a supranational 
authority (representative not only of the world wealth but also of the world 
population) with the power to determine on a current basis the exchange rates 
between the universal monetary unit of account and the actual national currencies. 
(v) An international agreement on the public debt of each country that while 
fixing rigorous limits allows for some flexibility in national economic policies. 
While many are the possible tools for a monetary reform, they only have 
one goal: the establishment of a rule (ius) with which the whole global community 
must comply (including the strongest countries), which defines a link between the 
level of life style and the living means available to everyone. 
In consequence, it is necessary to imagine the ways to pass from the 
ruler’s law (ius imperii) that produced the current global crisis to a rule of law 
(imperium iuris) capable to re-establish a fruitful international co-operation. 
Of course, we do not think that the world communities will comply with 
the monetary ius cosmopoliticum out of human righteousness and spontaneous 
preference for the “just” against the “strong”. Nonetheless, we do believe that if 
the “strong” do not become more “just”, they will eventually lose their strength.  
 
1.11 Drastic steps to remedy unbalanced wealth distribution are needed 
even in the self interest of rich countries as admitted by institutions such 
as OECD, IMF, WB, WTO and ILO 
 
Wealth distribution is an indispensable starting point to rethink the concept of 
human development in the 21st century, as global imbalances are widely 
considered to be major factors behind the current economic crisis. There can be no 
dispute about the extraordinarily high levels of global inequality, which imposes a 
deep and serious analysis on the link between globalization of capital and its 
impact on the workforce. The global pattern of subordination of labor to capital is 
unsustainable and seriously impacts both developing and developed countries. In 
poor countries, the high unemployment rate puts the whole local workforce at the 
mercy of global capital. In rich countries, Western Europe for instance, wage 
moderation follows - despite the rise both in inflation and productivity - reducing 
purchasing power and creating increasingly insecure employment conditions.  
This situation has been deemed problematic by all international agencies 
including those that are responsible for the policies that have mostly produced it. 
Considering the trend of the past decades, the OECD underlines that the gap 
between rich and poor and the number of people below the poverty line have both 
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grown, and the increase is widespread, affecting 3/4 of OECD countries. As 
regards the proposed solutions, both the WB and the IMF consider redistributive 
policies as a way to improve the income distribution in member countries. On the 
same line, the WTO underlines that the strength of the poverty-reducing effect of 
trade appears to be country-specific and will to a large extent depend on the 
policies accompanying trade reform. In its turn, the IMF stresses the fundamental 
role of income distribution in the achievement of social fabric and sustainable 
growth, as growth in the context of high income inequality is not likely to have a 
large impact on poverty reduction. Thus, the IMF promotes public subsidization 
of basic social services such as education and health, and specific targeted subsidy 
and transfer policies to increase consumption of the poorest groups and public 
works schemes to supplement incomes, with particular attention to the rural areas; 
moreover, during periods of macroeconomic instability social safety net programs 
may provide assistance to the non-poor that have fallen into poverty. 
The WB asks for both theoretical rethinking (“global thinking”) and 
practical action; the core objective is the achievement of “global progressivity” 
through the regulation of global transfers, the institution of a supranational 
taxation authority (with grants focused on Africa), limited country sovereignty 
with regard to the use of funds, transfers no longer from state to state but from 
global authority to citizens.  
Regarding the increasing and irrational abyss between median workers 
salary  and CEOs, the ILO underlines that such income inequality is both socially 
harmful and economically problematic, since it brings about escalating social 
conflict and makes low-income families likely to become increasingly indebted in 
order to fund their housing investment and consumption decisions. 
To summarize the evaluations developed so far, the essential point that 
emerges is the ill-conceived nature of an answer limited to injecting money into 
the economy: an effective increase of equality in the distribution of wealth has to 
pass through a structural reconsideration of economic core principles, to make 
them compatible with social justice, equity, stability and sustainable long term. 
The only way to achieve such goals is to rebuild the hierarchy of fundamental 
values and institutions that are the basis of civil society: the primacy of politics 
and law over economics; that of real economy on finance; the primacy of real 
needs on consumption and accumulation. 
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1.12 Thirty years of massive financial deregulation have produced results 
that must be redressed immediately. Wealth redistribution from the rich to 
the poor through the political process and the legal system cannot wait 
much longer. Structural limits must be set to avoid unsustainable 
injustice 
 
Special attention must be dedicated to the ratio between median workers 
salary and CEOs in major industrialized countries. In the US in the period 
between 1980 and 2003, CEO compensation had a six-fold increase (attributed to 
the six-fold increase in market capitalization of large companies during that 
period, as well as to the explosion of stock-option compensation). Between 2003 
and 2007, US executive managers’ pay grew in real terms by a total of 45%, 
compared with a real pay increase of 15% in the case of the average executive, 
and less than 3% for the average American worker. Hence, by 2007, the average 
executive manager in the 15 largest US firms earned more than 500 times the 
average employee (“only” 300 times in 2003). Similar patterns can be observed in 
other countries such as Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands and 
South Africa. 
All the studies conducted on the issue underline the discrepancy between 
how companies perform and what remuneration and bonuses CEOs get (a clear 
example of it is the case of AIG’s bonuses). On this point, we may conclude that a 
stable and significant relation between pay and performance has yet to be 
established; where such exists, it may be expected to be country-specific, 
depending largely on a country’s economic, institutional and cultural peculiarities. 
Even if such a relation were established the salary gap would still be abundantly 
questionable both on moral grounds and on overall sustainability. 
 
1.13 Powerful pseudo-scientific and self-serving rhetoric has 
accompanied and facilitated this state of affairs. Wrongdoing individuals 
and institutions are part of the problem and cannot be expected to help in 
the solution 
 
The dominant rhetoric of global competition has produced vague concepts such as 
market flexibility and competitive performance to justify social uncertainty, lower 
households saving rates, and greater economic disparities. From the late 1970s 
capital has been thus justified by the economic mainstream in its relentless 
increase in its share of the cake of production and economic wealth at the expense 
of labor.   
In the last three decades with the acceleration of globalization social and 
economic disparities have greatly increased, which is true of those related to the 
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Indicator of Human Development proposed by Amartya Sen and recently 
introduced by the WB. Thinking of labor as a commodity rather than the core of 
human dignity and a crucial element of a well-balanced and peaceful community 
is perhaps the single most dramatic ideological mistake that must now be 
relentlessly challenged. It is the law that should not allow labor to be considered 
just as any other commodity in the productive process. 
 
1.14 The outstanding debt of all poor countries must be legally analyzed 
and evaluated according to ordinary private law principles. Cancellation 
of most of it will be a necessary consequence of analyzing it according to 
the “general principles” that are already a source of international law. 
 
Among the enumerated sources of International law (Art. 34 of the Treaty 
establishing the International Court of Justice) we find the common principles of 
law recognized by “civilized nations”. Such principles support the argument that 
the outstanding debt of poor countries is in most part not due since it was 
contracted in historically unconscionable conditions produced by past 
colonization and by sudden withdrawal of capital after decolonization. Hence, 
cancellation of most of the poor countries foreign debt would follow from plain 
application of legal principles which are already part of international law. 
Some debts and loans were knowingly given by lenders to dictators or 
oppressive regimes (the so-called odious debts). In certain cases, lenders knew 
that money was going to be stolen through corruption. Certain payments refer to 
loans contracted to finance projects that failed because of bad advice or 
incompetence by the lenders, or had a dramatic impact over societies, 
environment and employment. Some debts were contracted with unfair terms, 
such as very high interest rates. Very often debt is contracted to repay other debt 
(the debt trap). 
The Paris Club and all the other States that are in credit with developing 
countries must renounce their credit. At the same time, it is necessary to analyze 
all other credit by public and institutional actors, so as to stop non-legitimate 
credit like that granted to Sudan to buy weapons. The same applies to debts 
contracted with the lender knowing that there was a high probability of default, as 
in the case of those contracted with an interest of 150% by the Russian 
Government in the 1990s. 
Most of the poor countries have debts with multilateral institutions - in 
particular, the WB, the IMF, and other regional development banks like the 
African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. However, 
the total share of credit owned by these institutions represents only 27% of the 
entire debt of developing countries, while commercial or private debts account for 
52%, and bilateral debts (government debt held by another government, especially 
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export-credit debt) for 21% of the total. Hence, a global debt policy should not 
only focus on the debt owed to multilateral institutions, but also on the debt 
contracted in bilateral agreements or owed to private creditors. Particularly, the 
practice of vulture funds must be forbidden: these are private funds that acquire 
credits from countries and act against debtor countries in order to obtain the 
money and the due interests. To date, the international program for debt relief has 
brought to the cancellation of $88 billion through the HIPC (Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries) and the MDRI (Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative). Both these 
plans that are run by creditors are not open to all the countries that face external 
debt, do not take in consideration the fundamental reasons supporting debt 
cancellation, do not take into consideration the injustice of the burden of the debt 
and the problem with odious debts, and have harmful conditions attached, such as 
inequitable reduction of public expenditure or privatization of national industries. 
This scenario is arbitrary and illegal. The solution to the debt problem is an 
integral part of any global attempt to put finance under some legal control. 
 
1.15 Canceling the debt of poor countries costs a fraction of the current 
cash injection in the financial systems operated by rich countries 
 
In the Gleneagles meeting of June 2005, G8 countries agreed upon canceling the 
debt of the 18 poorest countries in the world, 14 of which are African. To date, 
this pledge has not yet become reality. Currently, a wider cancellation is urgently 
needed to release funds in developing countries, which can be used to approach 
the crisis providing some social protection to the most vulnerable as is being done 
in the North. 
In 2006, the debt contracted by developing countries was calculated at 
around $1.5 trillion, around 20% of what the US have already planned to spend to 
re-launch their internal economy. If we considered the amount of money poured 
in the Western countries by governments and the global debt of developing 
countries, we would find new evidence that throughout economic history those 
who succeeded economically kicked away the ladder beneath to prevent the others 
from scrambling up behind. This attitude should be exposed and rejected. In the 
52 poor “Jubilee 2000” countries, a total of 1 billion people bear a debt burden of 
£286 billion, which is less than the total net worth of the world's 21 richest 
individuals. 
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1.16 Debt is more than an economic fact. It has a direct effect over public 
expenditures and people’s quality of life 
 
Extrapolating from UNICEF data, as many as 5 million children and vulnerable 
adults may have lost their lives in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of the debt crisis 
since the late 1980s. The UN fears another 3 million children will die in the 
poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 - the target for Millennium 
Development Goals to cut poverty by half. 
In this crisis, the developing world did not cause the problem. Bankers in 
developing countries were not lending irresponsibly to mortgage holders who 
were unlikely to meet their repayment obligations. The same reckless lending that 
created the developing world debt crisis in the 1980s is also behind the current 
financial crisis. The difference between the present and the past is that the entire 
world is facing a debt crisis, but there is a striking contrast in policy responses. 
While developing countries were left to suffer for decades, and are still left in the 
same situation notwithstanding the global character of the current drama, trillions 
of dollars have been pumped into the markets and to bail out banks in recent 
months. With traditional sources of finance drying up, export markets collapsing 
and a range of other economic impacts, the threat of a renewed debt crisis is very 
real (Jubilee 2000, A new debt crisis, March 2009). 
The economic and financial effects will make it harder for some countries 
– especially those most dependent on exporting to developed economies in deep 
recession – to service their debts. They will simply have less money in the bank to 
pay out. Developing countries have contracted $660 billion short-term loans with 
a repayment date of one year or less: if any of these countries find themselves 
unable to repay these debts, they will have to look for refinancing or restructuring, 
options which not only are extremely difficult in a situation of global credit crisis, 
but which could force developing countries to accept “conditionalities” and high 
interest rates attached to these loans. 
It is essential that apart from the debt relief, developed countries continue 
making progress towards giving 0.7% of national income as aid. New debt 
cancellation must be counted separately from donors’ aid commitments. This has 
been ratified in the Monterrey Consensus as principle of “additionality”. 
Countries should keep giving money, but in form of grants and not loans, and 
without inequitable conditionalities attached. 
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1.17 Not only legal and moral obligations but also self-interested long 
term political and economic reasons point at immediate debt cancellation 
as a pre-requisite to a sustainable international policy 
 
Because of the predatory nature of current debt situation, econometric studies 
show that a reduced reliance on external capital (including both equity and debt 
flows) is linked to higher economic growth, which collides with the standard view 
in most development and academic circles that access to external resources is a 
necessary condition for igniting growth in poor countries. This is, for example, the 
ideological starting point of the Paris Club, which claims that as debt results 
directly in future obligations for the borrower, this makes it necessary for the 
borrower to make sure it will, in the future, be in a position to repay its debt, 
notably through an efficient use of the loans, in order to generate income that will 
be used to repay the debt. This is why debt is often considered as a development 
tool. 
On December 31, 2007, the total debt of developing and emerging 
countries was estimated by the World Bank to be $ 3,357 billion, 52% of which 
are public and public guaranteed, while 48% is private debt not guaranteed by 
States. Of these, $660 billion are constituted by short-term debts already matured. 
The role that multilateral institutions can directly play toward debt relief is 
small compared to what they could indirectly do by acting on the debt that poor 
countries “owe” to private creditors.  Every year low income countries, the 
poorest of the planet, spend $34 billion in debt service. This is mainly the 
consequence of the debt trap, due to which very often governments have to 
borrow money (usually through short-term loans), in order to pay back previous 
and bigger loans. It has been calculated that developing countries spend $1.3 in 
debt services for every $1 they receive in grants. It is enough to think about 
Nigeria, whose original debt was around $5 billion, has paid about $16 billion, 
and still owes $28 billion. This can be seen in the case of Argentina, that before 
defaulting had an international debt that reached around $128 billion (2001), and 
normal interest plus premium amounted to $27 billion a year: the IMF offered a 
$20 billion bailout loan, which not only would have not solved the problem, but it 
would have increased the debt of the country. 
The development of social capital is the most important form of long-term 
strategy to reach sustainability. The World Bank has calculated that with $ 10-15 
billion per year during 15 years, it could be possible to grant the first cycle of 
education to all the children of the world. Compare this with the numbers offered 
before. One study of 10 African countries found a 40% increase in education 
spending and a 70% increase in health spending after just four years of debt relief. 
A study by the IMF economists in 2006 confirmed again that cutting poor 
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countries’ debt payments has a “significant” impact in terms of increasing social 
spending. 
The increase of social spending is the only plausible solution to keep poor 
people from increasing their desperate attempts to reach the shores of the wealthy 
countries. Such desperate attempts are currently conducted with the humble 
attitude of searching some rescue and human understanding. Soon enough in even 
more desperate economic conditions might become a well justified hostile assault 
to the rich. 
 
PART II 
BEYOND THE END OF HISTORY, 
ASSERTING THE PRIMACY OF THE LAW OVER ECONOMIC 
POWER 
 
 
2.1 The United Nations offers the basic institutional structure to negotiate 
a Global Economic Constitutional Treaty. It has jurisdiction to do so. The 
General Assembly, comprised of 192 States, is the most legitimate body 
currently available to initiate the process 
  
Due to post-World War II origins, the main purpose of the UN is to “to maintain 
international peace and security”, but we cannot overlook article 1.3 of the 
Charter, which states that one of the goals is “to achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character”. The broad nature of the second “mission” appears 
extremely important in the current situation of global economic and financial 
meltdown that undoubtedly represents an economic, social, cultural, and 
humanitarian problem. 
Article 13.1 of the Charter identifies the General Assembly of the UN as 
the body in charge to “initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose 
of: a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging 
the progressive development of international law and its codification; b. 
promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, 
educational, and health fields”. The body where all the member states are 
represented, and where the vote of every country counts the same, could be the 
place to discuss a new international legal system of the financial markets and a 
new model of globalization, and it could encourage the creation of a new treaty of 
adoption of a Global Economic Constitution. 
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One must recall that the General Assembly does not have autonomous 
legislative power and its recommendations are not binding. Politics will therefore 
be the key to their implementation. According to article 18 of the Charter, a 
majority vote of the present and voting members would be sufficient to adopt in 
the domain of the economic order a declaration of principles like the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To be sure, the issues of effective 
implementation would remain.  
 
2.2 The United States have Ultimate Control over the UN and they 
exercise it through economic pressures. Thus, as an institution the United 
Nations lacks independence 
 
The paradox of the current situation and the real obstacles that need to be 
overcome are better shown if one compares the global budget of all the UN’s 
system (estimated in $20 billion), or the UN’s current annual regular budget 
(represented by mandatory contributions covering UN activities, staff and basic 
infrastructure at the UN headquarter), which has been recently reduced to $1.8 
billion after several cuts, with the trillions that have been injected in private 
corporations bailout programs or toxic assets shopping.  
The UN, its General Assembly and its specialized economic institutions 
could represent the perfect platform to implement public, democratic, and 
universal policies; yet, a reclassification of their power would be crucial to that 
effect. It is critical to reform the relationship between bodies such as 
ECOSOC/UNCTAD and the major powers in global politics and economy – 
allegedly, the Security Council, and the Bretton Woods Institutions (as well as the 
WTO).  
There is one country which has played a fundamental role in establishing, 
building and shaping the UN: the United States. This dominant position stems 
from various factors: first of all the UN was originally the idea of US President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It was also Roosevelt who suggested granting the veto 
power to the permanent members of the Security Council, while the US Senate 
and the US House of Representatives requested by unanimous votes to establish 
the UN headquarters in the US, and therefore were placed in New York thanks to 
a donation from John D. Rockfeller Jr.  
The UN does not have independent financial sources, but they have to 
count on dues and donations by the member states. According to the contributive 
mechanism, every country has to participate to the UN budget. The US is the first 
contributor, with a share of around 22% of the annual budget that in fact should be 
higher since they account for about 30% of the global economy, but in 1995 the 
US unilaterally decided to limit its contributions. Being the highest contributor, 
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the US can use money as a threat, which is exactly what it has done in the last 
decades as a reaction against the increased importance of the global South. 
In fact, for many institutions like the Heritage Foundation, the UN had 
become the main vehicle to bring about a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) that would replace the centrality of the United States and of their 
development models. Thus, taking advantage of the 1980s debt crisis of many 
developing countries, and of the structural adjustment programs of the World 
Bank and of the International Monetary Fund, the Unites States managed to 
exercise strong pressure over the UN, which, for example, resulted in the 
dismantling of the UN Center on Transnational Corporations, which had 
repeatedly accused multinational corporations of the exploitation of people and 
natural resources; the abolition of the post of Director General for International 
Economic Cooperation and Development; the rejection of the program of debt 
forgiveness  proposed during UNCTAD V in Belgrade. 
Until now, the US economic power has been used to reduce the political 
discretion of the UN and impose some specific reforms invariably moving in the 
direction of curtailing UN power, personnel, and public information expenses by 
reduction of their budget. As of 1995, when UN officials advocated global taxes 
to address funding problems created by the huge amounts overdue by the US, the 
US Congress passed a law stipulating that the US would not pay its dues if global 
taxes were discussed in any UN venue. 
The US is not solely responsible for keeping the UN under economic 
conditionality. Five other states were behind in their payments in fall of 2005 – 
Spain, Japan, China, Korea and Brazil - with global states’ arrears amounting to 
62% of the assessed budget. While some countries simply postponed the payment, 
others tried to use the economic contribution to achieve political aims, as to obtain 
a permanent seat in the Security Council. The first consequence of the huge UN 
credit toward rich countries is the reduction of activity, as demonstrated by the 
fact that during the two biennia 2004-2005 and 2006-2007, a fundamental branch 
of the UN, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was only able to 
perform about 20% of its total programmed activities without specific donor 
requirement. The current meltdown now risks imposing even more severe 
restrictions, which will ultimately threaten the achievement of the important 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
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2.3 Despite their lack of independence and democracy, the UN is in a 
comparatively better position to define the basic process leading to a 
global economic constitutional treaty 
 
The world is looking for an alternative, with international financial institutions 
such as the WB and IMF lacking political legitimacy and facing longtime 
criticism on their conditionality approaches with developing countries and on their 
general macroeconomic policies which are in part responsible for the current 
global economic crisis. Such institutions cannot be again the global financial 
regulators without significant change. 
In this scenario, only the UN can guarantee universal participation and 
acceptance, since they provide the only forum where all states have a say, and - 
unlike the WB and IMF - a range of more transparent and accountable specialized 
economic institutions such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), or the 
new “Global Economic Council” suggested by Josef Stiglitz’s UN advisory panel.  
 
2.4 Both on the financial crisis and on the environmental issue the UN 
has proved long-sighted in its recent policy-making attempts. Its 
leadership in the search of a global economic and financial legality 
should be politically supported both by States and by civil society 
 
In its 2005 World Economic and Social Survey, the UN seemed to be the only 
“mainstream” international institution to warn against international capital flows. 
The 2005 report states that while standard economic theory argues that 
international private capital flows will make a major contribution to development 
to the extent that such capital will flow from capital-abundant developed countries 
to capital-scarce developing countries, “in recent years, reality has contradicted 
(…) this standard theory (…). For the last seven years, developing countries have 
transferred large amount of resources to developed countries. In addition to this, 
private capital flows to developing countries are highly concentrated in a group of 
large middle-income countries and are particularly insufficient for low-income 
and small countries.” 
More importantly, the UN report does not hide the fact that such capital 
flows have undoubtedly increased risks for financial crisis in both developing and 
developed countries: “private capital flows to developing countries have been 
highly volatile and reversible; as a consequence, they have been a major factor in 
causing developmentally costly currency and financial crises. Rather than smooth 
domestic expenditure, private capital flows seem to have contributed to making it 
more volatile.” Moreover, the global stimulus package should bring no new debt, 
nor should conditions be attached to grants for developing countries: “Indeed, the 
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package  should  enhance  their  ability  to  choose  from  a  range  of  policy  
options including  capital  controls  (which  should  be  “re-legitimized”  as  
essential  crisis prevention and mitigation tools) and various counter-cyclical 
measures (…). This stimulus could also include debt relief from arrears 
accumulated over the previous decades.” 
Another positive aspect of UN institutions is their advocacy and 
implementation of green plans for several years. A very good example is the most 
recent report by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), which 
suggests that investments could revive the current downturn of the world 
economy and aid in fighting poverty, decreasing unemployment, and of course 
brawling climate change. The 2009 Global Green New Deal report suggests a 
total of $750 billion investment in “more energy efficient buildings, renewable 
energies, better transport, improved agriculture and measures to safeguard nature -
- such as fresh water, forests or coral reefs”. The report suggests taxing oil as a 
source for this investment. Countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which are considered wealthy nations, 
consume approximately 20 billion barrels a year: any taxing on such countries 
would go unnoticed, especially after oil prices went from $140 in 2008 to the 
current price of $40 a barrel. If one were to put a five-year levy in OECD 
countries of $5 a barrel, one would generate $100 billion per year. This translates 
into roughly 3 cents per liter. The report emphasizes that even with all the 
“Environment Talk” by international institutions almost $220 billion is spent 
annually on agricultural subsidies while in return a marginal amount is going to 
reforesting. Moreover, the same amount of public investment is channeled to 
fossil fuel energy, while in return 2 billion people globally do not have electricity, 
oil or gas to cook food and provide heat and light. 
Publications by UNEP are concentrating on the viability and feasibility of 
green investment, underlining its employment benefits. Last year, the 
comprehensive joint report Green Jobs: Towards Decent Work in a Sustainable, 
Low-Carbon World” established  that there are new jobs created in many sectors 
of global economies in both developing and developed countries because of the 
changing patterns of employment and investment that have resulted from efforts 
to reduce climate change. 
 
2.5 The initiative for a process leading to global and legitimized economic 
and financial legality should be placed within the Economic and Social 
Council 
 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was originally 
created 63 years ago as a mechanism for global economic and financial policy-
making. ECOSOC was founded as the principal organ to coordinate economic, 
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social, and related work of 14 UN specialized agencies, functional commissions 
and 5 regional commissions The UN Charter in more than one article (mainly 
articles 57 and 63) specifies that specialized institutions such as the WB and IMF 
“shall be brought into relationship with the UN by entering into agreements to 
define the terms of the relationship, and that ECOSOC may coordinate the 
activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and 
recommendations to such agencies.”, as recently restated in the 2009 
Strengthening the Relationship between ECOSOC and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions report.  
It is within ECOSOC that a first proposal to review the institutions of the 
global economy should be advanced, and then presented for debate at the General 
Assembly. While the UN Charter makes it clear that decisions taken by ECOSOC 
are not binding either on member states, or even on the specialized agencies of the 
United Nations System, nobody would dispute a specially granted (and funded) 
initiative role. 
 
2.6 To be capable of governing the global financial system the law should 
be sovereign. Sovereign law is a political artifact not a technology 
 
Urgent fundamental measures such as cancelling the debt or returning to some 
external standards for currency “only” require some political resolve ultimately by 
the hegemonic power. To the contrary, a longer-term strategy aimed at developing 
more stable forms of legal accountability for economic and financial transactions 
must also face highly complex technical issues. Nevertheless, the technical nature 
of the legal discourse should not obfuscate the intimate relationship between law 
and the exercise of political sovereignty. 
Very simply stated, any transnational legal regime requires some surrender 
of sovereignty. Consequently, what is at stake is there is first the political resolve 
to surrender such sovereignty. Secondly, the issue arises as to what kind of 
institutional structure is needed to make the best use of such sovereignty 
surrender. 
Significant surrender of sovereignty is not an exception at the end of 
history. Much of the political transformations that have occurred in the last thirty 
years can be read as the rise of a corporate power strong enough to dominate even 
the political structure of the most powerful states. However the kind of surrender 
we need now must be in favor of some “public” entity capable to produce “law” 
(legal standards capable of controlling powerful global private and public actors) 
and which is itself ordered by “law”, in order to be legitimate and consequently 
effective. What is indispensable for any serious attempt to tackle the crisis is a 
demise of state sovereignty that does not work as “anti-law” like that of state 
power in front of the corporation. The demise of state sovereignty we need must 
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be in favor of a public legislator capable to restore the force of law as a limiting 
device of unrestricted power whether public (like sovereign funds) or corporate.  
While there are a variety of technical possibilities to exercise the amount 
of sovereignty actually ceded by sovereign states in favor of re-structuring a 
system of global building legality, there is no escaping the fact that such release of 
sovereignty should be real and that a system must be created to make it 
permanent. Any possibility of a unilateral exit strategy such as that of the US from 
the gold standard would make the system utterly useless. Any project of “global 
standards” that remains merely technical and which is not supported by 
tremendous political resolve and strengths would only be an unsustainable loss of 
time and a procrastination of the many urgent problems that humankind has to 
face.  If such political resolve is reached we would then be in front of a process of 
global legal integration which might have a variety of degrees of depths, from a 
global economic constitution to the grant of jurisdiction of a court, to more 
nuanced and creative ideas to make a decentralized system of legitimate “people’s 
rule of law” emerge (see infra). Yet, we believe, the show of political resolve 
from the G8 should start from the two fundamental priorities previously outlined 
(external currency standard and cancellation of the debt). 
In the last thirty years the connection between law and political 
sovereignty has been the object of a sustained attack aimed at the production of an 
idea of law that is technological rather than political. While it would be beyond 
the possibilities and the scope of this report to discuss the many strategies and the 
reasons behind this intellectual transformation, it is crucial here to make 
absolutely clear that the only kind of law that might serve some useful function in 
controlling a runaway financial system is one endowed with some global 
sovereign power that by essence must be political. 
          
2.7 The nature of global law as a space without territory must be fully 
appreciated before attempting to use it as a solution to the financial crisis 
 
Global law is a very unfamiliar entity for the traditional jurist. Its peculiarity is not 
only that the whole world is its territory and that this very territory is “owned” by 
local political sovereigns each one carrying on local selfish interests. In fact the 
space of global law goes well beyond the global territory and moves into a non 
material space. In a sense its relationship with the “real law” is like that of finance 
with the “real economy”. It is not just a physical contested and limited territory. It 
is a new imagined space. But this new imagined space communicates with the real 
one and determines its fate.  
As in the past with the sea, today’s mainstream constructs this imagined 
space as infinite. Its dimension is determined only by the possibilities of 
innovation and by the courage of the mariner. The so called economics of 
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innovation, with its deep faith in individual creativity sets the paradigm of this 
optimistic belief. Be it “financial innovation” so much responsible for the global 
meltdown, be it “technological innovation” to produce energy, responsible thus 
far for putting into communication the food market and the energy market, the 
West seems to believe today in an unbounded future of growth and progress.  
This different relationship between humans and the physical limits of the 
territory is the paradigm of global law: the law is not thought as stemming from 
sovereignty but rather from circulation.  
The history of law offers an example of such a space, widely believed as 
non territorial and unlimited. The sea is an infinite space beyond sovereign 
control, an infinite space that allows every form of self-interested activity. A 
space of no obligation. A space of piracy and plunder. It comes at no surprise that 
the metaphor of piracy characterized the legal discussion of the global space “par 
excellence”, the Internet. 
Thinking global law is a challenge for the legal thought. The latter looses 
its traditional bearings, its tools allowing it to represent the law. It is in fact 
tempted by simply and purely projecting the idea of legal system through which 
we have been accustomed to learn the law. After Kelsen and Max Weber, the law 
acquired its rationality as a system of rules, as rules are embedded within one 
another according to an order lying over a Grundnorm, at the same time 
foundation and hierarchical principle. Or, this is precisely what we must give up 
when approaching this global law, i.d. legal exchanges not organised by any 
system. 
Differently from internal and international laws, global law does not 
posses a vocation to be a system. It cannot be thought as the internal law, and this 
makes us uneasy. To understand global law we should not depart, as we do for 
national law, from a “system”, trying to master the rules’ hierarchy, the Kelsenian 
pyramid. This is not a temporary imperfection, rather being one of the essential 
elements of global law. 
  
2.8 The law must gain control of the global space. This is the most 
important political challenge of our era. There is an apparent tension 
between legitimacy and effectiveness that can be overcome only by 
limiting professionalism in favor of politics 
 
The issue is how to transform this space of piracy, which includes the space 
opened up by financial innovation, into a space controlled by the law. This is the 
main challenge for any attempt to use the law including the current hypothesis of 
global legal standards. As with pirates, the central issue of global law is that of 
effectiveness of control. It is a prerequisite of control to be able to trace, and to 
block the pirates in the seemingly unlimited space. Like for pirates, any legal 
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enforcement strategy requires a solid base, such as a port, to be at all effective. 
And this is the key issue of the relationship between global law and local 
territorial enforcement that puts the physical limits of space once again at the 
center of the stage.  
Formal organizations seems too ineffective to face the world’s economic 
needs, and the more an international organization is legitimate (formal, 
transparent, accountable, based on cooperation among sovereign member-States), 
the less it can be effective; and the more it is effective (informal, flexible, fast, 
non-accountable, based on multiple, non-State actors), the less it can be 
legitimate. It is not a paradox, it is a quasi-necessity. The international 
environment has not found thus far its way to self-institutionalize, other maybe 
than by uncritical surrender of power to business-dominated organizations such as 
the WTO. 
In such a scenario Global rules cannot be framed in a command-and-
control scheme, but rather according to the incentives/disincentives dichotomy. 
Sanctions change their nature: less of judicial (and then also ethical) ones, more 
market-like –i.e. using both comparison (ranking, classification) and reputation 
(naming and shaming, whistle blowing) as forms of soft law. Both these systems 
have in common the idea of sanctions refusing political and legal discretion in the 
enforcement: they must be both objective and automatic.   
The users of this global law are not human beings, taken in their whole 
self, having aspirations and passions, made of interest and altruism, who are both 
the makers and the subjects of the law. Rather, the users are “professionals”, and 
only their business activity is affected by this law. They are more expected to 
behave as rational actors, and global law is evaluated positively as long as it 
facilitates their rational activity. 
Global law, in the mainstream vision, should facilitate professional 
communities, this is why it must be self-imposed, self-created, self serving. 
Globalization of law is a return to medieval-like “communities”, professional or 
partial ones (and not total, all-encompassing as the Gemeinshaft). The life of those 
communities of professionals is in contrast to the self-calling “ international 
community” which perhaps does not exist and which must now take responsibility 
for the global economic constitution-making process. 
The political will seems odd within these circles, since it is perceived as an 
impurity in relation to the objective laws of the economy, which shall regulate the 
exchanges. The restructuring of the relations between economics and politics is 
then at the core of the solution of the crisis. Only the restructuring of such 
relationships can produce an effective decentralized and highly pluralistic 
people’s rule of law.  
Such a focus on political effectiveness is in contrast with the idea of 
universal law, which suffers from the contrary problem, as it is very thick in 
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values but practically does not have institutional strengths. It may enjoy legitimate 
institutions – such as the International Criminal Court but its effectiveness is a 
problem. Universal law certainly has a mouth but a mouth with no teeth, speaking 
a lot but unable to bite.  
 
2.9 At the global level the current dominant vision of the law has denied 
its political nature and frozen its capacity to work as an effective limit to 
exploitive growth 
 
Today the dominant vision of the law is the one created in the global “context of 
production” of legal ideology, i.e. the law schools and economics departments of 
the top Western, especially US universities. Here, the prevailing vision of the 
relationship between law and the economic system has been progressively 
subverted since the seventies of the last century. In a dramatic break with previous 
jurisprudence, law should not control but rather facilitate “the market” - an 
abstraction that nevertheless was capable of grounding the powerful ideology of 
the end of history.    
The new globally dominant intellectual movement known as “law & 
economics” substituted an ambiguous notion of efficiency for that of justice. It 
also substituted a vision of law as a system of incentives for that of a system of 
binding norms (carrot rather than stick). By so doing, economics - the dominant 
social science - was able to colonize legal thinking by seducing it with its highly 
sophisticated mathematical models, which made any traditional approach look 
irremediably obsolete.  
Beginning in the 1990s, by a systematic organizational effort, such vision 
obtained a significant following even outside of the United States, and became the 
dominant approach of the International Financial Institutions, thus gaining a major 
policy impact. The Bretton Woods Institutions were in fact eager to adopt a vision 
of law as a form of neutral social engineering. The abandoning of the previous 
notion of an intimate connection between law and the political system allowed 
them to reach a level of political intervention that was banned by their original 
bylaws (and by Cold War equilibrium).  
Ultimately, the result was the production of an idea of law which shares 
the universalism typical of economic theory (which is the same when studied in 
New York or in Bombay), and which is evaluated according to its capacity to 
prove “market friendly”.  A “one fits all” ideal type of efficient law whose role is 
that to “mimic” what an “efficient market” would do in the absence of obstacles to 
private transactions. 
The impact of this conception gaining global mainstream status was the 
promotion of a seemingly neutral and technical legal apparatus capable to 
promote exploitive economic growth, often included as conditionality to obtaining 
45
Research Group: At the End of the End of History
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
       
grants and loans from the international financial institutions. According to this 
vision, an “efficient” legal system should facilitate rather than restrict “the 
market” (i.e. the expansion of the private sector aimed at the commodification of 
every aspect of social experience). Also, a concrete market in a given context 
should not necessarily be evaluated in terms of coherence with the values 
contained in the legal system. To the contrary, it is the legal system’s values that 
are challenged and demoted as “inefficient” whenever not coherent with a 
simplistic and universalistic micro-economic vision of “the market”.  
This vision is very problematic and its ultimate result is to promote a legal 
system that does not bite. This vision is also the vehicle to allow a variety of 
ideological features and concrete policies (downsizing, outsourcing, flexibility, 
inefficiency of the public sector, incentive-based CEO compensation schemes, 
market-friendly tort reform, competition between legal orders, efficiency of soft 
law, and many others) to gain scientific status and be placed beyond critical 
discussion. We submit here that these policies are to a quite significant extent 
responsible for the failure of legal institutions to control the markets and to 
prevent the predatory economic behavior which was responsible for the crisis.  
The very idea of legal standards as proposed today needs to be 
disentangled from an academic tradition - Law & Economics - whose Chicago-
based mainstream contributed from the legal side to maintain the ill-conceived 
idea that “the market” (whatever this generalization means)  is almost always 
capable to cure itself.  
Short-term transaction-based efficiency cannot be a value for a long term 
sustainable plan to preserve human civilizations, being entirely grounded in 
western-centric assumptions and in the value of competition and economic 
performance. Every efficiency standard always makes whoever is willing to pay 
more prevail in the competition to control and exploit scarce resources. Clearly, 
willingness to pay is connected to the possibility to do so, with the consequence 
that it always sides with the stronger economic interest. Thus, the legal system 
becomes the mere technical backbone of a science of short-term exploitation 
rather than a complex and culturally specific device by which discrete human 
societies make their political will binding.  
In the struggle to protect civil society from final commodification, such 
dominant vision of the law should be abandoned.    
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2.10 The mere substantive dichotomy “standards versus rules” cannot 
theoretically support the necessity to tackle the crisis by means of the law. 
Rather, attention should be paid to institutional arrangements 
 
The notion of “legal standards” is tributary of the jurisprudential approach 
discussed above. It implies an idea of a legal system that is either unwilling or 
incapable to make a clear decision of what is to be done in a given concrete-fact 
situation. Example of a rule is: speed limit, 50 mph. Example of a standard is: 
drive reasonably.     
The idea that legal standards should be used to cope with the financial 
crisis implies that rules are not necessary or adequate. Nevertheless, one should 
consider that standards and rules are not substitutes for each other, but 
complements that reformers should be able to deploy in order to fine-tune legal 
systems: no legal structure can be based on a single kind of legal tool only. While 
a standard of good faith can be occasionally sufficient to avoid unconscionable 
practices (packaging high-risk derivatives as safe saving instruments is done only 
in bad faith) in certain fact situations clear rules are required (e.g., minimum 
capitalization requirements). Moreover, certainly standards but to a lesser extent 
also rules are mere words in need of “institutional interpretation”, which implies 
the need to discuss which institutions, themselves located at a number of levels, 
should apply them.  
 
2.11 Standards (or “principles”) are highly generic normative 
propositions, while rules are specific. The choice among standards and 
rules entails important implications on both interpretation and 
enforcement 
 
According to the basic and most diffused jurisprudential distinction between rules 
and standards, rules are very specific normative propositions, applicable in an all-
or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is 
valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which 
case it contributes nothing to the decision. In case of contrast between two 
opposite rules governing the same set of fact, one should prevail and the other 
yield. It is the hierarchical (or power) relationship between the producers of the 
rules that would decide which one prevails.  “Principles” (or “standards”), on the 
other hand, are highly generic normative propositions, applicable in a more-or-
less fashion. They have a dimension that rules do not – the dimension of weight or 
importance: when principles collide, one who must resolve the conflict has to take 
into account the relative weight of each. Rules do not have such dimension. Of 
course, they may tolerate exceptions. 
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These features of standards and rules entail some important implications 
with regard to both interpretation and enforcement. Since interpretation is more 
discretionary for standards than for rules, the former must be interpreted by 
decision makers endowed with legitimacy for their discretion. Moreover, 
standards have limited binding power unless they are accompanied by 
enforcement mechanisms sharing a common culture. 
For example, European Community Law Directives set uniform 
community-wide standards that the member states are free to implement 
according to their national legal style. Uniformity proved difficult to achieve 
because of discretionary interpretation in different national legal cultures. It took 
the relentless (and questionable from the point of view of legitimacy) effort of the 
European Court of Justice to transform directives into directly applicable rules 
capable of reaching the desired degree of uniformity. Of course, in Europe this 
process of interpretive transformation from “standards” to rules did not happen in 
a vacuum but it was accompanied by quite a substantive effort to create some 
traits of a common legal culture.   
Thus, institutional arrangements such as judicial (or non-judicial) 
enforcement mechanisms are crucial in order to obtain some interpretive unity and 
an acceptable degree of effectiveness for legal standards. 
 
2.12 Legal standards should only be adopted with a medium-long-term 
vision capable of considering a highly pluralistic enforcement and 
institutional framework. This scenario requires sustained investment in a 
legal and financial culture up to the task 
  
The adoption of legal tools for policy reform, and specifically for helping in the 
solution of the financial crisis, are likely to display even more serious problems 
than those generated by the plurality of legal experiences in Europe. The deep 
legal diversity that exists in the world must be considered and respected in the 
process of drafting (and even further along the line in that of searching for 
effective enforcement) in order to set a point of discontinuity with the 
ethnocentrism and the single thought that so far has characterized the relationship 
between the local and the global dimension. In fact, effectiveness and 
implementation are highly context-dependent, which the systems of monitoring 
should take into consideration. Moreover, global finance is highly sophisticated 
and difficult to access even for legal culture, so that there will be a need to deploy 
(and even earlier to educate) a global class of officials trained in both law and 
finance.   
The institutional framework in which such standards are supposed to 
operate, both at a national and a transnational level, should be carefully taken into 
consideration when planning their adoption. A mere set of legal standards 
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unaccompanied by an institutional apparatus capable to begin the process to 
transform them into sound rules for the concrete issues may have some symbolic 
meaning in the very short term but no effect in the medium-long term. The 
adoption of legal standards should then be accompanied by a global agreement on 
which courts or agencies endowed with strong and penetrating supervisory powers 
should implement them. A strong process of judicial cooperation at the 
international level should also be favored, which might imply some form of 
culturally sensitive legal harmonization.   
 
2.13 “Hard law” should be preferred to “soft law” in developing a legal 
structure capable to govern the market 
 
To keep the economy under control, law cannot be soft. Either the law is hard, 
keeping economic transaction under control (and potentially making them soft, 
acceptable and civilizing), or the economic relationship is hard and keeps soft law 
under its thumb, determining its form as well as its substance. Soft approaches, 
whose only power (if at all) is moral suasion, are functional to a legal and 
economic order in which the market governs the law rather than the other way 
around. In such an economic order, and under the shield of soft legality, 
aggressive and opportunistic market actors succeed in externalizing costs to 
society rather than facing the real cost of their market activity. Thus, in order to be 
successful, public legal institutions competing with strong economic actors need 
to be strong and highly effective. The stronger the actors, the stronger the 
institutions must be if individual or corporate short-term self interest is to be 
channeled or plainly limited for the welfare of everybody and in the long-term 
interest of human civilization. The challenge is how to make this hard law 
legitimate and truly cosmopolitan. 
The “hard law v. soft law” dilemma does not coincide with the “standards 
v. rules” one. Standards and rules are only “words in need of institutional 
interpretation”, which can be regarded as both “hard” or “soft” law depending on 
institutional arrangements which surround them (for instance, standards are often 
included in hard codes). What really matters are the institutional structure and the 
political processes rather than legal tools per se. 
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2.14 It is useless to create new rules or standards unless the issue of their 
effective enforcement is fully appreciated and steps are moved to 
guarantee it. The most urgent issue is returning privatized global rules 
and soft-law processes under public control 
 
It is useless to add grandiose declarations or universal principles as not only are 
they ineffective and often remain dead letter, but also as our existing legal 
panoply is already coherent. Care shall equally be taken when considering the 
creation of new instances (whether being international or supranational courts or 
institutions) which could add even new disorder to the existing system and 
increase its complexity outside of an overall legitimate general redesign of the 
system which could only be the product of a quasi-constitution-making effort. For 
the time being it seems more effective to have the plurality of systems already in 
place (national, international ones) work better, rather than continuing with the 
proliferation of systems and rules. 
In the past 20 years the economic world has required more liberty, lesser 
controls, and a right to self-regulation. Political institutions under the pressure of 
the increasing power of economic actors, have often accepted veritable transfers 
of sovereignty. All this has provoked a deep “privatization” not only of many 
sectors of economic life but also of law-making pertaining to those sectors. Real 
bubbles are impermeable with respect to any institutional control (whether 
judiciary or political). This phenomenon is very important in the financial domain, 
and there is the risk of it expanding into other domains of crucial importance for 
contemporary society such as the one of intellectual property. For some time this 
process has certainly generated a great economic performance, however, in the 
long term this system faces destabilization as shown by the current situation. The 
lack of public controls becomes dysfunctional to the very economic system. 
Consequently, the first aim to be pursued is to re-attract these quasi self-
regulated spaces within the institutional (national or international) framework of 
the law. 
 
2.15 The judicial function, even within the set limits of jurisdiction, can 
help in the global effort to develop established principles of fundamental 
liability and justice. A cosmopolitan exercise of coordinated judicial 
authority might facilitate this function 
 
Global law is very powerful, unnoticeably breeding in its own invisibility: very 
often it is about very technical, grey rules, not secret but so unattractive that few 
dare – including amongst the jurists – analyze them. Opacity and lack of 
transparence, like professionalism, are controlling process granting unrestricted 
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power to strong economic actors. Hence, the importance of establishing 
conditions that make it possible to question privatized legal standards and 
professionalized rules of the game; to force the open and clear formulation of 
otherwise inaccessible rules, ascertaining their substance, writing down their 
content, and hounding them out of their technical shelter. All of this requires 
putting enforcement back in the hands of the people through judicial and non-
judicial means. 
Global law as it currently stands must be challengeable before public 
courts, any public court available. This is a crucial condition, as there is more than 
an abstract risk of “justice” itself sharing the logic of privatization typical of the 
global economy. The unfolding of a ‘global market of judicial services is already 
a reality, transforming law into a commodity like any other, a mere source of 
satisfaction for the profit motive. One should beware of proposals attempting to 
transfer the function of justice to the private sector by means of indiscriminate 
extension of international arbitration and the related liberal regime of circulation 
of awards. Globalization changes the nature of justice: if it remains a public good 
within the frontiers of a State, it becomes a private good in the new “invented 
space” due to the establishment of a real competitive market for private 
commercial disputes’ resolution. 
The legal monopoly of the State (and of political legitimacy) – its 
jurisdictio as much as its imperium – is dramatically restricted as the economic 
actors become masters of their own normative frontiers. It is then essential that the 
different judicial instances remain accessible for the citizen of the world in order 
to help developing from the bottom up principles of justice acceptable to all 
human kind. 
It thus becomes crucial to provide access to all stakeholders, opening some 
forum for (economically subsidized) litigation to anybody potentially affected by 
acts or decisions triggering the justice motive of the civil plaintiff to react and 
struggle. Courts must be wide open, granting a path against injustice to everyone’s 
resolve.  Too much justice is always better than too little justice especially when 
sustained quantitative development is not seen as a value in itself. In the invented 
space of globalization this corresponds to a new use of the law open not only to 
the parties but to general stakeholders perhaps under liberal rules of of amici 
curiae as it is already the case for important cases of global competition law. 
Despite obvious limits in a potential redistributive function, and despite 
being itself open to the excessive risks of over-professionalizing, and thus of 
Western hegemony, open jurisdiction displays some cosmopolitan features, being 
more likely to circulate across frontiers and especially being a partially empty 
power, i.e. it is filled with the arguments submitted to it. Unlike the executive 
power, it does not set its own agenda which does not mean it is empty of political 
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bite but perhaps only that the political content of its decisions cuts across political 
preferences.  
Such an expansion of public courts’ accessibility to entertain global issues 
might eventually produce some collective elaboration, resulting from the work of 
several courts scattered around the globe who concur in defining rules and 
principles of global decency that reflect all decisions previously taken. This 
phenomenon, known as “the judges’ dialogue”, has been visible for several years 
and while certainly by itself it reflects the class and professional biases of judges, 
it might nonetheless introduce at least a degree of legal cosmopolitanism if the 
dialogue is not restricted to Western courts and perhaps even a forum of global 
legal resistance against the excesses of global capital.  
 
2.16 Ex-post models of accountability for financial damages may be 
scarcely effective and difficult to organize 
 
No matter how a legal regime is produced and no matter its content, the issue of 
effectiveness must be approached. Here a tension immediately originates. On the 
one hand, a legal regime capable to assert control over our runaway global 
financial capitalism must be “global” in its reach because transnational economic 
actors cannot be controlled by means of a “national regime”. On the other hand, a 
global top-down enforcement system is very difficult to conceive, potentially 
ineffective because of an overreaching global jurisdiction, and bound to reflect 
dominating value judgments, i.e. those shared only by the powerful policy-makers 
and their allied corporate lawyers. Too often international law simply fails to 
constrain the powerful (states as well as corporations) largely because of 
enforcement systems. We face either the lack of effective courts of international 
law (there are no such courts in the domain of transnational financial activity) or a 
failure of the chain of transmission of international law from its sources to the 
national courts as agencies of enforcement. 
True, in abstract one could imagine setting up such a global court system 
with a broad jurisdictional reach, endowed with some special enforcement 
mechanisms and perhaps even with sufficient power to maintain jurisdiction over 
corporate actors. We submit in this Report that the problems that setting up such a 
system would pose are staggering, to the point of making it utterly unrealistic. To 
begin with, the setting up of such a system would share all the problems already 
experienced with the International Criminal Court. The cession of sovereignty and 
of control of such a system would certainly encourage the stronger global political 
actors to boycott its functioning. Secondly, even if an agreement would be 
reached by the strong political actors, a global court system would face 
tremendous problems created by the Western professional domination over 
international law, structurally incapable of recognizing the interests of the weaker 
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actors. The very adversarial structure of adjudication understood as a zero-sum 
game with one winner and one loser is at the basis of some legal experiences but 
not of others. Moreover, the alternative to adjudication that has emerged in the 
international legal practice, the so called Alternative Dispute Resolution or 
International Dispute Settlement, displays well identified problems in unbalance 
of power settings. On top of this, it is very difficult to have a new, more 
responsible conception of the law emerge from an international body of 
adjudication or from global rules and principles adjudicated by national courts of 
law. The usual issues of technical and linguistic diversity would most probably 
defeat any effectiveness of such standards in practice. Thus, international law for 
deep structural reasons seems irremediably bound to remain detached from the 
real life of the people, exposed to reflect the desires of the stronger actors that can 
afford to hire the skilled legal professionals capable of litigating at this level. 
There is another important basic question that a traditional court-based 
approach to legal enforcement is incapable of solving. Almost invariably in any 
one of the cyclical financial crisis that seem to affect the expansion of global 
capitalism, the cages are locked when the animal has already escaped. Courts can 
react when the damage is already done and most often a non-judgment proof 
defendant is very difficult to find at that point. Bankruptcy is usually never the 
solution, being politically unfeasible in many cases (the famous “too big to fail” 
idea), especially when what follows bankruptcy is widespread unemployment or 
when a whole state economy is involved. This state of affairs produces 
tremendous incentives to transfers of public money to the private financial sector 
in a crisis situation, which in turn is an incentive to crisis-generating behaviors by 
the corporate management. In other words, courts structurally represent an “ex-
post” solution, a liability rule protection that has proved too weak over and over 
again. Ex-post strong actors can bribe themselves out, almost invariably paying a 
fraction of the damage they have produced (G. Calabresi and D. Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, Inalienability). Thus ex-ante regulation and the 
logic of authorization for potentially harmful activities are essential to avoid 
rather than to cure financial disasters.  
 
2.17 Command and Control regulation at the global level may be both 
ineffective and politically very difficult to implement. 
 
Command and control regulation is extremely problematic at the global level. It is 
in fact the ultimate example of a top-down political intervention badly in need of 
legitimacy to be at all effective. In the absence of politically accountable bodies 
such a regulation is unlikely to emerge, and if it emerges at all its effectiveness is 
likely to be minimal (think about the many international declarations on 
substantive rights, which are routinely entered upon but very poorly respected). 
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True, the current “financial emergency” might offer us a “state of exception” 
capable of producing some global sovereignty, and perhaps the need to cure the 
global market unbalance (redistribution, balance of trade etc.) might offer some 
guideline. Nevertheless, technical problems of such a regulatory model persist. 
Direct command and control regulation would require the development of a global 
bureaucracy to monitor it, which is a desirable long-time target in the process of a 
revamped globalization - but very hard to imagine as feasible at this point. 
Some might indicate the variety of “open systems of coordination” 
explored at EU level as an alternative to global command and control regulation. 
These methods, despite having originated some hopes in the scholarly community 
because of the added value of “flexibility”, are nevertheless highly at risk of being 
abused by strong actors. Moreover, the dialogue between very different state-
based bureaucracies, already very difficult in Europe, is very hard to imagine at an 
even broader scale. The very notion of flexibility has to be explored in concrete 
power settings, and it seems that actual political accountability requires a 
simplification in decision-making authority rather that a proliferation of 
regulatory bodies. Thus, while on the one hand the open system of coordination is 
not centralized enough and disperses responsibility, on the other hand it is not 
decentralized enough to “spontaneously” reflect the sense of justice of the people 
and thus be legitimate.               
To look for more alternatives capable of implementing an ex-ante control 
of the financial activity, one should first understand that in the real life of the law 
legitimacy does not only stem from an electoral process. In many settings today, 
and generally speaking in the domain of private law, the most important source of 
law is the “laboratory” of the life experience, the aggregate of relationships that 
economic actors formalize among themselves producing customs and binding 
institutional arrangements. This customary law is behind the development of 
commercial law from the middle ages, and even today a transnational lex 
mercatoria is produced outside of any top-down intervention of the political 
authority. There is no question that this spontaneous legal order is legitimate and 
as such corresponds to the broad idea of justice of the economic actors involved. 
In other words, legitimacy stems from decentralization, from the relational way in 
which individuals and groups relate to each other in a pattern of trading that in 
relatively equal power settings is capable of mediating between alternative visions 
of justice. Such standards of local decentralized justice should be enforced by a 
bottom-up approach whose effectiveness lies in its diffusion and coherence with 
the needs and perceptions of the people in the communities. We have called this 
model the “people’s rule of law”, a system of effective control on individual 
economic activity that reflects social justice. To reduce the potential catastrophic 
impact of individual’s financial creativity on the sense of social justice (for 
example to avoid gambling with retirement assets or people’s savings), one need 
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to find an effective professional and decentralized ex-ante control of the legal 
acceptability of each proposed financial scheme. 
 
2.18 The desirable gradual reduction in dangerous financial innovation 
can only be introduced with an effective ex-ante decentralized public-
minded gate-keeping control 
 
Since financial creativity at the end of history has created too many tools useful 
only to those of the winning part of economic betting and speculation, it is now 
the time of a drastic reduction of the size of the economics of illusions. It is 
necessary to study a form of control over financial innovation that cannot be 
considered any more something desirable per se. Critics will say that such a 
control is at risk of stiffening financial and economic creativity with an impact on 
efficiency that the modern world cannot afford. Indeed such a critique is based in 
the mainstream, and any long-term vision of sustainability must now reject these 
arguments.  
While it would be much beyond the domain of this Report to define the 
boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable financial practices, we can 
certainly point at a method - historically successful in many jurisdictions - which 
could be deployed to obtain some guarantees of security through ex-ante gate 
keeping. Since private signals such as those provided by rating agencies and 
accounting firms constitute a form of soft law that is very weak in the face of risks 
of a conflict of interest, and since the construction of a hierarchical system of 
commands and controls seems practically impossible to be organized, a mixed 
system seems to be what will better serve the current needs. Effective 
decentralized long-term controls over the legality of real-estate transactions have 
been obtained in certain jurisdictions more than in others by the presence of a 
millenniums old institution, the Latin Notary. It seems that such an ex-ante 
impartial and accurate legal control can be considered a global “best practice” 
potentially capable of guaranteeing security and coherence of economic behaviors 
with the variable local interpretations of a fair and sustainable global financial 
system.  
 
2.19 In an attempt to re-establish a decentralized public control over 
private activity, the Latin Notary, a mixed public/private institution, serves 
the needs of a mixed society such as the global one 
 
In a broad functional perspective, the Latin Notary serves the aggregate function 
of one judge and two attorneys. Its institutional posture is always ex ante, since it 
serves the need of avoiding rather than curing economic losses. In a sense, its role 
is that of a legally trained “gatekeeper” with a discretionary power to decide the 
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legal acceptability of a given legal form within a process of careful interpretation 
of the law. This process of interpretation happening ex ante with the active 
participation of the parties to the transaction is not different from that exercised by 
a judge ex post. However, while the interpretation ex post is carried on within the 
adversary conditions of a pathological situation, the Notary ex ante interprets the 
law outside of the tension of the conflict assisting in the development of a 
people’s rule of law. In certain legal systems the Notary’s presence is not limited 
to the law of succession or of real estate planning; rather, it is present in corporate 
law, exercising a role of control in the interest of stake-holders that is often 
resented by Anglo-American attorneys.  
The Notary is a mixed official. On the one hand, the Notary is a public 
officer endowed with power stemming from the State (but it could stem from an 
infra or super-state political entity). On the other hand, the Notary is a private 
professional with a non-hierarchical independent function. In transactions that 
require the presence of the Notary, this figure performs a double role. On the one 
hand, being independent and neutral, the Notary makes sure that the interests of 
the weaker party are protected and that there has been full understanding of the 
nature and consequences of the legal transaction entered upon (this would have 
been very useful in matters such as long-term adjustable sub-prime mortgages that 
share such a major responsibility for the current crisis). On the other hand, the 
Notary is a producer of public goods in the form of legal rules and standards 
incidentally stemming from the function of checking compatibility and 
incremental interpretation of the law. Because of its decentralized posture, very 
close to the bottom-up relational production of law, the Notary is in a very 
favorable position to interpret the needs of justice of society and of the parties to 
the transaction. The Notary serves in a dialogical dynamic with the parties 
involved in the transaction checking their private interest with the public interest 
represented by the respect of legal standards, thus helping to nurture what we have 
called in this Report the “people’s rule of law”. Being a public official, the Notary 
might perform an important role in tax enforcement thus generating significant 
income to the political institutions that deploy this figure. 
 
2.20 The bottom-up production of people’s rule of law could be facilitated 
by a globally organized professional group of easily accessible lawyers 
 
The institution of the Notary, which is currently diffused and known in many 
countries, from Europe to Latin America to China to many African countries, has 
been the target of tremendous ideological critiques at the “end of history”, having 
been considered the product of a guild-minded mentality at odds with the 
development of an efficient market. No wonder that this form of control is 
resented by the strong financial institutions, allergic as they are to any form of 
56
Global Jurist, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 3 (The Global Legal Standards Report), Art. 2
http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/iss3/art2
       
effective “gate keeping”. There is no business here in advocating any of the 
current variations in the organization of the Notary. Reforms might be in order to 
make such a profession serve the global needs. In certain systems, it might be 
necessary to look for functional substitutes. However, such a professional group, 
already organized at the international level, could be a feasible avenue of ex-ante 
enforcement of global legal standards, capable of assisting in the evolution of an 
effective system of control that is legitimate from the perspective of a people’s 
rule of law.  
In the production of a “public good”, such as legal structures reflecting the 
sense of justice of the people, it seems easier to train an international group of 
already existing professionals to obtain a diffused ex ante control, rather than 
implementing a new system of global courts attempting to cure the damage ex 
post. Moreover, the channels of professional communication between the self-
interested professional members of such global guild accompanied by a long 
experience in organizing and maintaining a record of private transactions (perhaps 
in electronic form) can be very useful in the definition and organization of global 
systems of recording of financial transactions simply too difficult to obtain from 
the top down within reasonable time by a global public bureaucracy. 
The global training of a selected number of professionals functioning on 
the model of the Latin Notary with the aim of introducing an ex-ante control of 
feasibility to a number of economic transactions might be a sound way to “slow 
down” financial markets and to keep them alive and prestigious only when 
effectively performing a desirable social function. It would also be a way to do so 
that respects local variations in legal sensitivity and could be organized in a 
relatively slow time with an eye to the long-term security of transactions.   
 
2.21 Fixing the economic and power unbalance between the regulator 
and the regulated is a priority for any legal project aiming at effectiveness 
 
The problem of the strong comparative position of global private actors over the 
large majority of States is very serious. Even if global standards or rules were 
enacted aimed at limiting predatory behavior, their capacity of being enforced 
could be seriously undermined by the current subverted relationship of power 
between the private and the public sector. The corruptive nature of the financial 
capital over the political process is well documented in the literature both in 
“advanced” democracies and a fortiori in weaker political settings. 
Moreover, the amount of state-based shelter needed by predatory financial 
activity is rather minimal because of the technological mobility of capital and of 
the de-territorialized nature of financial activity. In this perspective, the issue of 
“fiscal paradises” but more generally of “banking secret” is extremely serious and 
might make any legal attempt to react against the most egregious predatory 
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practices extremely difficult for the very simple reason that these practices are 
most often “perfectly legal”.  
Even these few lines should be sufficient to see the difficulty in coping 
with the issue of the legality of financial predatory activity. Very soon we reach a 
whole aggregate of deeply entrenched issues in which the law is actually the 
problem much more than the solution. The construction of globally defined and 
authentically legitimate legal standards of acceptability of financial behavior thus 
introduces us to the extremely difficult issue of the boundary between legality and 
illegality, and in particular of which authority should ascertain this boundary, and 
when and with what power to act.  
While in the previous paragraphs we have suggested the need to make use 
of a highly decentralized and locally rooted system to make the boundary between 
legal and illegal financial activity rooted in a people’s rule of law, the 
enforcement of such a boundary cannot be left to national authorities that are 
either too weak or too corrupt to effectively monitor predatory activity. True, it is 
naïve to think such a boundary as a clear-cut black-and-white divide between 
legitimate and illegitimate financial activities. Also, it would also be unrealistic to 
think that one authority could be charged with its ascertainment. The distinction 
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior is a cultural long-term project that 
requires the involvement of many actors (and a very strong role of education) in a 
complex relationship with each other. Regardless of all this, it is indubitable that 
effective enforcement requires a quite significant financial effort. The law does 
not work if it is not endowed with resources that make it stronger than those that it 
has to regulate. 
From this perspective, in harvesting human experience, we can learn from 
quite a large number of past mistakes: in the United States, for example, the 
agencies of enforcement have traditionally been significantly under-funded. The 
strategy of creating an agency and then granting it an insufficient endowment 
serves the political purpose of showing some public mindedness but at the same 
time granting safe havens to the private crony interests that the newly created 
agencies should regulate. The most recent episode of such a strategy in the US, 
following the Enron scandal, has been the Accounting Profession Oversight Board 
introduced by the Sarbanes Oxley Act, presented as a radical solution to the 
problems of conflict of interests and then endowed with a budget comparable to 
that of a small-size academic law school. Similarly, chronic under-funding and 
understaffing has affected the SEC through its lifespan. 
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2.22 Consideration should be given to the possible development of a 
“global financial misconduct intelligence prosecution and police 
authority” as a first common effort towards the development of a global 
class of public-minded civil servant 
 
From the previous analysis a few consequences follow. First, a sustained 
international economic effort should be entered into in order to revamp the public 
sector as a regulator and enforcer, as opposed to the private sector that should not 
be allowed to regulate or to enforce. The separation between the private and 
public sector should be regained to the extent that is necessary to avoid the 
endemic conflicts of interest that characterized predatory capitalism. While this 
certainly involves the strengthening of public authority on such highly dangerous 
private corporations such as those running the stock exchanges, it should perhaps 
involve forms of international control over such major centers of global financial 
activity such as the main stock exchanges, whose reach is certainly global and 
whose current regulation is to say the least highly unsatisfactory. To be sure, the 
tools to control speculation are extremely weak without such kind of public 
control. More generally, the current almost complete lack of control over crucial 
global actors such as the rating agencies, whose work as unaccountable “soft” 
legislators and gatekeepers determining much economic behavior in the current 
financial setting is highly questionable.  
Such a revamping of the public sector should be guaranteed at the 
international level with systems of selection of global, independent, highly 
prestigious and qualified civil servants recruited on the basis of capacity and 
geographical representation. The presence of such public-minded civil servants 
shielded from corruption is an historical best practice from Imperial China to 
France to Japan. Again, such a project requires some long-term global investment 
in systems of legal and financial education capable of creating such a global class 
of public-minded lawyers/economists to be inserted in the regulatory and 
controlling authorities of all systems. The revamping of the public sector is 
perhaps the most expensive but also the most promising long-term strategy for 
any global model of sustainable development. 
Only once the public sector is revamped can it be used as a system of 
proactive and reliable execution of a long-term plan of financial sustainability 
which, as we have seen in the Introduction to this Report, cannot be seriously 
conceived outside of a global plan of economic redistribution. Any such plan 
cannot be carried out without sufficient institutional strength and human capital to 
overcome the likely tremendous resistance from the strong economic actors. This 
is why serious plans of public money interventions in the economy cannot be 
outsourced to private law firms or investment banks without being defeated by the 
structural conflict of interest.  
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A global class of public servants is also required for the more immediate 
task of struggling against global financial predatory behavior. Just as international 
taskforces of soldiers under UN responsibility are sometimes used and sent to take 
care of international emergencies (this parallel does not imply that such model of 
intervention is deemed here useful, let alone desirable), the establishment of an 
international class of enforcers of the global financial legal order it may be 
immediately necessary. Such a global financial police force or prosecutorial 
authority should be endowed with great power of investigation, discovery of 
documents, files and other information (including power of deposition). Such a 
power is essential not only for the ex-post investigation of discrete events, but 
also, which is most important for an effective global legal order, of ex-ante 
intelligence of extremely sophisticated schemes. 
 
 
PART III 
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKET 
 
 
3.1 Each new crisis revealed a large number of holes in the global 
architectural framework. However, instead of creating a new coherent 
system, the global institutional framework is a complex, crisis-driven 
structure. 
 
The current international architecture for financial market supervision and 
regulation is a complex network in which national authorities are paired by a 
plethora of private and public international and transnational bodies that have 
emerged since the 1970s. The system’s evolution and its sophistication are crisis-
driven. Not by chance, the beginning of cooperation between supervisory 
authorities dates back to the early 1970s, when the Herstatt Bank’s failure sent 
shock waves through the world’s financial markets and, subsequently, the G10 
Central Banks’ Governors decided to establish the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision.  
After every crisis a new piece was added to the global puzzle. In 1944 and 
in 1945 the WB and IMF were respectively created. During the 1970s, new bodies 
were founded to set standards and to monitor different branches of financial 
markets. Thus, in 1973 the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) was 
established, and in 1983 the International Organization of Securities 
Commissioners (IOSCO) was founded.  
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Subsequently in the late 1980s a further specialization was required and 
several “task forces” were created such as the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering (FATF), and the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS). In 1994 and in 1995, respectively, the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the Egmont Group were created.  
The overabundance of these bodies and the Asian crisis pushed 
policymakers to establish more trustworthy coordination mechanisms in order to 
ensure global stability. Hence, in 1996 the Joint Forum was established between 
IOSCO and IAIS, operating under the guidance of the Basel Committee. 
Moreover, in 1999 the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the Financial Stability 
Institute (FSI) were formed.  
With the new millennium, other organizations were created to respond 
new social and economic needs. Accordingly, in 2004 the International 
Organization of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) was founded. Nonetheless, the most 
remarkable institutional implementation of these days is surely represented by the 
increased role of the European Union in defining a European Financial Market. 
Ad hoc rulemaking procedures involving newly created committees were 
established - i.e. the Lamfalussy process, putting financial market regulation and 
harmonization at the top of European policymakers agenda, namely through the 
European Commission Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). 
While all these bodies and authorities often operate jointly in order to issue 
codes, guidelines, and best practices, the global order is a plural order, in the 
sense that there is neither unity nor homogeneity in its structure. All those 
organizations, indeed, independently from their administrative structure, 
participate in the (global) governance of financial markets. The standards they 
prescribe directly affect the national legislations, even if such a mechanism is 
totally extraneous to a law-making process grounded on democratic values, such 
as accountability and transparency. In this sense the global institutional 
framework is governed by an international order composed of heterogeneous 
bodies representing different interests and with overlapping scopes, aims, and 
memberships. 
The fragmented scenario just presented is the result of a series of short-
term policies mostly taken to solve specific needs and to provide a quick answer 
to a situation of distress.  
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3.2 A narrow regulatory culture has created a path-dependent mechanism 
in which every new legal arrangement was not designed to deal with the 
growing complexity and globalization of financial markets 
 
Even if any crisis might be understood as an occasion to revisit an outdated 
system, it appears that the current framework is locked in a self-perpetuating 
mechanism, in which every solution taken is shaped around specific regulatory 
culture.  
In general terms, when a system is in distress a “menu of options” is 
considered by policymakers in order to respond to such a crisis. All reforms 
occurred after a crisis followed a pre-cast ideology. In this sense, the menu of 
possible choices was locked in by a dogma built over a set of principles rooted in 
market fundamentalism. Accordingly, because of this menu-dependence, and 
because situations of distress in financial markets are often perceived to be the 
result of supervisory failure, the international architecture – every time a crisis 
occurred – was enriched by a new organization, whose aim was not to deal with 
instability (because deemed as physiological), and whose scope of action was not 
involving free movements of capital (because such regulation is burdensome for 
international business).  
When a legal system has to cope with a crisis, a change in the original 
structure might be required to provide an escape from the distressing situation. In 
financial markets, when scandals or crises emerge, an immediate answer is often 
needed to limit the impact on the real economy of such events or simply to 
improve state’s credibility. Thus, in order to block eventual systemic effects and 
to recover from the crisis, an immediate institutional response was instinctively 
provided, with the aim of instilling new trust in the supervisory structure. 
However, in urgency situations like financial distress, the dependence on existing 
cultural beliefs might impede the creation of new, more effective institutional 
frameworks. 
In other words, if on the one hand an institutional response was expected, 
on the other hand the ideological background stifled any new attempt in providing 
a consistent and general revision of financial architecture. This approach 
determined the adoption of legal arrangements not coping with the growing 
interconnection and sophistication of capital markets. Considering the current 
situation, it is necessary to implement a genuinely new structural framework 
dealing with the externalities directly generated by excessive speculation. In this 
sense, only once the classical common beliefs are overruled can a reliable 
architectural framework for financial markets supervision be put in place. 
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3.3 All previous reforms were constructed around harmful dogmas, 
according to which: (i) crises are inevitable; (ii) markets are self-healing; 
(iii) crises are a domestic matter. Only by overriding such cultural grid of 
references a genuinely new approach can be designed 
 
It is commonly recognized that after a crisis or a shock, governments – even the 
most reluctant – strengthen their regulatory tights. As just explained, however, 
every new legal arrangement adopted in the aftermath of a crisis was determined 
by a narrow cultural grid of references, according to which: (i) crises are 
inevitable; (ii) markets are self-healing; (iii) crises are a domestic matter.  
Are crises inevitable? It is often alleged that human beings are selfish, 
rent-seekers, and profit-maximizers; greed and self-indulgence is unavoidable 
behavior of our species. In this sense, crises cannot be really avoided and a certain 
amount of instability is required to get rid of “unhealthy” institutions, promote 
competition and create sound financial system (which eventually never occurred). 
Consequently, following this belief, the strategy to cope with crises could be well 
represented by the “let the fire burn” slogan.  
Several studies have already explained the phases of every crisis. In 
accordance with the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), over periods of 
protracted wealth, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure 
dominated by “hedge finance” (i.e. stable) to a structure that increasingly 
emphasizes “speculative” and “Ponzi finance” (i.e. unstable). It is clear that in this 
historical time we are in the so-called “Minsky moment”, in which the income-
debt relation led us to a “Ponzi finance”. The systemic consequences are evident 
even if not yet fully assessed.  
Nevertheless, the fact that there is cyclical movement in the way financial 
markets (without a calibrated governmental intervention) generate instability has 
provided the ground for “wait and see” approach to financial crises. Although 
rescue packages are generally enacted as immediate response to the crises, the 
normative application of the “physiological argument” has contributed to block 
any attempt to redraw a consistent architectural framework. 
Are markets self-healing? This question might appear odd in such an 
historical moment, in which is under everyone’s eyes the daily governmental 
activity in attempting to heal the current economic meltdown. Nevertheless, the 
logical consequence of considering crises as physiological occurrences implies to 
believe that markets have the natural power to overcome instability; in other 
words, markets are auto-regulating. Exogenous regulatory actions (in a broader 
sense) are, thus, considered an inhibition to growth and competition. Even after 
recent scandals, it was said that market would respond without needing the 
implementation of new legislations. As a result, the Enron scandal became an 
example of market functioning and not a market failure. 
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Even if it is in the long run, the market’s invisible hand may solve failures 
by its own endogenous mechanisms; nevertheless, it is obvious – as proven by 
historical evidence – that losses caused by market failures, may be unpredictable 
and disastrous in the short run. This makes public intervention necessary. The 
evolution of financial markets shows that countries are oriented towards 
regulatory solutions instead of deregulating, while free banking remains confined 
to some limited historical examples.  
Furthermore, stronger waves of liberalization (which does not necessarily 
coincide with deregulation) of financial systems have occurred throughout 
financial history. Countries have sometimes lowered compulsory reserve 
requirements and entry barriers in the banking sector, governmental interference 
in credit allocation has been reduced, insurance companies and banks have been 
privatized, and several countries promoted the development of local stock markets 
encouraging the entry of foreign financial intermediaries. Nevertheless, several 
studies conducted by the WB have verified that an excessive financial 
liberalization, once it leads to deregulation, exerts an independent adverse effect 
on financial stability.  
In the case of the current crisis, it appears that deficiencies in the 
regulatory and supervisory systems contributed in determining the current severe 
situation. The shadow banking system provides clear evidence. Non-bank 
mortgage lenders (such as hedge funds, investment vehicles, brokers, etc.) were 
operating like credit institutions: they borrowed very short-term and in liquid 
ways and they carried the risk, but unlike banks they were not subject to banking 
regulation and supervision, which implies they were more leveraged without a 
deposit insurance coverage and they were not protected by systemic risk by 
central banks’ lender-of-last-resort liquidity. The growing expansion of such a de 
facto unregulated system has aggravated the subprime mortgage crisis and 
contributed to transform the credit crunch into a global meltdown. 
Are crises a domestic matter? This common belief is also addressed as the 
“house-in approach”. This assumes that shocks are domestically originated and no 
internationally coordinated response is required if all countries enhance optimal 
policies. The ex ante consequences of such wisdom leads to prescribe general 
recipes for uninflationary policies to avoid global systemic imbalances. The ex 
post reaction (when a crisis still occurs) is the enactment of a series of measures to 
“isolate the contagion”.  
Although good domestic policies are an essential piece for the stability of 
the international system, this approach has often compromised any attempt to 
shape international arrangements in order to deal with what is deemed a mere 
domestic problem. In this sense the “reform of the international financial 
architecture” proposed by the G7 countries, and highly debated after the Asian-
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Russian crisis of the 1990s, was mainly conceived as an effort to strengthen 
financial systems in emerging market countries by adopting standards and codes. 
There are at least two economic reasons that make any domestic-oriented 
approach to cope with crises a limited and potentially harmful device. Scholars 
have pointed out that since the 1973 crisis frequency has been double that of the 
Bretton Woods and classical gold standard periods, and matched only by the 
crisis-ridden 1920s and 1930s.  
Precisely, the indicator that financial crises are not anymore a domestic 
matter only is the increased frequency in financial turmoil. Conventional thinking 
holds that risks are mainly local and routine, and they can be dealt with through a 
risk-based approach shaped upon previous experiences.  
The first argument deals with the globalization process. The growing 
interconnection of markets and people characterizing this age emphazise the 
impact of any financial turbulence, thus making impossible to forecast any 
consequences. In this sense, the impact of a crisis tends to be unpredictably 
spreading out easily around the globe, like a pandemic infection. Moreover, the 
financial products’ complexity (misunderstood by supervisors, banks, rate 
agencies and practitioners) makes it hard to predict consequences and losses. In 
this sense, previous experiences only provide a small hint to the future 
consequences. For this reason, a structural arrangement that is aimed at filling a 
gap is a solution born already outdated. The only certainty is that nowadays every 
spark might light a fire. Thus, a global net ensuring a reliable supervisory scheme 
has to be urgently put in place. 
The second reason is more subtle. It is clear (and easily verifiable 
nowadays) that a failure of a bank in the US might indeed easily cause the failure 
of other healthy institutions in Europe and elsewhere, by activating a subsequent 
chain reaction that will dramatically affect the real economy. However, there is 
another channel of contagion in crises: information. Financial instability generate 
negative externalities that my affect other markets not directly touched by the 
crises. In other words, after a crisis occurs, a second generation of crises (defined 
as “self-fulfilling”), might occur. Self-fulfilling crises on a fixed exchange rate 
occur when markets come to expect that a crisis will force the authorities to adopt 
new policies, or when a country simply fears some negative consequence might 
touch its market.  
In these days (again leaving aside any ethical consideration about the 
different approaches), “isolating the fire” is simply nonsense, considering the 
scale and the severity of current crises. 
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3.4 Reframing the international architecture implies both the creation of 
a single, reliable and transparent framework for international bodies, and 
the establishment of a more consistent domestic architecture for national 
financial supervisors 
 
Both avoiding inconsistency among regulations set up by different bodies 
operating at the domestic level (but in different sectors) and at the international 
level is important. In this sense, the domestic architecture for financial markets 
supervision is a fundamental brick in the overall stability of financial markets.  
The institutional design for financial supervision has become a major 
policy issue (especially after scandals or crises), and in some cases ending in 
structural reforms and animating public debate in a number of countries (just to 
mention some instances in the last decade of a new architectural regime: Belgium, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Singapore, United Kingdom). 
Increasing emphasis, even before the present crisis, was given to the architectural 
shape as a medium to implement the efficiency of regulation and supervision - 
although the literature in this field is poorly developed and it is merely relying on 
identifying the optimal number of authorities. 
The need of a national consistent system has been stressed in several 
occasions. It appears that a bank operating in different European countries with 
cross-border and cross-sector operations (mainly between insurance and banking 
products) has to deal with 57 different authorities, which all have similar, but not 
identical, standards and procedures. Even more, the recent Basel 2 agreement in 
Europe allows for more than 300 differences among EU member states. The 
creation of a European Security Exchange Commission might be, accordingly, a 
project to be carefully analysed, though perhaps such an authority - to be at all 
effective - should be imagined at the global level, and funded very generously to 
learn from the failures of the US model.  
The highly fragmented system has also played a crucial role in the 
subprime crisis in the US and in the spread of toxic assets around Europe. Such 
institutional framework, in fact, might induce hazardous behaviours. Firms may 
invest substantial resources to avoid a specific country’s regulation, which would 
leave consumers no better-off and provoke social disadvantage. The shadow-
banking phenomenon that emerged in the US is a clear example of avoiding bank 
regulations through the implementation of new derivative devices. Such practice 
falls into the broader definition of regulatory arbitrage. This typically could lead 
to “forum shopping”, if companies choose the weakest regulatory regime in order 
to operate without strong transparency requirements or rigid supervisory 
standards, to the detriment of investors. 
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3.5 Every new authority should fully embrace the conceptual distinction 
between regulatory powers and supervisory tasks. Such distinction lies at 
the core of a system based on accountability and transparency principles. 
 
Independent authorities (both at the national and international level) are not only 
entrusted with the power to enact specific rules: many of the above-mentioned 
international bodies do issue soft laws that might take the form of best practices 
and codes. Together with this rulemaking power, they have also the power to 
control the compliance of market participants with those rules. It is evident that a 
regulatory action will not be complete (nor credible) without an effective 
oversight mechanism, nor without adequate enforcement procedures. Considering 
the high volume of transactions, the number of participants and the involvement 
of end-consumers, the surveillance activity is a fundamental tool to ensure the 
transparency and the soundness of financial markets. 
Two distinct but interconnected activities are performed by independent 
agencies: regulation and supervision. Generally, the terms are confused and the 
word “regulation” absorbs the concept of supervision. The conceptual distinction 
between regulatory activity and supervisory duty, even if both embedded in the 
same body, represents a fundamental logical step in defining a transparent, 
accountable, and reliable system. Regulation, therefore, consists of a legislative 
delegation allowing the specialized bodies to produce more detailed provisions. 
The very concept of delegation implies that the legislative power is performing an 
a-priori policy choice, which is enacted in its detail by other bodies. However, 
supervisory activities are related to the oversight performed by independent 
bodies once they are controlling the application of the relevant laws and 
regulations. Conceptually, therefore, this implies monitoring and enforcement 
activities. 
In this sense, the administrative agencies’ role, in which supervision and 
regulation converge, is a form of bureaucratic lawmaking that does not follow the 
democratic decision-making process, though it has a strong impact on the 
regulated sectors. Accordingly, accountability is a manner to inject some 
democracy into such an important decision-making process. Thus, in line with the 
legal theory, accountability becomes a way to ensure a democratic mechanism of 
rule making.  
By emphasizing and institutionally enforcing the conceptual distinction 
between regulation and supervision, it becomes clear that accountability can be 
both a way to ensure a democratic mechanism of rule making, and a means to 
ensure the fairness in supervisory activities. Accountability is precisely what 
legitimates quasi-legislative action that falls outside the parliamentary activity, 
and quasi-judiciary activity performed by administrative agencies. 
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Accordingly, accountability should be ensured at the structural level by 
establishing appointment and removal procedures for the head officials, 
assessment and evaluation mechanisms, and coordination procedures with other 
national and international bodies. Moreover, every new authority should clearly 
set up accountability mechanisms to cope with the regulatory dimension of its 
activity. Regulatory accountability consists of all those mechanisms directly 
devoted to counterbalancing the discretionary rulemaking powers. In this sense, 
the limits established by international laws and legal systems should be fully taken 
into account together with mechanisms fostering transparency and the right of 
participating, through public consultations in the rulemaking activity. Finally, the 
supervisory dimension should be addressed by a set of accountability mechanisms 
devoted to counterbalancing the individual decision making activity, i.e. the 
discretionary action that might affect individual rights or interests.  
Having in mind a clear allocation of powers, the implementation of 
specific mechanisms to counterbalance such powers will immediately lead to a 
transparent and legitimate regulatory action in which procedures in the decision 
making actions are fully disclosed.  
 
3.6 To shape a consistent framework for financial market supervision and 
regulation, financial instability should be directly addressed by setting up 
regional monitoring agencies and by taxing speculative capital flows 
 
Financial instability might be seen as a “public bad” (like pollution) generating 
non-pecuniary externalities. Though a certain degree of volatility can be accepted, 
an excessive volatility causes wide spread damages through an undefined number 
of people.  
Such costs should be internalized, by shaping a system directly coping 
with a core characteristic of financial markets, i.e. the free movement of capital. 
Free movement of capital is advocated in terms of efficiency, welfare spread, and 
even a higher flexibility in case of shocks. However, it is true that a liberal 
approach to capital circulation generates instability. More precisely, the 
externalities generated by instability are flying with capital and they circulate 
around the globe.  
The analysis of capital flows usually discerns between long-term (e.g. 
foreign direct investments or long-term loans) and short-term flows (short-terms 
loans or speculative investment). In the neoclassical approach, both flows are 
supposed to generate positive effects equilibrating the internal production (and 
consumption), and evening out the risk.  
However, this view hardly explains those crises (e.g. Asian crisis) which 
are associated with the excessive liberalization of short-term capital flows. 
Moreover, the actual crisis proves that the liberalization of capital flows around 
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the globe has amplified the externalities of financial instability. To internalize 
such costs, in a long-term perspective, two main actions can be adopted. At first, 
the architectural framework should include regional monitoring agencies, 
entrusted with the power to track capital flows; then, a tax policy to internalize 
short-term speculative flows should be adopted. 
One of the main problems is to track flows and assets (toxic or healthy) 
circulating within a given geographic area. Accordingly, new regional authorities 
whose primary task is to track information over capital, cross-border operations 
and assets might be the first step towards a reliable network of international 
bodies constantly monitoring capital flows. Such bodies, which should not have 
sanctioning or rulemaking powers, might become the point of reference for 
national authorities, which indeed are carrying out the supervisory activity. In this 
sense, capital and financial products should be monitored and tracked not by a 
scattered system of rating agencies, but by an independent public body that might 
provide information to national or international authorities.  
A similar system is, for instance, set up to fight money laundering and 
financial fraud. International mutual cooperation is crucial to combating the fraud 
globally. In this field, national agencies are acquiring the power to share 
information with their overseas partners enabling prosecution in multiple 
jurisdictions. This system is supported by a series of Financial Intelligent Units 
located around the world, whose primary task is to provide assistance to the 
national authorities. A similar solution might be adopted to track and assess 
capital flows circulating around the world.  
Independent regional bodies, entrusted with the power to gather 
information, analyzing assets and practices have the positive effect to directly 
cope with what has turned out to be one of the main disadvantages of free 
movements of capital. In addition, capital flows can be restrained selectively by 
using Tobin taxes as successfully operating in different countries. Such tools 
discourage speculative short-term flows without harming efficient long-term 
capital flows. 
The Tobin Tax has heated several debates since 1974, when James Tobin 
first formulated his proposal to tax currency transaction. However, this proposal – 
vividly discussed in several occasions and presented again by James Tobin as a 
contribution to the UNDP Human Development Report in 1994 – was blocked by 
the regulatory culture inspiring the lassez-faire approach that claimed to have 
weaker governmental intervention in the economy. 
The rationale is to regulate short-term round trips, affecting negatively 
long-term investments, by adopting a uniform fixed tax for each transaction. As a 
result, short-term repeated operations will be heavily taxed and strongly 
discouraged.  
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By adopting a systemic approach necessary to cope with such a global 
crisis, a Tobin taxation mechanism could have beneficial consequences to the 
global financial stability by establishing a correct set of incentives that leads 
towards less speculative finance. While Tobin taxes were mainly considered as a 
tool to cope with the exploitation of emerging economies, in the actual situation 
they may become a general policy tool to internalize the externality generated by 
financial instability.  
 
3.7 Decision-making depends on the institutional structure within which 
the decision is taken as a concrete exercise of power. Yet, since 
questioning economic policy as currently produced by the IMF and the 
WB goes beyond the purpose of this Report, the focus will only be on the 
IMF and the WB as producers of global law 
 
It would be pointless to add here yet another voice to the chorus that blames the 
IMF and the WB for the current global inequitable state of affairs. More important 
is to approach them as institutional producers of global law by fully emphasizing 
that most policy decisions are determined by the institutional structure in which 
they are taken. Both the WB and the IMF display the hierarchical structure of a 
corporation. Both of them were thought as agencies of economic policy and not of 
law-making. While the hierarchical structure has remained unchanged until today, 
the economic policy has been dramatically transformed, especially in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, when geo-political powers stopped to 
work as counter-forces to preclude legal intervention in contested political 
settings. The outcome of this altered context makes an institutional reform process 
of the WB and the IMF an unavoidable precondition for maintaining or expanding 
their function. Until such deep structural reform allows them to operate as systems 
of democratic governance subject to global checks and balances, their role should 
be marginalized since bad, self-serving, short-sighted policy will be the 
structurally unavoidable result.     
In theory, the WB assists the governments of developing countries in 
implementing their own customized economic policies and developmental 
strategies, under what is now called the Comprehensive Development Framework 
(CDF), set in 1999, which includes the ideas of long-term development strategies, 
local stakeholder “ownership”, and ongoing supervision and evaluation. In 
practice the most important vehicle through which the WB exercises a law-
making activity is the so called “Structural Adjustment”. These “adjustments” to 
the internal legal systems of assisted countries are necessary (so called 
conditionality) if they wish to access new loans or decrease interest rates on 
existing ones. Since the “end of history”, Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) 
in a regime of conditionality have been used to apply free market policies, such as 
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privatization, deregulation, reduction of trade and capital barriers as well as 
opening up developing countries to exploitive foreign investment.  
Structural Adjustment policies applied by the WB have affected negatively 
the fight against poverty in developing countries. Although the total number of 
conditions may have decreased because of sustained critique since the end of the 
last century, only non-legally binding conditions were dropped, while those 
legally binding remained unchanged. More than 71% of all grants and loans of the 
International Development Association (IDA) contained some sort of legally 
sensitive condition, such as price liberalization, privatization, public enterprise 
restructuring, abolition of commodity price regulation and subsidies, trade 
reforms and tariff reductions. Privatization has led to a shift in ownership from 
local governments to foreign investors in many cases, leading to employment 
cuts. Promotion of exports and trade liberalization are both trade policies of SAP 
that have led to ignoring domestic needs in favor of foreign markets (thus 
producing more unemployment). The imposition of user fees and the downsizing 
of government spending have reduced the main services available such as health 
and education services. 
Hence, the pedigree of the WB in regard to the new necessary policies at 
the end of the end of history is very poor. For instance, the WB has played a role 
in several of the financial and economic crisis of the past - beginning as far back 
as the debt crisis in 1982. While forcing countries to remove any control over 
capital or exchange movements, the WB increased the phenomenon of capital 
flight, tax evasion and corruption. Throughout its lifetime, the WB has financed 
projects with severe negative effects on the environment especially in the areas of 
forestry, water and mining. The building of dams has displaced millions, many of 
them without sufficient compensation and resettlement steps, while forests have 
been opened up for commercial logging because of road projects.  
Nor does it seem wise, considering its past performance, to rely on the 
IMF. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created at the Bretton Woods 
Conference in 1944 as a public entity whose unique scope was to maintain global 
economic stability. Originally, the IMF was created as an international institution 
- “democratic” in some sense, even if only the representatives of the winners of 
World War II gathered in Bretton Woods (1944). The IMF was based on the 
theory of the lack of aggregate demand formulated by Lord Keynes, and on the 
understanding that markets are flawed and that a depression is always behind the 
corner. Therefore, it was born as an institution that formally belonged to the entire 
global community, and whose aim was to prevent unassisted global markets from 
falling apart. However, well-known circumstances, mostly based on political 
transformations that followed the abandoning of the gold standard, transformed 
the IMF into a supporter and guardian of the free and global market and of a 
laissez-faire approach of economic policy. Ironically, the IMF has been 
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sponsoring economic and legal policies that are exactly the opposite of what it 
was originally conceived to sustain.  
 
3.8 The IMF and the WB - albeit discrete institutions - are de facto highly 
integrated partners in the making and execution of the system of global 
financial deregulation that has severely limited the possibility of 
legitimized political actors to protect themselves against the spreading of 
the US crisis 
 
Born as two separate entities - even if created during the same Conference - the 
two institutions began working more closely with each other starting from the 
1980s. The World Bank for the Reconstruction and Development, which until that 
moment had been exclusively involved in low-interest rate loans necessary to the 
realization of international projects, both public and private, became the 
operational arm of the IMF and the Washington Consensus policies.  
The two headquarters, not far from one another, agreed on a new form of 
cooperative action, according to which the WB would have granted its loans only 
to those countries that had committed to implement a series of economic, financial 
and political reforms suggested by the IMF. This determined the birth of the 
tragically famous structural adjustment loans, and their legislative reforms 
generally based on the three watchwords of austerity, privatization and 
liberalization, and on the so-called cross-conditionality.  
Given the current situation and its repercussions over the developing 
countries, the IMF-imposed conditionality concerning the liberalization of the 
banking system and of the financial markets, should be the object of some second 
guessing. In fact, one of the typical IMF conditions aims to create a unique and 
global financial market where capital and securities can flow from one country to 
another (or to an offshore heavens), without any barrier. Unfortunately, fast and 
widely unregulated liberalization of the banking system and of the financial 
markets without an appropriate set of rules and limits also makes the contagious 
effect of a financial crisis very difficult to limit. This “no rules no limits” policy 
prevailed because of its ability to increase the profit made by the big financial 
institutions and speculators. Regrettably, it had a very negative impact over the 
involved countries. It has been long generally known that, without going too far in 
the past, the 1994 Tequila crisis in Mexico, the 2001 crisis of Argentina, and the 
1997 Asian crisis, were all mainly determined by the possibility for foreign capital 
to enter and exit without any difficulty. First, the free flow of financial capital 
makes it a fundamental part of the national economies; then, its sudden 
withdrawal determines an immediate turmoil of the real economy with all the 
consequent suffering. 
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Confronted with this scenario, it is necessary to create institutional 
conditions that preclude the IMF from imposing the traditional and draconian 
conditions to its loans, especially to those provided in order to plug the effects of 
the global meltdown. Furthermore, the privatization and liberalization of the 
banking and financial sectors, which on average account for almost half of all 
privatization and liberalization conditions, are at the basis of the spreading of the 
current crisis so that once again a turning point is needed. Again, institutional 
conditions should be produced for a change. It is never too late to intervene 
responsibly. The last twenty years represent only a fraction of modern history, and 
the faster we act, the easier it will be to stop the ongoing process of self-
destruction. Unfortunately, using the Fund outside of a thorough revision of its 
institutional decision making not only makes the same old policies inevitable, but 
also produces more self-serving double standards between rich and not-
sufficiently-represented poor countries. The only foreseeable consequence of such 
fundamental continuity is the broadening of the gap that separates poor and rich 
countries, a scenario that could only lead to stronger global instability. 
 
3.9 The organization of Special Drawing Rights is a short-term response. 
A more structured long-term institutional reform is necessary now 
 
One of the six pledges announced by the recent G-20 London summit is to give 
the IMF an extra $750 billion to distribute special drawing rights (SDRs). While 
some commentators have described this plan as a strong commitment to help 
countries whose economies run into trouble, a close look to the history and 
structure of this financial instrument suggests a certain amount of skepticism. 
Briefly speaking, SDRs are an international reserve asset whose value depends on 
a basket of currencies - a sort of credit line that can be allocated to member 
countries in proportion to their IMF quotas. The IMF created these quotas in 1969 
to support the Bretton Woods fixed exchange-rate system, as a reserve that 
countries could use to buy their own currency in order to pop up its value when 
downward fluctuation so requires. Soon, as the fixed exchange-rate system 
collapsed, and all the countries started looking at the US dollar as a trustworthy 
currency that could be used to build up national reserves, SDRs were abandoned, 
and the US acquired the central role they have had during the last decades (see 
supra Part II). The scope of SDRs is, in any case, to reinforce national reserves: in 
fact, they are interest-free if untouched, while countries pay interest whenever 
SDRs are converted into hard currencies.  
This reserve asset is not a new tool to fight back crises: SDRs were 
distributed in 1970-1972; again in 1979-1981; and proposed in September 1997, 
but in this last case the US, with their 16.75% of total votes in the IMF, imposed 
their veto. Now, the choice of SDRs undoubtedly has geopolitical consequences, 
73
Research Group: At the End of the End of History
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
       
but unless something changes in the way they are managed and distributed, a 
change in the economic perspective will be extremely unlikely. 
 
3.10 The international financial institutions should be reformed in a 
long-term perspective. Their current role shows the need of a degree of 
separation of power in any system of global representative government 
 
There is no doubt that through the “end of history” the role of the international 
financial institutions has been transformed into a role of unaccountable global 
economic legislator endowed with tremendous executive power through the 
leverage of economic conditionality, and outside of any possibility of judicial 
challenge. This institutional stance explains much of their policy in fostering the 
interests of the strongest (mostly US-based) transnational corporate power. 
Consequently, rethinking the role of the international financial institutions today 
requires a focus on their internal governance to foster representation and to limit 
the concentration of power.  
The description of their voting quota and of their representativeness (or 
lack of it) shows that it is necessary to redistribute the number of votes that every 
member country has, because otherwise these institutions will continue to be 
undemocratic and unrepresentative bodies where corporate interests are imposed 
throughout the world.  
It is structurally impossible for an institution that assigns the voting rights 
on the basis of the economic power of the member countries to create a new, fair, 
and widely accepted global system. Because of this impossibility many countries, 
like Venezuela, have already withdrawn from the institution, but that kind of 
decision is not what we need right now. To reshape world governance, we need to 
at least improve the existing institutional system into a new globalized and fair 
framework where there is an actual possibility for all countries to exercise 
political discretion rather than simply having to forcefully implement policy 
imposed from the top down.  
To do so, the specific weight of the countries must be increased up to a 
level that should force the IMF and WB to take into full consideration all 
proposals and alternative visions - the requests and the needs of all the people of 
the world. While the first step should be to give a higher level of importance to 
the BRIC Countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the eventual goal is to 
establish a public international body that helps the poorest on the basis of their 
needs, independently and autonomously from the money deployed by the 
wealthier. The logic of the stronger cannot ground any legal system. Rather, what 
we need is a public international body that helps all countries on the basis of their 
needs. In this new logic, among the various proposals that have appeared in recent 
years is, for instance, the suggestion of a system which, like today, starts from a 
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minimum amount of votes equal for each country (currently in the IMF, each 
country has 250 basic votes); then, another share of votes could be given on the 
basis of the population and its life conditions, attributing more votes where life 
conditions are lower and an external support is needed more; a third share of votes 
could be finally attributed on the basis of the size of the state economy in the 
global market. Such a combination, negotiated within the global economic 
constitution process, would annul the present US power of veto, reshuffling the 
current priorities and substituting the needs for the power, which is the first step 
toward a fairer and more equal world.  
Moreover, from the legal perspective, one should also observe that the 
international financial institutions display another very strong structural problem, 
so that a change in the voting ratio while necessary would not be a sufficient 
precondition. Based on a hierarchical structure of governance shaped after the 
structure of a private corporation, and exercising a strong indirect de-facto global 
law-making power through the mechanism of conditionality, both the IMF and the 
WB display a severely counter-democratic posture. In a sense, they concentrate 
legislative (drafting of policies to be implemented through internal legal 
transformations of member states), executive (monitoring on the effectiveness of 
the implementation of the policy through tremendously powerful conditional 
means), and even judicial power (countries can challenge the execution of the 
policies only through mediation panels internal to the very same institutions).  
Working out an effort of constitutional creativity aimed at making good of 
the shortcomings that we have briefly described would be a major aspect of the 
development of a global economic constitutional framework under the umbrella of 
the UN.         
 
3.11 Before market liberalization, the Western financial system was based 
on the strict institutional partition between “banking” and “securities”. 
Socio-economic evolution and technological innovation have favored the 
legal breaking up of market segregation and the creation of financial 
conglomerates and giant financial institutions 
 
The financial systems of most Western countries – starting from the 1930s and for 
almost six decades – were based on the strict institutional partition between 
“banking” and “securities” (viz between traditional banking activities on the one 
hand, and financial activities connected with the sell and purchase of negotiable 
financial instruments on the other). In the US, segregation was established by the 
well-known Glass Steagall Act and any country which adopted de jure or de facto 
a similar regulatory regime was denominated a “Glass-Steagall Country”. 
The rationales for segregation were the followings: (1) Banks and 
securities firms deal with risks which are structurally different requiring different 
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know-how: the former manage credit and interest risks bearing instruments, the 
latter deal mostly with market risks. (2) Consequently, the balance sheets of banks 
and securities firms are structurally different: banks’ balance sheets have assets 
and liabilities which are not only illiquid, but also quite heterogeneous - mid-long 
term assets (credits) versus short-term liabilities (deposits). On the contrary, on 
balance sheets of securities firms we find assets and liabilities which are both 
liquid and, therefore, basically homogeneous. (3) Customers of the two types of 
institutions are socially different: banks sell their “products” (deposits on bank 
accounts) to lower income and less sophisticated customers (account holders); 
securities firms usually sell their “products” (financial instruments) to wealthier 
and more sophisticated investors. 
The strict partition between banking and securities was mirrored (and it is 
partially still mirrored today) by a corresponding partition within the regulatory 
schemes adopted: the main objectives standing behind banking regulation were 
financial stability and prudential supervision, whereas, as far as securities firms 
are concerned, the main regulatory objectives were transparency and investors’ 
protection. As a result, banking regulation was a body of imperative rules aimed 
at ensuring capital adequacy, effective public control and supervision (central 
banks or other public authorities were in charge of prudential supervision) and 
protection of the holders of banking accounts. To the contrary, securities 
regulation was based on the imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements in 
accordance with the logic of investors’ self-protection. 
In the last two/three decades, the traditional partition between banking and 
securities has been eroded. Behind this trend there are both technological and 
socio-economic reasons.   
First, assets securitization has had an unprecedented growth in the last few 
years: the traditional households’ financial savings in advanced economies until 
the end of the 1970s were still mostly held in the form of bank deposits, whereas 
nowadays financial sophisticated products are not only held by higher income 
classes of investors, but also by a growing number of much less informed 
individuals. Furthermore, technological innovation (development and 
management of complex data banks) has made it possible to convert traditionally 
illiquid bank assets into negotiable financial instruments to such an extent that 
also credits of modest entity (e.g. land credits, consumption credits etc.) are 
pooled and repackaged into financial instruments and then sold (the so called 
credit securitization). Hence, if up to ten years ago small business and households 
were mainly financed by banks, whilst long-term funding to big business was 
provided by securities firms, today we can state that this traditional 
compartmentalization has lost its accuracy. 
In the 1990s, the original segmentation was gradually dismantled. In 1999, 
in the US the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act abrogated the Glass Steagall Act; similarly 
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in Europe, EC directives have followed the German model of “universal banks” 
(i.e. banks whose principal functions are not only to receive demand deposits and 
provide short-term loans to families or mid-long-term loans to firms, but also to 
trade in securities, investment funds, private equity funds etc.). 
In the last decade, also due to the liberalization of financial activities, we 
have witnessed: (i) the rise of “financial conglomerates”, i.e. financial institutions 
supplying a range of financial services in the three traditional fields of finance 
(banking, securities, insurance; the so-called conglomeration process); (ii) the 
support of the European and American Antitrust Authorities to the consolidation 
of economic power in the hands of few large complex financial institutions (the 
so-called concentration process). 
 
3.12 Unrestrained liberalization and market-friendly controls have 
contributed to the current financial crisis fostering and exacerbating 
conflicts of interests and pricing opacity 
 
The mere fact that currently financial conglomerates, in their quasi-oligopolistic 
position, can combine banking and securities activities exposes the financial 
system to several structural risks. One of the major risks is undoubtedly the 
conflict of interests. If, prior to liberalization, banks (to which trade in securities 
was forbidden) could only purchase financial instruments from third-party 
financial intermediaries, in the new liberalized regime, the same banks (which 
now are allowed  to trade in securities directly or via other branches of the same 
financial conglomerate) can freely purchase, on behalf of their customers, their 
own financial instruments. In other words: prior to liberalization, banks could be 
considered as impartial disinterested third parties in contracts between securities 
firms and investors, and so they could act in the interests of weak parties; on the 
contrary, after deregulation, banks can sell and purchase their own financial 
products: it follows that they are more likely to act in a self-interested way instead 
of giving impartial information. 
Western legislators have advocated a shift from the old paternalistic and 
imperative regulatory arrangements (i.e. the original segmentation of financial 
activities) to a modern, “market-friendly” technique of managing conflicts of 
interests (e.g. the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive - Mifid). Three 
general principles and tendencies emerged: (i) rules of conduct aimed at 
preventing conflicts of interests are to be developed “within” rather than “outside” 
the market; (ii) there is a duty to disclose an actual or potential conflict of interest; 
(iii) several activities that would normally create conflicts of interest are deemed 
permissible if authorized by customers who have been previously informed. We 
can see that regulators have leaned toward a self-regulatory model that could 
work some decades ago, when mainly qualified investors purchased financial 
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instruments, but it is inadequate to face the current situation whereby financial 
instruments are widespread amongst common retail customers.  
The breaking up of market segmentation and the adoption of a self-
regulatory model based on disclosure requirements represent a dangerous attack to 
the functional pricing of financial activities. The mere fact that banks may act 
with a simple authorization of customers simultaneously as sellers on one side and 
as a buyers’ intermediaries on the other implies that the pricing of financial 
instruments is someway distorted: it is not the result of arm’s length transactions 
(i.e. transactions whereby the parties act independently and have equal 
information), and therefore it is easily maneuverable. 
This happens especially for unlisted financial instruments that do not have 
an “official price”. If the financial instrument involved in a conflict of interest 
transaction is a listed instrument, there is less room left for price manipulation. On 
the contrary, unlisted financial instruments that do not have an official price are to 
the highest degree at risk of price manipulation because financial institutions, 
acting at the same time as sellers (on their own behalf or as intermediaries) and as 
buyers, can freely set (rectius can freely manipulate) prices without any concern 
about the correspondence between the set price and the real market value - at least 
up to the moment when the veil of financial illusion will be lifted and the real 
value of those operation will be brought to light. 
It is no accident that the majority of financial instruments that are closely 
involved in the ongoing financial crisis are the unlisted ones (e.g. securitized sub-
primes and derivatives – especially credit derivatives – whose value is 
significantly above the GDP of Western countries). Mainly with reference to the 
unlisted financial instruments, the end of segregation between banking and 
securities has contributed to their uncontrolled introduction into the financial 
system without any real market price mechanism in place. 
The lack of an effective market discipline, together with the “license to 
manipulate prices” given to financial intermediaries, produced adverse effects 
throughout the whole financial system. To the price manipulation of the financial 
instruments sold to customers, the parallel price manipulation corresponds of the 
same financial instruments on financial institutions balance sheets. A plausible 
objection might be that while price manipulation of financial products for 
circulation and to be sold to customers may have a logic (i.e. it is a fraudulent 
operation at the expense of consumers and to firms’ advantage), to the contrary 
the manipulation of financial products that are placed on financial institutions 
balance sheets is a quite illogic and self-destructive behavior - such operations 
“make up” the balance sheets, but are easily detectable and very likely, at some 
point, to come to light. Actually, this would be true if those behaviors were rare 
and adopted by a single firm, but if the bad conduct is generalized, as it is, for a 
sort of “herding effect”, no financial institution has incentives to abstain from 
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such conducts for fear of facing the unfair competition of misbehaving 
competitors. 
 
3.13 Mandatory disclosure remedies make information more extensively 
accessible and affordable to consumers, but they are not alone sufficient 
to address conflicts of interest and price manipulation 
 
The typical contract relation between firms/issuers and consumers/savers is 
characterized by an information asymmetry that market forces alone cannot 
address properly. The usual remedy adopted to address such market failures is to 
impose a mandatory disclosure regime (mandatory prospectuses, accounting 
disclosure etc.) so that the information is freely accessible to consumers/investors. 
If we consider that financial institutions often act in the face of conflicts of 
interest and that the only assets given as a guarantee for the fulfillment of the 
disclosure requirements are the same financial products sold to the public, it 
follows that they do not have incentives to provide all the relevant information. 
Hence, if we wish the mandatory disclosure remedy to be functional, the law must 
provide an adequate sanction in case of breach of the duty to inform, and 
mandatory disclosure of information must be imposed not only on issuers, but 
also on other parties that are supposed to act to guarantee a well-functioning 
financial environment (accounting auditors, intermediary institutions etc.).  
The extension of the disclosure requirements to other subjects (e.g. 
auditors) would transform them into sort of investment advisors, providing 
investors with all the necessary information, thus leading to a progressive solution 
of the information asymmetry problem and to a more efficient pricing of financial 
products. A regulatory reform based on a pure mandatory disclosure regime with 
reference to listed financial instruments and on the legal prohibition of conflict of 
interests transactions with reference to unlisted ones would be a less intrusive kind 
of regulation - if compared to a new segmentation of the financial markets - and 
would undoubtedly represent a leap forward in the right direction. Nevertheless, 
disclosure rules are necessary, but not sufficient to address the problems in a 
correct and optimal way.  
Disclosure regulation makes information more extensively accessible and 
affordable to investors - thus addressing the problem of accessibility of 
information - but the information provided might not be sufficient because the 
many small investors/savers often lack the expertise required to process the data 
properly. In other words: investors need not only professionals who provide 
information, but above all professionals who translate the provided information 
into prices in order to enable them to make good informed choices. To address the 
problem of the full understanding of information an “institutional buyer” of 
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financial instruments is required who must be free from any form of conflict of 
interest. 
 
3.14 In order to overcome role confusion, re-establishing market 
segmentation is a necessary step to effective reform 
 
Legal reform must have a new segregation of financial markets à la Glass 
Steagall: a reform that is willing to optimally address the problems deriving from 
conflicts of interest and price manipulation must look to a rigorous segmentation 
of financial activities, and therefore to a sharp distinction between sellers (firms 
and firms’ intermediaries) on one hand and buyers (investors and investors’ 
intermediaries) on the other. 
Such legal reform, in order to be successful, should aim at, and end up 
with a tripartite compartmentalization of financial services industry into: 
(i) traditional banking activities; 
(ii) financial intermediation activities in the interests of firms (sellers); 
(iii) financial intermediation activities in the interests of  
investors/savers (buyers).  
Accordingly: 
i. Traditional banks shall be allowed to combine their traditional 
“monetary functions” (i.e. collecting deposits and providing loans) with other 
financial activities ( i.e. the management of individual investment portfolios) if 
and only if, in so doing, they do not risk any conflicts of interest (banks shall not 
be allowed to trade securities directly, but only on behalf of individual clients). As 
a result, we would have banks that could effectively address information 
asymmetry problems, not only by providing customers with all the necessary 
information, but also by helping them to process the given data; 
ii. Securities firms that operate only in the interest of firms (i.e. merchant 
banks and private investment funds) shall act as professional issuers of financial 
instruments and shall be prevented from managing individual or collective 
portfolios (in order to avoid any form of conflict of interests). As a result, we 
would have those securities firms officially and legally recognized as buyers’ 
counterparts or better as sellers’ side intermediaries. 
iii. Securities firms that operate only in the interest of investors/savers - 
collective investments undertakings, like pension funds, investment funds, etc. - 
shall act as professional buyers of financial instruments, and shall be legally 
banned from consulting sellers as well as from issuing their own financial 
products. As a result, we would have those securities firms officially and legally 
recognized as buyers’ side intermediaries. 
Such a reform is unquestionably ambitious, but not completely utopian, if 
we consider that in the current global crisis the role of regulators is crucial and 
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market segmentation could indisputably contribute to a more efficient and fair 
pricing of financial instruments, and to the general equilibrium of the global 
financial system. 
 
3.15 The law should monitor the originate-to-distribute business model. 
Ex-ante legal control should be provided to guarantee the full 
understanding of the relationship 
 
The so-called originate-to-distribute model introduces a notable structural change 
in the relationship between the bank and the contractor of a loan. Such a model is 
based on a scheme according to which banks do not hold the credit assets they 
originate until maturity, but they distribute them to different types of investors 
through the issuance of structured finance products. The originate-to-distribute 
model was thought to have made the financial system more resilient by dispersing 
credit risk to a broad range of investors. Yet, it became itself perhaps a principal 
source of financial instability. Monitoring such transactions which produce a basic 
principal-agent problem, and determining in which cases they should and should 
not be acceptable is a crucial role of the law. Such transactions are fundamentally 
vulnerable to certain adverse behavior, since agents seek to maximize their 
benefits, while principals cannot fully observe and control the agents’ actions. 
Thereby, without a legal framework forcing a different distribution of costs and 
benefits, the incentive for market participants to maximize their revenues may 
have the following effects: originators reduce their efforts in screening and/or 
monitoring borrowers and select originated assets in the event of their being sold 
to intermediaries; intermediaries’ interests conflict with investors’ objectives of 
balancing the risk/return trade-off; credit rating agencies (CRAs) are less willing 
to effect timely downgrades; and servicers are not inclined to adopt the most 
efficient measures with respect to non-performing loans. Moreover, investors may 
not have the proper incentives or the technical equipment to conduct their own 
risk assessment of structured finance products, thus relying excessively on 
external ratings and failing to play an effective disciplining role with respect to 
the other actors in the originate-to-distribute model. 
 
3.16 Reviving securitization and its benefits requires deep structural 
change. However, the reform process does not need to start from scratch. 
It could draw on from safe and steady financial techniques, such as 
‘Pfandbriefe’ and covered bonds 
 
Legal reform should address a variety of issues such as: the setting of the 
threshold of risk and ownership retaining by the originators (with no retention 
there are no appropriate incentives to screen and/or monitor borrowers and to 
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select assets to be sold to the intermediaries); setting standard contracts for the 
securitization transactions; enhancing “environmental” transparency of the 
transactions themselves (i.e. reducing conflicts of interest between originators, 
intermediaries, and credit rating agencies), determining the appropriate 
information to be disclosed, and establishing the centralization and timely 
dissemination of aggregated data. 
The reform process does not need to start from scratch. It could draw on 
from safe and steady financial techniques, such as “Pfandbriefe” and covered 
bonds. As is well-known, “Pfandbrief” is a German-born securitization technique, 
whose first appearances date back to the late 18th century. The technique offers 
Pfandbrief investors a tight-knit safety net. Financial institutions must satisfy 
stringent requirements in order to receive a license to issue Pfandbriefe. Only a 
percentage (in German law: 60%) of the originators’ mortgage lending value is 
eligible to be securitized and refinanceable through the Pfandbriefe. The 
outstanding Pfandbrief is covered by mortgages (or by public-sector loans) of at 
least an equal amount. These assets are entered into separate registers. In the event 
of an issuer’s insolvency, the claims of the Pfandbrief creditors are privileged by a 
preferential right in respect to the assets entered into the registers. An obligation 
(statutorily imposed in Germany) to disclose the key data of the pools on a 
quarterly basis makes their composition transparent and comparable over time, 
thereby making it difficult for inferior quality loans to find their way into the 
Pfandbrief issuers’ pools. 
Before, and aside from the rise of the lucrative US model(s) of 
securitization, Pfandbriefe have provided banks (esp. German Banks) with cost-
efficient secured financing for over 200 years. The same holds true for the 
younger covered bonds techniques. 
Covered bonds have been developed in many European countries on the 
Pfandbrief model since the 1990s. They are characterized by the following 
common essential features which are achieved under special domestic 
legislations: (i) The bond is issued by – or bondholders otherwise have full 
recourse to – a credit institution which is subject to public supervision and 
regulation. (ii) The credit institution has the ongoing obligation to maintain 
sufficient assets in the cover pool to satisfy the claims of covered bondholders at 
all times. (iii) The obligations of the credit institution in respect to that of the 
cover pool are supervised by public or other independent bodies. 
Covered bonds and Pfandbriefe are backed by identifiable and legally 
“ring-fenced” pools of loans. They remain on the balance sheet, so that the bank 
retains the ultimate credit risk and is encouraged to maintain loan quality. During 
the market turmoil, in particular until mid-September 2008, the relative resilience 
of covered bonds was demonstrated by the European Central Bank, especially 
once compared with other forms of asset-based finance – such as the US model of 
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securitization – associated with the “originate-to-distribute” model. Moreover, the 
market for covered bond and Pfandbriefe is known for its comparatively high 
transparency standards (as originators’ organizations frequently calculate indices 
for the whole market and sub-indices), and does provide a less complex 
alternative to outright securitization.  
When US authorities launched an initiative to encourage the use of the 
above European techniques by US banks, it was already too late. 
 
3.17 In recent times, the growing complexity and interrelation of 
financial markets’ segments has induced firms operating in various 
jurisdictions to establish financial conglomerates, in which the insurance 
business is conducted within the same group, alongside other financial 
activities, such as banking or financial intermediation 
 
Significant challenges have to be faced by prudential insurance regulation and 
supervision worldwide. For instance, in order to avoid double gearing of capital or 
the risk of contagion, a close collaboration and mutual understanding between 
different authorities (or different divisions within the same authority) in charge of 
the regulation and/or supervision of different financial markets’ segments is 
required. 
When financial conglomerates are also multinational groups, such 
difficulties are further exacerbated. The cross-sectoral and trans-national nature of 
modern financial-market players, in fact, greatly increases the risk of regulatory 
gaps and regulatory arbitrage. The case of the American International Group 
(AIG) tells us a lot, since the core insurance activities duly performed worldwide 
were “poisoned” by the catastrophic results of the US “financial arm” of the 
Group which issued - taking advantage of the fact that derivatives markets, unlike 
insurance markets, are mostly unregulated in the US - a high volume of credit 
default swaps (CDS) to European banks and other protection buyers without 
setting aside sufficient reserves to cover the undertaken credit risks. 
On top of that, the core insurance function of risk pooling, diversification 
and spreading is greatly enhanced by the use of reinsurance and retrocession. Risk 
securitization, moreover, is yet another means to further spread the risks, and to 
increase the available financial capacity, especially with respect to the coverage of 
peak risks (e.g. catastrophic risks). Since the reinsurance, retrocession and risk 
securitization markets are global in nature, it is more and more often the case that 
risks are transferred across jurisdictional borders. The resulting complexity and 
interdependencies generate the need for a coordinated international and cross-
sectoral regulatory and supervisory approach. 
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 How best to achieve an effective global cross-sector coordination and 
information exchange between regulatory and supervisory authorities? 
 To what extent are insurance companies still taking up risks from other 
segments of the financial markets (such as credit and/or liquidity risks from 
banks)? How are they managing such risks? 
 To what extent are insurance companies taking into account the 
potential impact on their portfolio of global emerging risks, such as those posed 
by climate change and by the interdependence of critical networks? 
 Will insurance companies that currently offer retirement products 
(such as annuities) be able to cope effectively with longevity risk worldwide and 
finally meet their obligations? 
Furthermore, the transfer of insurance risks to capital markets via risk-
linked securities poses additional regulatory and policy questions such as: 
 Under what conditions and to what extent should insurance-sponsored 
SPVs be exempted from prudential regulation? 
 Under what conditions and to what extent should 
insurance/reinsurance companies be allowed to take credit for risks ceded to 
investors via (on-shore and off-shore) securitized deals? Is there a risk or 
regulatory arbitrage? 
 Under what conditions and to what extent should the development of a 
secondary market for risk-linked securities be encouraged? Are we comfortable 
with the idea that such risk-linked securities (covering e.g. catastrophic risks 
posed by natural hazards) could end up in the investment portfolio of households 
and individuals? 
The relationship between the regulatory/supervisory authorities and the 
regulated/supervised entities is another key issue in this field. While it is certainly 
very important to establish a direct and close relationship with top management 
based on mutual understanding and trust, the risk of capture must be controlled. In 
this respect, the new wave of risk-based solvency standards (e.g. Solvency II in 
Europe), placing a high degree of reliance on internal risk models may pose 
additional questions such as: 
 Are insurance regulators and supervisors in all relevant jurisdictions in 
a position to fully evaluate and appreciate the reliability of internal risk models? 
 Are there significant information asymmetries that may undermine the 
effectiveness of supervisory activities? 
 Is the risk of capture sufficiently controlled? 
Insurance regulation, however, is not the only prudential regulation. There 
are a number of other areas in which the legal, regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks for insurance will play an increasingly important role to ensure the 
proper functioning of the market and to enhance market confidence. 
Key questions include: 
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Monitoring claims management practices, for instance, is a fundamental 
step: the fair, efficient and speedy adjustment of claims is essential to the 
protection of the interests of policy holders and insured parties, especially where 
the private insurance sector is taking up roles that should be played by the public 
sector (e.g. in the fields of health insurance, natural hazards insurance, retirement 
products).  
 
3.18 Ensuring transparency of insurance contracts is another key 
objective of an effective legal and regulatory framework. However, one 
should be aware of the ideology according to which in every domain of 
life uncertainty private insurances are good substitute for public 
institutions 
  
As regards the retail insurance market is concerned, culture widely varies across 
jurisdictions and decisions made under uncertainty by prospective policy holders 
are very often affected by cognitive biases. While education and awareness 
campaigns in this field to introduce or strengthen a risk management culture are 
advisable, they certainly cannot allow the creeping reproduction of the caveat 
emptor principle. Potentially tricky insurance products should be banned by hard 
law. 
Too often in the past, “sensible” risks were progressively shifted from the 
public budget to that of households and individuals on the assumption that private 
sector solutions, such as insurance, are available to cover such risks. While the 
availability of the private sector should never be a reason for the public sector to 
shrink, it is particularly important that at least the following measures aimed at 
limiting abusive profit-seeking private behavior are taken: 
 explicit coordination schemes between the public sector and the 
private insurance sector (such as private-public partnerships) to ensure 
consistency with policy objectives, enhance the degree of reliability and trust, and 
achieve a clearer allocation of the respective duties and responsibilities;  
 behavioral bias and systematic deviation from the rational-choice 
paradigm in the policy holders’ decision-making process must be fully assessed 
by policymakers (the decision to purchase protection for their assets against 
natural hazards, for instance, is rarely made by individuals according to rational 
criteria). In this perspective, behavioral bias should be incorporated into policy 
analysis when setting up explicit coordination schemes. 
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3.19 With the financial crisis, rating agencies have come under repeated 
criticism, either for poor responsiveness and delays in modifying ratings 
in view of market developments, or for the abruptness of unexpected 
downgrades. Their role should be limited and their activity monitored 
 
Rating agencies function as private soft-law makers. Lack of legal instruments left 
such agencies free to compromise the quality of their processes in order to grab or 
defend market share in a booming environment, with the volumes and complexity 
of securitizations sharply on the rise in the years to 2007. Conflicts of interest in 
their relationships with their clients aggravated the situation. 
In the US, a regulatory framework for credit rating agencies’ activity 
exists since 1975, reinforced by the 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. The 
2006 Act aimed to foster increased transparency, accountability, and competition 
in the credit rating agency industry for the benefit of investors. It enhanced the 
SEC’s regulatory authority over rating agencies in several areas, requiring the 
SEC: to establish a registration process for credit rating agencies; to impose 
disclosure and filing requirements on credit rating agencies seeking registration; 
to prohibit certain activities of registered credit rating agencies; to censure, deny, 
suspend or revoke the NRSRO registration. Although this regulatory framework 
has not prevented the agencies from ill-performing their role, in 2008 the 
European Commission followed the US model through a proposal for a European 
regulation on credit rating agencies. 
The point is that both the US and EU regulatory approaches content 
themselves with focusing on the lack of competition in the rating market, on the 
absence of transparency in rating processes, and on the conflicts of interest 
inherent in the rating process. Their implied assumption is that market discipline, 
in the form of fear of loss of reputation, does (or at least should) provide the right 
incentives for high-quality ratings. According to this school of thought – to which, 
to nobody’s surprise, credit rating agencies fully adhere – investors and issuers 
can only accept reliable and serious agencies’ conduct in the long run. Once 
again, the creed is that the market can always regulate itself. 
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3.20 The highly favorable legal regime shielding rating agencies from 
liability should be radically transformed. The possibility to establish an 
international not-for-profit public or quasi-public institution to carry on 
reliable rating should be explored 
 
The mere existence of many competitors does not guarantee quality unless there is 
something causing high-quality producers to benefit and low-quality producers to 
suffer. Despite this obvious point, so far regulatory authorities have focused on 
measures to improve rating agencies’ incentives and to adjust investors’ degree of 
reliance on agency ratings, and showed no interest in considering appropriate 
disincentives or constraints to rating agencies’ misbehavior, and in devising or 
enhancing remedies providing direct relief for low-quality ratings. 
Striking! Rating agencies are everywhere almost immune from any form 
of liability. In Europe there is no case law in point, while US courts have failed to 
recognize the de facto regulatory power of rating agencies within the market, 
equating their ratings to mere opinions, thereby imposing liability on the agencies 
only when they were found to cause the intentional harm.  
Rating agencies should bear significant liability for their misconduct, 
where “significant” means that liability should be dependant on the negligent 
breach of a pre-determined (and revisable in the course of time) set of duties. 
Beyond stay or stop of the activity, agencies should be liable for compensation, 
disgorgement, and penalties, whose amount should be linked to a fixed multiple, 
and imposed not to benefit plaintiffs but to feed an international fund to be set up 
with the aim to compensate victims of financial entities that become insolvent and 
leave investors holding an empty bag. Third-party insurance coverage should be 
imposed upon the agencies, also to set a market user- friendly threshold for the 
agencies’ choice to leave, or to keep playing into the market.  
Finally, for the activities carried on by the rating agencies, which have a 
sweeping and truly global impact on the whole of the economies of states and 
inhabitants of the planet (and this should apply to any financial activity), there 
might be the case for contemplating a global public system either in the form of 
ex-ante sweeping controls or in the form of of independent organs made up of 
independent experts representing all the areas of the world where the activity at 
stake has had a harmful effect. 
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3.21 In the last couple of decades, the shareholder’s model of corporate 
governance has gradually become the dominant mode of organizing listed 
corporations in the world. This structure is responsible for distorted 
incentives and weak regulation favoring shortsighted and often predatory 
corporate choices. This supremacy of optional contract-based law over 
regulation should be stopped and radically inverted. 
 
Since the beginning of this century, there has been a movement of competitive 
convergence of corporate governance systems throughout the Western 
industrialized world. In our vision, such convergence must be understood as a 
rush to the bottom. It has displaced and marginalized other models of corporate 
governance structurally more effective in taming opportunistic and predatory 
corporate behavior.   
The path of convergence was based on the common concept of a public 
corporation, which despite the apparent divergence had achieved a high degree of 
conceptual uniformity in all jurisdictions. However, institutional differences in 
governance, share ownership, capital markets, and business culture have been, and 
still are, quite significant. Four models have been competing with each other: (1) 
the manager-oriented model (US in the 1950s and 1960s); (2) the bank and labor-
oriented model (Germany and Austria); (3) the State and family oriented model 
(Italy, France, Spain and Asia); (4) the shareholder-model (US and UK since the 
1980s and gradually Continental Europe since the 1990s).  
In the last decade, there has been an open debate on the shareholder model 
as corporate law’s end of history. Some authors cited among the reasons for the 
supremacy of the shareholder model the followings: the weakness of all the 
alternative models; the competitive success of contemporary British and 
American firms; the growing influence worldwide of the academic disciplines of 
economics and finance; the diffusion of share ownership in developed countries, 
and the emergence of active shareholder representatives and interest groups in 
major jurisdictions; a superiority, as yet unproved, of diffused shareholder’s 
structures over concentrated ones as far as cost of capital and value creation are 
concerned. We add to these considerations a number of factors which are 
fostering shareholder-style capitalism in European markets, such as: the 
homogenization of large firms’ behavior (in accounting standards, corporate 
finance and strategic planning) due to influence of international investment 
houses, consulting firms and rating agencies (discussed supra) and to the de-
listing of large European corporations on the New York and London Stock 
Exchanges; the growing number of strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions 
among firms of different nationalities, including trans-national equity agreements, 
which are mostly based on international standards, where Anglo-American modes 
are dominant; privatization which greatly increased the number of European firms 
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listed on national and international markets, including former state-owned 
companies with very large market capitalization; a large participation of Anglo-
American investors on the pan-European equity markets; last, but not least, the 
equity shift of private portfolios from governments bonds into equity investments, 
which has gradually introduced an Anglo-American-style equity culture among 
European investors. 
Disagreement continues among scholars on the timing and modalities of 
the global process of Americanization of corporate structure and governance 
through the periphery and semi-periphery. Clearly, the current crisis should lead 
to very serious questioning on the soundness of the dominant model of corporate 
governance, which has been behind much of the unrestrained predatory activity, 
including the trend to over-compensate the managers. Naturally, a whole 
academic industry mostly active in top US research institutions has provided 
mainstream scholarly legitimacy for this rush to the bottom, exporting its vision to 
weaker geo-political contexts through World Bank’s development reports.  
As well known, Anglo-American globalized corporate governance puts the 
maximization of the shareholder’s value at the centre of the stage. This model is 
“light” and contractual in its form. It has been described as a mere “nexus of 
contracts” – which conceives efficiency primarily as the maximization of value of 
the firms’ shares. “The firm” must be preferred to “the market” as a place of 
production only on efficiency grounds. 
Such a model is characterized generally by a total absence of social 
responsibility. The management is contractually linked only to the shareholders 
and not to the workers and the social context of the activity. The firm is abstract, 
its playground is the world - its efficient strategy is to mimic a zero transaction-
cost market. All of this is incompatible with a social reality made of real people in 
real settings, to whom you might owe a long-term commitment. The only 
counterpart is the consumer - another abstract reduction of the human experience 
into a one-shot deal of selling and buying. The “shortermism” that has 
characterized the managers’ behavior in the last few years naturally follows from 
this conception.  
The managers of the firm are “winners” if they maximize the value of the 
shares, which is directly related to their huge bonuses and stock options. Labor is 
a mere input in the process of maximizing the value for the shareholders. The firm 
is efficient if it minimizes the cost of labor (and other social or environmental 
costs) by discharging such cost directly on the community, and minimizes the cost 
of capital under the logic of share-value maximization. 
For some scholars of the law and economics paradigm, such a model 
represents “the end of history in corporate law”. Indeed, during the global process 
of privatization at the end of history the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance was transplanted in most European, Latin American and Asian 
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settings. This light model turned out to be a failure, not only for the economy and 
society as a whole, but also for the long-term value of the firms themselves. We 
therefore need to rethink the very foundations of such a conceptual apparatus 
ultimately based on the dominance of incentives over regulation. 
 
3.22 Short from obeying the logic of economic democracy, the public 
company structure actually encourages the concentration of irresponsible 
power. The system of “public companies” in the UK is run by a group of 
few major financial institutions; individuals and households have no 
direct role in the governance of the system. 
 
At the end of history, within the massive effort to privatize global economies the 
“public company” was represented as the best of all possible worlds. Its destiny 
would be to achieve the so-called “shareholders’ society”, where millions of 
citizens played an active part in the strategic choices of the firms, through a 
democratic mechanism of votes in the general assemblies and by nominating their 
representatives to the boards of directors. In this “dream”, an aggregate of selfish 
individuals would actually work for the public good (represented by economic 
growth) because of their direct holding of shares and of quotes of investment 
funds, insurance companies, and pension funds. Shareholders were then supposed 
to be part of the life of the firms via two possible actions: either by “voice” 
(representation in the governance of firms), or by “exit” (by selling the shares of 
firms which were “badly” run). 
Why did this “dream” turned out to be a nightmare? First, the shareholders 
are not “citizens” of the firm. They do not have any real interest, let alone 
competence, to have a voice in the managerial and strategic choices of the firms. 
Their only real interest is in the value of their investments (or pensions). Second, 
even where there is a genuinely diffused shareholding structure, through systems 
of collection of voting rights, the decisions on the governance of the listed 
companies in the US-UK are in the hands of the few - no more than 10-15 very 
large financial institutions, which are related to each others through a system of 
cross-holdings. The system works in a way very close to the typical logic of 
British clubs. Power always tends to be concentrated at the top. Whenever a firm 
is going through a major strategic choice, or is not run according to a given vision, 
this group of financial institutions enters into the shareholding base of the firm to 
take control for a limited time span, until the “change” (of management or of 
strategic direction) is made. The following step is obviously to cash in the capital 
gains by selling the controlling stakes. Recent empirical studies on the temporal 
evolutions of shareholdings’ structures on the London FTSE have confirmed the 
workings of such a mechanism, showing how a much increased institutional 
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ownership of UK equities has come mainly at the expense of the direct holdings 
of individuals.  
 
3.23 Very different models of ownership structure of the systems of large 
corporations characterized the rise and decline of 20th-century State-
owned enterprises in Europe. Basic structural elements of that 
experience, dismantled in the privatization frenzy at the end of history, 
should be used in the new public intervention required to overcome the 
negative effects of the crisis. 
 
The end of history was characterized by major privatization programs. A large 
part of the industry and banks belonging to States was transferred to capital 
markets. A profound transformation in the role of the State in the economy 
occurred in most industrialized countries.  
Mixed-economy systems began to emerge in Europe in the 1920s and 
1930s, mainly in France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain to save some major firms 
from bankruptcy after the 1929 international financial crisis. Afterwards, 
however, their role gained importance and eventually became an essential 
mechanism of 20th-century European economy. The underlying common belief 
was that the State should take responsibility for national industrial growth. One of 
the main arguments was that infant industries in major sectors (steel and iron, 
telecommunications, energy, infrastructures, aerospace, defense and, in general, 
high technology) needed greater investments and managerial capacity than private 
capitalists and capital markets alone could provide. It was also widely believed 
that a certain amount of protection of new industries had to be provided by the 
State before exposing them to international competition, and some infringement 
of the liberal rules of international economy was necessary if structural conditions 
for the “take-off” were to arise. Accordingly, in his National Self-Sufficiency 
(1933), John Maynard Keynes declared his personal, moral and intellectual 
disassociation from 19th-century theories on free trade, and helped mercantilist 
logic regain a new dignity. 
After the Second World War, a second wave of nationalization of the main 
European economies occurred, with added social goals such as full employment. 
So, the tendency of modern capitalism to introduce planning elements in the 
running of the economy offered updated instruments for economic post-war 
nationalism. At this point, however, interventionism also aimed at making 
national monopolists competitive on the international markets, since they were 
thought to be ready for it. As well as using macroeconomic instruments to protect 
the economy (control on prices, on foreign exchange, and on the discount rate), 
major European governments established a panoply of industrial/political tools to 
bolster growth, such as subsidies, public job orders, mergers of various national 
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firms working in areas of national interest, control of foreign investments, a 
reduction of export fees, and so on, in order to favour reconstruction and new 
industrial growth. 
In many European countries, state holdings included industries of basic 
and strategic importance, such as energy and transport services. Moreover, public 
ownership was not confined to the State. Lower public authorities also owned 
(and still do) enterprises. Examples are the Länder of Austria and Germany, the 
Regions in Italy, and local authorities virtually everywhere. 
The Public Enterprise system in Europe was a very successful model until 
the end of the 1970s. Its dismantling was less the product of a wise evaluation of 
pros and cons, than of an ideological turning point. From the mid-1980s on, 
privatization became mainstream all over Europe. The European Union played a 
crucial role in fostering privatization, with its free-trade politics at the basis of the 
formation of a single European market that supplied all the countries with a 
common conceptual picture and neo-liberal theoretical paradigm. While the 
Rome’s Treaty left each country free to decide on whether companies should be 
publicly or privately owned, the principal economic reasons for the choice of 
public ownership were successfully challenged. This conceptual picture - 
borrowed from the experience of the US and the UK, and strengthened by the 
European Commission’s increasing role in anti-trust policy - caused the 
transformation of ownership systems and financial markets in all European 
countries. Since the State was variously prevented from helping companies, 
companies turned to private capital markets. Moreover, public ownership was 
thought to render the international alliances games more difficult and contribute to 
the under-valuation of state-owned companies’ stocks. A number of other factors 
had paved the way for privatization: the excessive costs of social security that 
weighed heavily on a public financial balance already in deficit; the internal crisis 
of the public enterprise; the enforcement of European competition policy; the 
wide belief that the private insurance business could provide social welfare. 
 
3.24 The case of self-management schemes in former Yougoslavia - 
overstretched for ideological reasons - shows that even desirable 
ideologies need to be appreciated in practice. Like neo-liberal orthodoxy 
in Western Europe, self management was put above critique and 
consequently produced paradoxical results. 
 
We now know, “at the end of the end of history”, that many sectors that were 
hastily privatized – especially in the public utilities, in the large strategic 
corporations and in the banking systems – did not deliver the promises 
emphatically claimed by the neo-liberal supporters of the privatization process. 
The time certainly is now to rethink the role of the public sector in the large and 
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medium industrial and financial corporations, and to introduce some structural 
factors that might avoid the waste of the massive amount of public money that is 
currently introduced into the system.  
Creative legal structures must be conceived of only after acquiring full 
knowledge of the large menu of options available to create a system of corporate 
governance capable of reflecting the needs of stability and long-term quality-
based sustainable development. To do so, the menu should be wide open and 
include experiences that, in the decade of market fundamentalism, were 
transformed into taboos. From such an exercise of humble reflection on a too 
hastily condemned past, we can learn something important for a long-term future. 
Of course, every institutional experience must be appraised in its own 
context. Let us look briefly to a governance model which comes from the 
examples of Tito’s Yugoslavia. For decades, it was possible to experience a rather 
fervent response to the Soviet type political system and economy. Labor’s self 
determination was put at the center of the scene. Labeling the Soviet system as 
“State capitalism”, Tito and his followers put on their flag “self-management”, 
and the idea that decisions should always be crafted by those who are directly 
concerned. Hence, there were worker’s self-management and “organizations of 
associated labor” instead of corporations or State enterprises. Participation as an 
indispensable element of human dignity was also stressed: people who participate 
in decision-makings will not be reduced into robots, incapable of facing 
unexpected circumstances requiring flexibility and creativity. 
The experience of a law student might show how self management, a 
subject regularly thought in law school would work in practice. Teachers decided 
about the curriculum, teaching load, appointments, deans; teachers – together with 
staff, including janitors and cleaners – decided about salaries, reconstruction of 
the building, and many other things. Materials were prepared for meetings, and 
students were supposed to read them. Had they participated at all meetings – and 
had they read all materials – this would have taken not much less than a third of 
their working time. But students, as any other social group, were also a part of the 
self-management structure of the building where they lived, and they were 
supposed to attend meetings at which it was decided on most efficient ways of 
handling garbage collection, repairs, installation of TV antennas, and on many 
other emerging problems. Students were also a part of a self-management 
structure deciding on research priorities and channeling of funds. There were such 
“self-management communities of interest for scientific research” at provincial 
level (e.g. Vojvodina), at regional level (e.g. Serbia), and at State level 
(Yugoslavia). Everybody was also a part of the self-management structure in the 
part of the town where they lived, part of the self-management structure of the 
school of their children – and part of many other self-management structures. 
According to certain calculations, each citizen would have needed between 23 to 
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28 hours per day just to observe all self-management rights and duties. But it was 
hardly possible to raise such a question. You had to believe in self-management 
(rather than to analyze it seriously).   
It is difficult to know whether it would have been possible to organize self-
management in an efficient way while remaining within the realm of rational 
time. The question had to be raised in order to be addressed, which did not happen 
at the time. As structural problems were not spelled out and faced, self-
management was to a large extent hijacked. Rights that in principle belonged to 
the “self-managers” (the owners) were mostly exercised by the managers and the 
party. 
Quite paradoxically, the same happened to the ideology of market 
fundamentalism until the current crisis. People believe in it – instead of analyzing 
it seriously. People believe in the rationality of a mechanism (particularly when it 
is juxtaposed to Soviet type communism after the fall of the Berlin Wall), without 
even trying to comprehend its actual structure. We needed a disaster in order to 
give some room for doubt. In addition to disasters, we need dissidents. (This is 
also something we all learned under communism.) 
It has been obvious for some time that present day capitalism displays 
severe structural irrationalities. Also obvious is that it is impossible to get any 
improvement if one continues to be in denial of such irrationalities. (Just as under 
communism, where “taking away from the kulaks” was the paradigm of 
rationalization – even when there were no more kulaks, and when bureaucracy 
presented a rampant irrationality.) Let’s briefly look into the paradigmatic case of 
Bob Nardelli, the former CEO of Home Depot based in Atlanta. He took over in 
2000, and since the first year yielded some difficulties, he resorted to the pattern 
of rationalization that was dominant (in Yugoslavia, they would have said “which 
was on the party line”), and turned to “downsizing”. This meant the firing of 
about 200 employees (including many cashiers). The yearly salary of these 
employees was between $20,000 and 25,000. Hence, his rationalizations saved 
about 5 millions. This may make some sense, until compared with his CEO 
salary, which was $156 million per year - equivalent to about 6,000 Home Depot 
workplaces. Had his salary been reduced to a still outrageous 150 million, there 
would have been no need to fire anyone. (Also, Nardelli was probably more 
responsible for the bad year than the cashiers.) But downsizing CEO salaries 
(rather than jobs) would not have been in accordance with the “party line”, hence 
was not an option – just as reducing bureaucracy for the sake of rationalization 
was not an option under Stalin. When Nardelli was fired in 2006, he received a 
severance payment of 210 million. He later wound up in the automobile industry, 
as a top manager of Chrysler. 
Since last year the irrationalities are less hidden, and it seems that the 
“party line” is not as unimpeachable as it used to be. What has become an issue is 
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that Wall Street distributed $18 billion in bonuses in 2008. This is actually the 
equivalent of more than half a million jobs. Furthermore, this was not a one-year 
event (in 2007 Wall Street distributed bonuses for $32.7 billion). In the experience 
with self-management, corrections and rationalizations were hardly possible, 
because this would have presumed spelling out and facing irrationalities. We hope 
this will be possible this time around. Our knowledge is limited (probably even 
more limited than with regard to self-management), but let us try to contribute by 
way of spelling out some ideas.  
 
3.25 A significant number of irrationalities affecting the current 
corporate governance structure are located in property theory - especially 
in the paradigm of individuals’ rationality when following their self 
interests. To this, it is usually added that the interests of the owners are in 
line with the interests of the consumers. 
 
Let us mention a few stumbling blocks that make the functioning of the dominant 
model of corporate governance difficult in present times: Can the owners do what 
they want? Not really. A key issue closely linked with (the chances of) 
rationalization is the balance of rights and duties between owners and managers. 
Increasing shareholder’s power is one of the proposals already on the table, and it 
deserves attention. While it is not entirely clear whether the interests of the 
owners are necessarily in line with rationality, it has become clear that the 
interests of the managers are often not – at least not within the present regulatory 
framework. In his lecture to the Columbia Law School Federalist Society on 
November 24, 2008, Judge Posner stated that boards of directors are hardly 
reliable agents of shareholders, and pointed out that managers were actually acting 
rationally (in line with their own interests) while leading corporations towards 
disaster. It is obvious that these premises have to be changed. If incentives are 
misaligned, this should be perceived as a systemic irrationality rather than an 
expression of freedom. 
It is also important to observe that in those (not many) cases in which 
outraged shareholders tried to obtain some legal remedy against managers, the 
existing legal framework made this often impossible. In the (in)famous Walt 
Disney company Derivate Litigation case, the shareholders sued the managers for 
breach of fiduciary duty by way of choosing a most unsuccessful CEO – and for 
giving him after 14 months a $140 million severance payment. The Delaware 
Court found that there was no remedy under the existing rules. An interesting 
(although not really persuasive) thought in this judgment was that one cannot and 
should not measure corporate behavior ex post with those more demanding 
standards that were shaped after the ENRON and World Com scandals. In his 
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statement of reasons, Judge Chandler was quite apologetic, but this did not change 
his position. His judgment was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware.  
The truth of the matter is that owners are neither informed nor qualified 
enough to make decisions within the corporate structure. Corporate structures and 
ways of dealing are getting more and more complicated, and less and less 
transparent. One of the essential findings of the Powers Committee which 
analyzed the circumstances of the ENRON scandal was that ENRON did not 
make its activities transparent and understandable for those who read financial 
reports. In sum, owners simply did not understand what was going on. Hence, 
even if they had power to make decisions, they were not in a position to do so. 
What is even more important is that this was not just a bizarre idiosyncratic 
situation. Lack of transparency and lack of preconditions for comprehension is 
quite typical. This leads to a situation in which the majority of decisions are 
guided by fashion, or belief (or “party line”), by “heard mentality”, rather than by 
rational choice. It is difficult to see how capitalism can be rational if the owners 
are deprived of the opportunity of making rational choices. Making corporate 
dealings fully transparent and understandable is probably not possible. A 
considerable improvement of the present situation by way of legal norms is 
probably possible. 
Today, a huge number of owners are simply unaware of their ownership. 
People have portfolios, which tend to be diversified, and which are handled by 
agents and banks. Shares in these portfolios are, of course, proofs of ownership, 
and the owners will gain or loose money as a consequence of their ownership. But 
typically they do not really know what is exactly in their portfolio – and even less 
do they feel entitled or obliged to act as “real” owners. This type of ownership 
covers a considerable territory of the economy. It is clear that the mythology of 
ownership-based rationality has no soundness in this territory.  
This circumstance puts again into focus the power of managers, and the 
issue of control over managers, when a significant part of the owners does not 
even have a voice (because they are not even aware of ownership). A recent 
article in the Washington Post claims that many companies (including Google) 
allowed executives to exchange sharply depreciated stock options for new awards 
with more generous terms. The article mentions that “the companies argue” that 
this is “necessary to retain and motivate personnel”. The question is: Who actually 
articulated this concern? Who are “the companies”? The owners?  
One could link to this question another one. Has the number of fired 
unsuccessful executives come anywhere near to being proportionate to the 
disastrous results accomplished by them? Again, who are the companies? 
We would also like to raise a different (though not unrelated) issue. Two 
years ago, a new course at the International Business Law Program of the Central 
European University in Budapest was introduced. The title of the course was 
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“Human Rights in Corporations”. It has been a very positive experience, and we 
would like to suggest that such a course should be an element of law school 
curriculum. Corporations have obviously become important and powerful enough 
to determine one’s life and human rights. Contemporary human rights problems 
cannot be fully analyzed if they are only perceived in juxtaposition with States. 
And, as we have already mentioned many times in this report, education is the key 
element in any long term endeavor. 
In fact, one of the main shortcomings of the shareholder’s value model of 
capitalism is its short-term horizon. It is important to introduce a long-term view 
of bank/industry relationship and corporate governance. To do so, it is essential to 
restructure the best of all historically tested models, be it the European social 
model of capitalism or the self management model of the former socialist world. 
Sustained investment in a global social capital may produce the kind of mix that is 
desirable for the challenges of this century. 
  
3.26 The process of labor commodification, reflected in its legal 
organization, was exacerbated at the end of history. There is a global 
urgency to reverse this process. 
 
The weaker the legal system, the less capable it is to tame the process of 
commodification of human beings. Globalization has exacerbated this process. 
Cheap labor stuck in poor countries by the artificially produced barriers of 
immigration law is today one of the most important inputs of the global 
productive process. Not only powerful economic forces but also many different 
legal strategies have facilitated this process, whose result is to transform a large 
portion of the global society into objects of production rather than subjects and 
human beings.  
 
3.27 The separation of labor law from commercial law institutionalizes a 
division of the cooperative surplus that is unfair and unsustainable. Any 
benefits of financial capital mobility must always be synergized with the 
realities of social capital mobility. 
 
From the economic perspective the productive process within a firm is a 
cooperative effort. Its hierarchical organization and the always increasing 
tendency to outsourcing of the activity into very competitive markets which 
require quick decision-making have produced an almost watertight distinction 
between decision makers (the management and the corporate organs) and 
subordinates, which as any other productive factors are the object of the decision. 
Commercial law and labor law have consequently reflected this separation, the 
former being devoted mostly to the process of corporate decision making, while 
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the latter dealing mostly with the issue of “protecting” these human factors of 
production while at the same time guaranteeing the “flexibility” of the labor 
market - striking a balance that should avoid class conflict to disrupt production. 
What lawyers see as “labor law” today is generally confined to the 
regulatory structures that define and organize collective bargaining among various 
sub-groups of employees and employers. Some systems distinguish labor law 
from employment law as regulating the respective rights of individual employees 
and their employer. All capitalist legal systems reinforce the distinction between 
subjects and objects of the economic decision making by distinguishing labor law 
from corporate and commercial law, as regulating the organization of capital in 
various enterprises entities.   
There are two structural principles that are needed to guide a forward-
thinking integration of modern economic law, especially with regard to labor and 
corporate law. The first is that the benefits of financial capital mobility must 
always be synergized with the realities of social capital mobility. Even if, and this 
an empirical question, increases in financial capital mobility yield marginal 
increases in economic efficiency and growth, this has to be weighed against the 
distributive meaningfulness of such returns, but more importantly against the 
time-series specific impacts on quality of life that such mobility generates through 
economic instability. In short, Schumpeter’s creative destruction taken to its 
extreme logic yields a life that is chaotic, uncertain, and ultimately undesirable. If 
the degree of financial capital mobility is used to define the regulatory logic of an 
economic system, it will invariably generate economic conditions that exceed the 
adaptive capacity of social capital, and consistently lead to the traumatic shocks 
people are facing around the world. 
At the same time, the classic distinction between holders of labor and 
capital itself must be rejected as a structural principle that is again neither 
ontologically necessary nor socially desirable. The critical distinction between 
corporate and labor law is predicated on the incredible inequality in financial 
capital distribution during the 20th century. While certain institutional investors, 
most notably pension funds, represent accumulations of individual financial 
capital, they have neither acted nor invested with substantial deviation from any 
other economic actor. Because of the overall systemic logic, such actors have 
failed to promote conditions of economic justice and are not truly accountable to 
their individual constituents. A closer practical integration of labor and capital is 
the key to promote sustainable, community-driven wealth as well as a more 
effective internalization of enterprise externalities. Here, the two principles 
mutually reinforce each other: increasing integration between labor and capital in 
the wider sense serves to effectively and productively reconcile financial capital 
mobility and social capital mobility. 
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3.28 Alternatives aiming at the birth of a sustainable global economic law 
should be explored. Systems of co-decision, profit sharing and employees’ 
ownership structurally facilitate long-term sustainable corporate decision 
making. 
 
There are four extant regulatory alternatives that have been either marginalized in 
the mainstream labor/corporate law dichotomy, or de-emphasized in the last few 
decades of excessive transfers of regulatory power from public to private actors. 
Such alternatives have to be considered as better practices to be implemented by 
global labor law.  
The first and least radical alternative is a shift away from the focus on 
collective bargaining on the individual corporate level (which is the global 
tendency given the trade unions’ increased weakness) towards global industry-
based bargaining units. While still problematic - given its perpetuation of the 
labor/corporate conceptual distinction - a large-scale social negotiation can in 
some way address real issues of long-term sustainability and quality of life for 
people. This represents in various shades the most successful traditional collective 
bargaining arrangements, including the effectively national-level bargaining in 
Scandinavia and the industry-level bargaining in pre-1996 Australia. 
Moving progressively out of the traditional labor law paradigm is the 
proliferation of effective systems of corporate co-determination – giving workers 
or unions a real vote in corporate decision-making. For a long time an aspect of 
German corporate governance, co-determination has been fiercely resisted 
globally and not just as part of the recent trends in economic politics, but 
throughout the 20th century (the fate of the EC’s Fifth Directive on Company Law 
illustrates this well). By diversifying the stakeholders in corporate decision-
making, co-determination adds another powerful actor to monitor intra-firm 
management as well as alter the longitudinal-time horizons of corporate decision 
making. Both of these dynamics militate against exactly the type of insular, short-
term cognitive fallacies that helped generate the current financial crisis, while 
underlining the necessity of strongly linking economic production to people’s 
welfare instead of considering it an end in itself. This critically subverts the 
labor/corporate law distinction by creating a more holistic, and realistic, 
regulatory scheme that more broadly addresses the effects and justifications for 
enterprise activity. 
The next two regulatory possibilities seek a more radical break from the 
traditional labor law paradigm. The first is the robust promotion or mandated 
provision of scheduled profit sharing and workplace reinvestment. A primary 
assumption of traditional labor law was that wages were the static outcome of the 
bargaining process grounded in the inherent antagonism between employee and 
employer. This grew out of assumptions in classic political economy related to 
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bargaining power and static profit pools. Furthermore, it created the justificatory 
illusion that wages defer all enterprise risk to capital, while in fact they contribute 
to systemic economic instability by removing employees from intra-firm 
monitoring and decision-making, and towards managerial agents with 
increasingly short-term time horizons. Coupled with limited liability for capital 
investment, a lack of profit-sharing moves most people into a context where they 
cyclically suffer the harshest practical consequences of economic downturns and 
the least benefit of economic upturns, witnessed by the growing rates of global 
and national inequality and wage stagnation in developed economies. Moreover, 
the advantages of profit sharing for enterprise activity are increased when at least 
some profit sharing is encouraged in workplace reinvestment. However, this also 
exposes the limitations of profit sharing when decoupled from direct governance 
mechanisms such as co-determination, as the diversification issues related to 
401(k)’s have recently exposed in the US. 
The final and more coherent expansion of the profit-sharing option is the 
promotion of systemic employee corporate ownership. This option largely vitiates 
the labor/capital distinction by creating an economic reality where capital itself it 
distributed equally enough, so that the labor/capital distinction is obviated on the 
individual level. Employee ownership itself has been an often-heated subject of 
analysis that joins in debate, though mostly in disagreement, contemporary labor 
law and corporate law scholars. A great deal of this debate concerns the 
theoretical intra-firm efficiency of employee-owned corporations – which at least 
for the time being has ended in an empirical stalemate over quite small marginal 
effects. In addition, most of the abstract or theoretical criticism of employee 
ownership generated in the debate, especially in regards to diversification, has 
either been empirically unsubstantiated or refuted in practice. However, on the 
political level employee ownership has often had a much less problematic fate. 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans or ESOP’s in the US and abroad have attracted 
a great deal of attention largely because the idea of the citizen-owner cuts across 
traditional divisions in economic politics.  
Yet, existing forms of employee ownership and ESOPs have been quite 
limited in their ability to represent a coherent alternative to the traditional 
labor/corporate law distinction. This is directly due to the fact that little in current 
labor or corporate law doctrine is tailored to regulate employee-owned 
corporations. The mainstream conclusion among most corporate law scholars is 
that the often heterogeneous interests in such firms are intractably inefficient. This 
conclusion is amiss because it holds up efficiency as the only value that enterprise 
activity serves, today that those heterogeneous interests in corporate decision 
making are increasingly desirable for sustainable, long-term growth, but also for 
preventing the type of unchecked groupthink that creates economic bubbles. 
Defenders of employee ownership are often caught up in old ideological debates 
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over whether they are good or bad, and not what makes them good or better. It is 
exactly the necessary process of research and experimentation in employee 
ownership that speaks to the need for mechanisms for agglomerating local 
economic successes and failures into a more global regulatory discussion. 
The reduction of labor to a mere productive input (and of laborers to a 
commodity) is responsible for the growing global disparity, a problem whose 
solution is crucial to a stable and sustainable human future. Legal ideology - 
including that reflected in global organizations such as the ILO - institutionalized 
this view of the labor relationship by limiting itself to a reactive protection against 
the most outrageous abuses. This legal approach should be questioned. The more 
we can unshackle our law from the conceptual legacy of the 20th century the better 
off we will be for facing the new challenges of the 21st century and beyond.   
 
3.29 Long-Term Investors should be the objects of much institutional 
attention, given their potentially stabilizing role. Such investors should 
find an adequate position in any new global financial architecture in 
order to support them with specific policy decisions and incentives 
 
From a purely financial point of view, a long-term investor can be defined as an 
investor who believes that markets will rise over a long period of time, and hopes 
that this long-term trend will offset short-term price volatility; the opposite of a 
long-term investor would be a short-term trader, who will hope to profit from 
market volatility by buying assets at a low price and selling them at a higher price 
within a short period of time. 
There is a concrete institutional possibility to overcome the current 
prevalence of choices determined by short-term strategies in favor of more long-
term oriented responsible forms of corporate investment. As is always the case, 
such a result can in principle be reached by working on the incentives, by 
introducing regulation, or by focusing on the institutional structure of the 
decision-maker. This last structural aspect should be modulated according to 
specific vocation and nature of the “Long-Term Investors”, which requires some 
taxonomic scheme to handle potentially very different global institutional actors. 
We may have private, public and private/public Long-Term Investors, and each 
category may have different legal and structural constraints; different policy 
objectives; therefore different asset allocation models. For example, Long-Term 
Investors may hold controlling shares in strategic corporations for general national 
long-term interests; or for achieving specific policy goals related to sectors such 
as energy and climate change, infrastructure, transport, defense, R&D, education, 
cultural heritage, and the like. 
From a legal perspective, a crucial topic is the desirability of particular 
corporate governance and general legal settings – as well as accounting standards 
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and techniques – for different types of Long-Term Investors like those that 
operate in the public sector, but also institutional investors such as Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, and Hedge Funds. New legal standards may require more 
segmentation (separation) of credit and financial institutions, which may pair with 
corporate governance, accounting and legal constraints on different classes of 
Long-Term Investors.    
Long-term investors are, in fact, prepared to accept risks that short-term 
investors are unwilling to take - they are prepared, for example, to invest a large 
part of their wealth in equity portfolios and to finance infrastructures, the 
profitability of which can only be measured over a very long period, but which 
might be essential for a sustainable future; they stabilize markets and are prepared 
to smooth their gains and losses over time, and publish high quality long-term 
oriented information; they can adopt a counter-cyclical approach, as long as this is 
measured over the time horizon of their investments. 
Long-term investors can be conceptualized as agents carrying on a long-
term plan or vision of their principal. The relationship with the principal, 
shareholder or public authority, must be focused above all on preserving the long-
term character of the investor, and particularly the permanence and stability of its 
liabilities. Special corporate governance rules, legal and accounting constraints 
and/or incentives may also be necessary. 
In the case of a private-sector principal, the relationship should be 
expressed in the accounting and prudential framework, which must reflect the 
investor’s desire to consider his investment as long-term in nature. If the principal 
is in the public sector, the State as a shareholder must undertake to guarantee the 
credibility of the investment through a legal framework, which clearly describes 
the medium-term contractual relationships. It may also maintain long-term control 
of corporations for strategic reasons of national interest, such as industrial policy, 
international cooperation, special needs of certain economically disadvantaged 
areas of the territory, and achievement of social and environmental goals.  
Against the background of future discussions on the necessary changes to 
international financial regulations, we believe that it is both necessary and urgent 
to define a regulatory regime for long-term investors that is both stable and 
appropriate to their mission. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The law is not a technology. It is not a mere system of social engineering. It is not 
an abstract set of black letters that can be objectively followed or interpreted. The 
law lives an intimate, inextricable relationship with the society, the culture and the 
system of political economy it has to govern and from which it is governed. The 
law must be assisted by power in order to function as a vehicle to frame society 
and to materialize the collective will. 
The global economic and financial system is not a technology. It is not an 
object of observation, which follows general scientific laws capable of being 
described by abstract models. The financial system is not a playground where the 
smartest guys in the room should be free to bet with other people’s money. 
Both law and the economic system must be understood as deeply political 
artifacts, through which human forces driven by particular - most often - opposite 
interests shape their future. Global finance is like war waged with different means. 
The attempt to maintain some financial stability through the legal system is the 
purpose of a system of global legal standards for the 21st century. 
Such a proposal, brave and ambitious, must however face the challenge of 
real life - of the concrete circumstances of the current phase of development. 
Above all it has to prove its own good faith. The political economy of the current 
times has entered a phase of crisis serious enough to force even the most powerful 
among the political actors to second-guess most of the ideology of the end of 
history. This report has attempted to assist in a process of self critique that must 
be fully carried out as a pre-condition to look for some new global order through 
the law.  
We had no claim whatsoever of being complete. Our task was only to 
expose from the perspective of the “real life of the law” a variety of false 
assumptions, of concrete problems in the chaotic global legal architecture. We 
have also pointed at some priorities that cannot be procrastinated if capitalism 
credibly wishes to be the human social system for a future. These priorities, 
particularly the immediate and complete remission of the debt of poor countries, 
are the fundamental test of the good faith in attempting to re-establish a global 
order through the law.  
To understand how the political economy of the law might develop after 
the crisis, we should be aware of where we are coming from. Historical memory 
of the past is essential to imagining a long-term future. The eternal present is one 
of the components of the disordered present.            
In a famous book of some years ago, Michel Albert claimed that the end of 
the Cold War would have opened a competition between two different 
conceptions of capitalist development, European Social capitalism and what he 
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called the Neo-American model. The end of history was characterized by the 
triumph of the latter. The historical development of the European capitalist system 
(which deserves attention as the most advanced experiment in legal integration of 
foreign sovereigns) seems to confirm the triumph of privatized corporate 
capitalism as a deep aspect of the current era - the single most important aspect 
that has determined the global financial crisis.   
We observe in fact a clear partition of post-World War II European 
economic history into two distinct phases. The first goes from about 1950 through 
the 1970s. The second arrives to the current day. The main feature of the first 
period was mixed economy, within which strong states interacted with weak, still 
mostly local, markets. The second period has been characterized by an integrated 
market economy within the hegemony of private corporate actors. All European 
countries, albeit differing in speed and intensity, have designed and implemented 
major structural reforms since the mid-1980s, thus favoring these actors. This 
period has featured weaker states and stronger corporate actors. Even evaluated in 
its own terms, it would be difficult to consider this historical unfolding as a 
progress or an evolution. Remarkable growth rates and almost full employment 
rates were the characteristics of the first phase, known as the Golden Age. By 
contrast, sluggish performance in terms of both output and employment, have 
dominated the second phase. Average real GDP growth in European countries was 
4.6% in the period between 1950 and 73 and a mere 2% in the period between 
1980 and 2001. Exceptionally low unemployment rates prevailed in the first 
period, while the highest rates of unemployment ever experienced since the Great 
Depression characterize the present. In a recent book, Robert Reich offers a 
similar picture of the United States, the center and “context of production” of the 
worldly dominant model. In the crib of the Washington Consensus we must 
appreciate an incremental decline of the institutional structures of a capitalist 
system respectful of public order, and the triumph of a corporate super-capitalism 
whose social and even economic performance is nevertheless quite poor. Reich 
also points at an earlier Golden Age. 
Under these conditions it is very tempting to point at the golden past as 
humanists pointed at ancient Greece. Such an approach would be reactionary and 
as such utterly unrealistic. The current crisis deeply questions the paradigm of the 
end of history, an ideal convergence of all the countries of the world towards a 
model that Guy Debord very critically named the “integrated spectacle” born from 
the ashes of the bi-polar world. We cannot indicate one or the other model of 
development of the past as a recipe for the future. They were both an expression 
of the same logic of physical exploitation of the world that it is the necessity of 
our time to overcome. But we must learn from past mistakes as well as from the 
best ideals and practices that the past conveys to us. The future is not in a single 
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thought, neither in politics nor in the law. The future belongs, if at all, to 
pluralism, hybridization, dialogue and mutual respect.  
This crisis puts those of us who still have not understood it in front of 
incontrovertible facts: we have just one planet; human societies are all 
interconnected; and no discrete human group no matter how rich, powerful or 
technologically advanced, can behave as if it were alone on earth, and as if the 
entire planet were the object of its ownership and sovereignty. We can guarantee a 
future for our species only if we are humble enough to tap every legal and 
institutional experience that may propose some reasonable solution for the 
complex aggregate of issues that must be approached. This attitude would be the 
only hope to solve for the first time in history (within history, not outside or at the 
end of it) the daunting problem of a sustainable society where the necessary 
conditions exist for the ideals of “liberté, egalité, fraternité” to unfold.  
The law, the economic system, or the financial system, are all means to 
allow the dignity and the gifts of humans as well as of nature to survive and 
prosper. The law should provide an order to all of this, or at least should not serve 
the disorder that precludes the ultimate end of a society based on peace and 
respect from being achieved.  
Another crucial point that we have emphasized in this Report is that the 
law, in order to be able to govern finance (and more generally the economic 
system) should be based on a collective, public political authority. It should not be 
functional to the profit motive of any private individual or corporation. It should 
be structured to serve the public good. It should find its life in the public spirited 
justice motive of each and every individual in different societies. The nature of 
law as a public good is perhaps its only universally-recognized structural 
character. The privatization of law at the service of narrow special interests is its 
single most important degeneration supported by the ideological construction of 
the end of history. This degeneration must be cured.  Either the law is a public 
good serving the public interest (i.e. the interest of stability, order and justice 
towards everybody that enters in contact with it) or it is not law. The legal 
standards for the 21st century must be a public good produced by a highly-
inclusive global political process. Otherwise, they are not going to be law, but just 
another source of disorder and plunder. 
The knowledge of the past and the critical appreciation of the present can 
bring us into the future. A future that itself must belong to everybody - and no one 
should live in the illusion that it can be privatized in the interest of some (the rich 
and the powerful market-dominant minority). Global law cannot be seen as an end 
in itself, but as a means to protect interests that humankind collectively decides 
are worth of protection. This approach is reflected in the fundamental claim of this 
Report for a new broader vision of the commons and of the public goods. 
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It is imperative to re-think access to the public and common resources, 
starting from the “commons”. Not only individuals but also communities have 
rights; not only humans but also nature has rights, as recently recognized by 
Article 10 of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008. Hence, a reflection is urgent on 
the process of progressive corrosion and reduction of common resources 
worldwide, and the recurrent privatization of public goods through sale or private 
management that seems to be a structural consequence of the global triumph of 
corporate capitalism at the end of history. In fact, as long as the State was holding 
a dominant role in the essential public services, it was not of immediate need to 
distinguish common from public goods. However, starting from the 1990s, the 
situation changed when the management of these goods gradually passed to 
private entities (corporations) in many countries, leaving in the hands of public 
institutions (only if at all) the formal ownership of the goods, and an undefined 
and most always weak power of control and external regulation. As a 
consequence, almost everywhere, the dominant interpretation of competition and 
efficiency has marginalized the interests of the local territories and communities, 
and the social aim of public services; it has emphasized growth and development 
offered by multinational corporate and financial investments in complete oblivion 
of their social costs. 
To be sure, both in industrial and in poor countries, the possibility to 
realize big business in situations of natural monopolies, through the exploitation 
of the goods of collective property and the involvement of multinational 
corporations is very attractive for the political elites. The weakness of the present 
regulatory framework and global institutional systems is in no little part caused by 
an outdated conceptual framework, which is unable to respond to the new 
demands of an ordered management and regulation of collective long-term 
interests of communities and future generations. It is thus necessary to define new 
categories capable to take into consideration the rights of human civilization as a 
common good in the broadest sense. 
In the outlined perspective, the “Commons” are goods that, beyond their 
property title might be public or even private (think of a forest), fulfil by natural 
vocation social and economic and survival interests of the very same community 
of humans and nature. Hence, commons belong to all individuals, and the law 
must protect and preserve them for the benefit of future generations. There are 
daunting legal issues open to preserve goods that are predominantly of the natural 
and cultural heritage, like the rivers, streams and springs, lakes and other waters, 
air, parks, forests and wooded areas, mountainous areas of high altitude, glaciers 
and perennial snows, beaches and stretches of coastline declared an environmental 
reserve, wildlife and flora, and finally archaeological, cultural, environmental and 
other protected landscape areas. 
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In other words, all such and other commons, beyond the title of property, 
are characterized by a destination of general utility. Therefore, they are goods 
instrumental to the achievement of economic-social and territorial cohesion and 
the fulfilment of fundamental rights. As a result, the sound management of these 
goods should be able to “enrich” the community and territory of reference within 
the logic of solidarity and social justice.  
Most often private or public economic, financial and development activity 
endangers the commons. To be apt to serve the needs of the 21th century, global 
legal standards must be capable of protecting the commons by developing within 
their structure a grammar capable of handling these very concrete issues - always 
serving as a reminder that one world is a gigantic common and the final tragedy is 
a most likely possibility. 
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